Cheater suppression and spite through quorum sensing
The evolutionary consequences of quorum sensing in regulating bacterial cooperation are not fully understood. In this study, we reveal unexpected consequences of regulating public good production through quorum sensing on bacterial population dynamics, showing that quorum sensing can be a "spiteful" alternative to unregulated production. We analyze a birth-death model of bacterial population dynamics accounting for public good production and the presence of non-producing cheaters. Our model demonstrates that when demographic noise is a factor, the consequences of controlling public good production according to quorum sensing depend on the cost of public good production and the presence of alternative sources of the fitness benefits provided by public goods. When public good production is inexpensive, quorum sensing is a spiteful alternative to unconditional production, in terms of the mean population extinction time. When costs are higher, quorum sensing becomes a selfish strategy for the producing strain, both stabilizing cooperation and decreasing the risk of population extinction.