Experiments on the r.n.s. (real nervous system) and monkey memory

I am afraid that I find a title such as 'The logical analysis of cerebral functions’ irresistible. With what can it be contrasted except ‘The illogical analysis of cerebral functions’ ? Logic is a set of rules that allows one to deduce certain conclusions from certain assumptions. It is best carried out while sitting in an armchair or, nowadays, in a swivel chair in front of a computer console. But, of course, everything depends on the assumptions, and given any set of assumptions it is only a matter of time before, in principle, all possible conclusions can be listed exhaustively. Then, one can compare some of the conclusions with actual empirical results, provided one has the necessary connecting assumptions. This is a classical strategy. But given the peculiar past history and present state of our knowledge about cerebral functions, I am afraid that I am driven to embrace a contrasting approach of an ‘illogical analysis of cerebral functions’. Or, perhaps I should say I prefer an analysis of cerebral function that depends on inference rather than deduction. Deduction is an all-or none affair. It either leads to the brilliant break-through or to the scrap heap, or at least to the repair shop for patching or remoulding. In the history of our subject the scrap merchants have grown rich. I prefer a state of affairs where the assumptions stem from the conclusions rather than the conclusions from the assumptions. The problem of the analysis of cerebral function, as I see it, is that an organism both behaves, with all that can be elaborated by that word, and it also possesses a brain. But the two universes of discourse are quite different—there is nothing that we can say in making an assertion about the possession of a cranium that overlaps with descriptions about behaviour, except that without such a possession no behaviour is displayed for long. That is not a remarkable statement nor even one restricted to possession of an intact cranium: it applies equally forcefully to other vital organs. But somehow we have reached the point where we have more than a shrewd suspicion that the two are not independent—and it is by no means immediately obvious that they are not, as evidenced by the Greek hypothesis that the brain was a device merely for cooling the blood. But how do we study the mutual interaction? I suspect that one rather good way is by following the same steps that have already led us, over the centuries, to the firm view that there is some connexion between brain and behaviour. But progress has been painfully slow, and we are impatient.