scholarly journals On the nature of the function expressive of the law of human mortality, and on a new mode of determining the value of life contingencies. In a letter to Francis Baily, Esq. F. R. S. &c. By Benjamin Gompertz, Esq. F. R. S

This paper, which professes to be a continuation of former researches on the same subject printed in the Transactions of the Royal Society, is divided into two chapters. In the first the author considers the nature of the law of those numbers in tables of mortality, which express the amount of persons living at the end of ages in regular arithmetical progression. He remarks that for short intervals the law approaches nearly to a decreasing geometrical progression, and that this must be the case whatever be the strict expression for the law of mortality, provided the intervals do not exceed certain limits. But he further remarks, that this property will be found to belong to very extensive portions of tables of mortality, and instances Deparcieux’s tables, where from the age of 25 to that of 45, the numbers living at the end of each year decrease very nearly in geometrical progression. Considering however the whole extent of such a table, it will be found that the ratio of this geometrical progression is not the same in all parts of the table. But before he enters on this consideration, the author draws some consequences from the hypothesis of a geometrical progression being the strict law of nature after a certain age. One of these is the equality of value of all life annuities commencing after that age. Another is, that the want of instances in history of persons living to very enormous ages (waving those of the patriarchs,) is no proof that such may not be the law of nature, as he shows by calculation, that out of 3,000,000 persons of 92, not more than one should on this supposition reach 192. This leads him to some general considerations on the causes of death, after which he resumes the consideration of the general law of the tables.

2021 ◽  
pp. 222-250
Author(s):  
Stuart Banner

This chapter examines the status of natural law in the legal system over the past century. In law schools, natural law never ceased to be a topic of study. This academic interest in natural law has had almost no effect on the working legal system, where natural law has been relied upon by only the most idiosyncratic of judges and lawyers. The history of our use of natural law has nevertheless continued to exert influence on the legal system, which still contains doctrines and practices that were once based on the law of nature.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diego Lucci

In their attempts to revive “true religion,” Locke and several English deists, such as Toland, Tindal, Chubb, Morgan, and Annet, focused on the relationship between the Law of Nature, the Law of Moses, and Christ’s teaching. However, Locke and the deists formulated different conceptions of the Law of Nature and its relationship with natural religion, Mosaic Judaism, and primitive Christianity. Locke saw the history of human knowledge of morality and religion as a process of gradual disclosure of divinely given truths—a process culminating in Christian revelation. He argued that the Law of Faith, established by Christ, had complemented the Law of Nature and superseded the Law of Moses. Conversely, the deists maintained that the only true religion was the universal, eternal, necessary, and sufficient religion of nature founded on the Law of Nature. They thought that Jesus had merely reaffirmed the Law of Nature, accessible to natural reason, without adding anything to it. Concerning Mosaic Judaism, there were significant differences between Toland and later deists. Toland considered Mosaic Judaism to be on a par with primitive Christianity, since he viewed both the Law of Moses and Christ’s precepts as essentially grounded in the Law of Nature. Conversely, Tindal and Chubb judged the ritual prescriptions of the Mosaic Law superseded by Christ’s revival of natural religion. Morgan and Annet went even further, for they identified true Christianity with the religion of nature, but criticized Mosaic Judaism as a corruption of natural religion. Briefly, Locke and the English deists aimed to recover true religion from long-lasting distortions. However, their rethinking of the relationship between the Law of Nature, the Mosaic Law, and Christ’s message led to different conceptions, uses, and appropriations of natural religion, Mosaic Judaism, and primitive Christianity in their attempts to restore what they perceived as true religion.


1937 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Montell Ogdon

The protection of unhampered and free exercise of the diplomatic function was recognized as one of the fundamental purposes of the law of diplomatic immunity in the Havana Convention of 1928, and in the Draft Convention of the Harvard Research Committee, 1932. The idea is not a new one—it has long been considered necessary that the channels of intercourse between States be made secure. Even before the political institutions of man began to play an important role in the life of peoples, nations or tribes recognized that it was necessary to treat with each other and guarantee security to messengers in order to advance their mutual interests. The history of the juristic philosophy of diplomatic immunity indicates that there are three periods of development in which the protection of the diplomatic function was deemed to be the purpose of the law, viz., (a) in antiquity, particularly in the universal law of Greece and Rome; (b) in the philosophy of the law-of-nature school, from the twelfth century to the seventeenth; (c) in the precedents of the modern Statessystem and the views of positivist writers, especially since the seventeenth century


1901 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
Frederick Pollock

Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1(64)) ◽  
pp. 179-203
Author(s):  
Bartosz Włodarski

Between Philosophy and Science – Reflections on the French Roots of Political Science at the Cracovian University in the Era of Kołłątaj’s Reforms This paper aims to present the history of the political sciences at the Academy of Cracow during its reorganisation by Hugo Kołłataj in the 18th century. Kołłątaj and other patriots – professors and representatives of the law faculty, precursors of French physiocratic political doctrine in Poland – established „The Chair of the Law of Nature, Economical and Political Law and Law of Nations”. It was the institutional and theoretical base for all political sciences at that time. The plan of developing this particular branch of science was put into practice by Antoni Popławski – great philosopher, reformer and the author of the first book on physiocracy in Poland inspired by dr. Quesnay’s doctrine. The article also presents the origin of the 20th century’s modern political sciences rooted in the knowledge of the 18th Central Crown School – at present known as the Jagiellonian University.


2001 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
D J Ibbetson

If you scan through the law reports ofthe last century or so, you will come across a sprinkling of references to Natural Law, commonly in conjunction with some such phrase as “manifest nonsense”.1 Introductory books dealing with the sources of law hardly place it in the forefront of their treatment, to say the least; and anyone writing a practitioners' manual on some practically useful area of law who began with a chapter on Natural Law would be thought to have taken leave of his senses. Go back two or three hundred years or so and the picture looks very different. References to the law of nature abound in the reports of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; institutional writers dealing with the Common Law will regularly list Natural Law as one of its principal sources, and when Stewart Kyd wrote the first English book on what we would now call company law2 the obvious starting pointfor his first chapter was the work of the Natural Lawyers of the previous century. England, like everywhere else in Europe, had been caught up in a fervour of Natural Law thinking. Legal historians, of course, are well aware of this, but commonly portray it in their books as part of the background against which the Common Law was worked out, rather than as an integral part ofthe story of English law's development.3 This downplaying of the practical significance of Natural Law represents something of a lost opportunity, not merely because it can give a frame of reference within which some sense can be made ofthe reorientation of English law in the eighteenth century, but also because it provides an important point ofcontact between the all-too-insular history ofEnglish law and the apparently more homogeneous legal history of the rest of Europe.


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