scholarly journals The benefits of being seen to help others: indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner choice

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Roberts ◽  
Nichola Raihani ◽  
Redouan Bshary ◽  
Héctor M. Manrique ◽  
Andrea Farina ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Partner Choice ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Strategic Investment ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Signalling Theory

When one individual helps another, it benefits the recipient and may also gain a reputation for being cooperative. This may induce others to favour the helper in subsequent interactions, so investing in being seen to help others may be adaptive. The best-known mechanism for this is indirect reciprocity (IR), in which the profit comes from an observer who pays a cost to benefit the original helper. IR has attracted considerable theoretical and empirical interest, but it is not the only way in which cooperative reputations can bring benefits. Signalling theory proposes that paying a cost to benefit others is a strategic investment which benefits the signaller through changing receiver behaviour, in particular by being more likely to choose the signaller as a partner. This reputation-based partner choice can result in competitive helping whereby those who help are favoured as partners. These theories have been confused in the literature. We therefore set out the assumptions, the mechanisms and the predictions of each theory for how developing a cooperative reputation can be adaptive. The benefits of being seen to be cooperative may have been a major driver of sociality, especially in humans. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

scholarly journals Gossip and competitive altruism support cooperation in a Public Good game

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Giardini ◽  
Daniele Vilone ◽  
Angel Sánchez ◽  
Alberto Antonioni
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Competitive Altruism

When there is an opportunity to gain a positive reputation, individuals are more willing to sacrifice their immediate self-interest. Partner choice creates opportunities for competitive altruism, i.e. individuals compete to be regarded as more generous and to be chosen for future partnerships. Tests of the competitive altruism hypothesis have focused so far on reputation based on direct observation, whereas the role of gossip has not been theoretically and empirically addressed. Partner choice can create an incentive to cooperate and to send truthful messages, but it can also work in the opposite direction. In order to understand the consequences of partner choice on cooperation and gossip, we designed an experimental study in which participants played a sequence of Public Goods games and gossip rounds. In our two treatments, we observed that cooperation increased when there was an opportunity to be selected, but also that cooperators sent more honest messages than defectors, and that this strategy was prevalent in the treatment in which inter-group competition was implemented. We also found evidence that participants detached themselves from the information more often when lying. Taken together, our study fills a theoretical and empirical gap by showing that partner choice increases both cooperation and honesty of gossip. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

scholarly journals Gossip and reputation in everyday life

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Terence D. Dores Cruz ◽  
Isabel Thielmann ◽  
Simon Columbus ◽  
Catherine Molho ◽  
Junhui Wu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Daily Life ◽  
Community Sample ◽  
Partner Selection ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Daily Events ◽  
Shared Information

Gossip—a sender communicating to a receiver about an absent third party—is hypothesized to impact reputation formation, partner selection, and cooperation. Laboratory experiments have found that people gossip about others' cooperativeness and that they use gossip to condition their cooperation. Here, we move beyond the laboratory and test several predictions from theories of indirect reciprocity and reputation-based partner selection about the content of everyday gossip and how people use it to update the reputation of others in their social network. In a Dutch community sample ( N = 309), we sampled daily events in which people either sent or received gossip about a target over 10 days ( n gossip = 5284). Gossip senders frequently shared information about targets’ cooperativeness and did so in ways that minimize potential retaliation from targets. Receivers overwhelmingly believed gossip to be true and updated their evaluation of targets based on gossip. In turn, a positive shift in the evaluation of a target was associated with higher intentions to help them in future interactions, and with lower intentions to avoid them in the future. Thus, gossip is used in daily life to impact and update reputations in a way that enables partner selection and indirect reciprocity. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

scholarly journals Honesty and dishonesty in gossip strategies: a fitness interdependence analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhui Wu ◽  
Szabolcs Számadó ◽  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Bianca Beersma ◽  
Terence D. Dores Cruz ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Perfect Match ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Simple Rule ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Partial Match ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Conflicting Interests

Gossip, or sharing information about absent others, has been identified as an effective solution to free rider problems in situations with conflicting interests. Yet, the information transmitted via gossip can be biased, because gossipers may send dishonest information about others for personal gains. Such dishonest gossip makes reputation-based cooperation more difficult to evolve. But when are people likely to share honest or dishonest gossip? We build formal models to provide the theoretical foundation for individuals' gossip strategies, taking into account the gossiper's fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target. Our models across four different games suggest a very simple rule: when there is a perfect match (mismatch) between fitness interdependence and the effect of honest gossip, the gossiper should always be honest (dishonest); however, in the case of a partial match, the gossiper should make a choice based on their fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target and the marginal cost/benefit in terms of pay-off differences caused by possible choices of the receiver and the target in the game. Moreover, gossipers can use this simple rule to make optimal decisions even under noise. We discuss empirical examples that support the predictions of our model and potential extensions. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

scholarly journals Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Károly Takács ◽  
Jörg Gross ◽  
Martina Testori ◽  
Srebrenka Letina ◽  
Adam R. Kenny ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Identity Formation ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Field Studies ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Shared Information ◽  
Network Topologies

Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from information exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and large-scale societies. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

scholarly journals Parochial cooperation and the emergence of signalling norms

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wojtek Przepiorka ◽  
Andreas Diekmann
Keyword(s):  
Partner Choice ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Scarce Resources ◽  
Potential Applications ◽  
Life Threatening ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Why do people adorn themselves with elaborate body piercings or tattoos, wear obstructing garbs, engage in life-threatening competitions and other wasteful and harmful but socially stipulated practices? Norms of cooperation and coordination, which promote the efficient attainment of collective benefits, can be explained by theories of collective action. However, social norms prescribing wasteful and harmful behaviours have eluded such explanations. We argue that signalling theory constitutes the basis for the understanding of the emergence of such norms, which we call signalling norms. Signalling norms emerge as a result of the uncertainty about who is a friend and who is a foe. The need to overcome this uncertainty arises when different groups compete for scarce resources and individuals must be able to identify, trust and cooperate with their fellow group members. After reviewing the mechanisms that explain the emergence of cooperation and coordination norms, we introduce the notion of signalling norms as markers of group distinction. We argue that adherence to signalling norms constitutes a commitment promoting parochial cooperation rather than a quality-revealing signal facilitating partner choice. We formalize our argument in a game-theoretic model that allows us to specify the boundary conditions for the emergence of signalling norms. Our paper concludes with a discussion of potential applications of our model and a comparison of signalling norms with related concepts. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

The Evolution of Charismatic Cultures

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 254-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Bulbulia ◽  
Marcus Frean
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
The Body ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Common Solution ◽  
Cooperative Strategies ◽  
Signalling Theory

AbstractThe following essay explains how religion may evolve to support cooperation among anonymous partners. It first reviews honest signalling theory, and reveals a limitation in the model’s capacity to explain large-scale cooperation. It then suggests that much cooperation is threatened by uncertainty, rather than by cheating. Finally, it explains how signalling theory can be extended to address the problem of cooperation threatened by uncertainty, ‘fragile cooperation’. The resulting extension of signalling theory—called ‘charismatic signalling’—directs attention to potential cooperative benefits from religion’s fascinating and diverse effects on the body. The charismatic signalling model is presented as a ‘how-possibly model’, not as a ‘just-so story’. The model’s interest comes from its ability to organise seemingly unrelated puzzles under a common solution, and to motivate the study of cooperative strategies harboured in shared ecologies.

scholarly journals Honest signalling with costly gambles

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (87) ◽  
pp. 20130469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frazer Meacham ◽  
Aaron Perlmutter ◽  
Carl T. Bergstrom
Keyword(s):  
Average Cost ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Signalling Theory ◽  
Signalling Models ◽  
Signalling Games ◽  
Fundamental Mechanism

Costly signalling theory is commonly invoked as an explanation for how honest communication can be stable when interests conflict. However, the signal costs predicted by costly signalling models often turn out to be unrealistically high. These models generally assume that signal cost is determinate. Here, we consider the case where signal cost is instead stochastic. We examine both discrete and continuous signalling games and show that, under reasonable assumptions, stochasticity in signal costs can decrease the average cost at equilibrium for all individuals. This effect of stochasticity for decreasing signal costs is a fundamental mechanism that probably acts in a wide variety of circumstances.

Competitive morality

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-98
Author(s):  
Gilbert Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Partner Choice ◽  
Strategic Investment ◽  
Moral Conduct ◽  
Competitive Altruism

AbstractBaumard et al. argue that partner choice leads to fairness and mutualism, which then form the basis for morality. I comment that mutualism takes us only so far, and I apply the theory of competitive altruism in arguing how strategic investment in behaviours which make one a desirable partner may drive moral conduct.

scholarly journals Evolution of passwords for cost-free honest signalling between symbionts and hosts

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Archetti ◽  
J. Benjamin Miller ◽  
Douglas W. Yu
Keyword(s):  
Mate Choice ◽  
Species Recognition ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Potential Conflict ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Complex Species ◽  
Juvenile Mortality ◽  
Honest Signals ◽  
Soft Selection

AbstractHonest communication between potential partners with conflicting interests is generally thought to require costly signals. Costly signalling can explain partner choice when it is possible to link a strategic cost to an individual’s quality, like in mate choice. However, in mutualisms, it is usually impossible to link a cost to the likelihood that a potential partner will behave cooperatively in the future. In fact, signals like Nod factors in rhizobial bacteria, which form symbioses with leguminous plants, are evidence of cost-free, honest signals in situations of potential conflict. How can such a signalling system evolve? We use a population-genetics model to show that a cost-free, honest signal can evolve when the receiver is under soft selection, which is when high juvenile mortality does not lead to a corresponding reduction in fitness, a common occurrence in many species. Under soft selection, senders evolve increasingly complex messages of identity, a system akin to a password or a lock and key. Thus, a symbiont can signal that it shares a coevolutionary history with a potential host, and if that history is mutualistic, then the host can believe that the symbiont is mutualistic. Password signalling might also explain the acquisition of some defensive symbionts and the evolution of complex species-recognition signals in mate choice. “…Say now Shibboleth: and he said Sibboleth: for he could not frame to pronounce it right. Then they took him, and slew him….” — Judges 12:6, King James Version

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