scholarly journals Contribution of self- and other-regarding motives to (dis)honesty

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anastasia Shuster ◽  
Dino J Levy

AbstractWhy would people tell the truth when there is an obvious gain in lying and no risk of being caught? Previous work suggests the involvement of two motives, self-interest and regard for others. However, it remains unknown if these motives are related or independently contribute to (dis)honesty, and what are the neural instantiations of these motives. Using a modified Message Game task, in which a Sender sends a dishonest (yet profitable) or honest (less profitable) message to a Receiver, we found that these two motives contributed to dishonesty independently. Furthermore, the two motives involve distinct brain networks: the LPFC tracked potential value to self, whereas the rTPJ tracked potential losses to other, and individual differences in motives modulated these neural responses. Finally, activity in the vmPFC represented a balance of the two motives unique to each participant. Taken together, our results suggest that (dis)honest decisions incorporate at least two separate cognitive and neural processes – valuation of potential profits to self and valuation of potential harm to others.

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anastasia Shuster ◽  
Dino J. Levy

Abstract Why would people tell the truth when there is an obvious gain in lying and no risk of being caught? Previous work suggests the involvement of two motives, self-interest and regard for others. However, it remains unknown if these motives are related or distinctly contribute to (dis)honesty, and what are the neural instantiations of these motives. Using a modified Message Game task, in which a Sender sends a dishonest (yet profitable) or honest (less profitable) message to a Receiver, we found that these two motives contributed to dishonesty independently. Furthermore, the two motives involve distinct brain networks: the LPFC tracked potential value to self, whereas the rTPJ tracked potential losses to other, and individual differences in motives modulated these neural responses. Finally, activity in the vmPFC represented a balance of the two motives unique to each participant. Taken together, our results suggest that (dis)honest decisions incorporate at least two separate cognitive and neural processes—valuation of potential profits to self and valuation of potential harm to others.


Author(s):  
Joshua May

This chapter introduces the long-standing idea that inappropriate motives, such as self-interest, can militate against virtuous motivation (acting for the right reasons). Some theorists have tried to show that we are universally egoistic by appeal to empirical research, particularly evolutionary theory, moral development, and the neuroscience of learning. However, these efforts fail and instead decades of experiments on helping behavior provide powerful evidence that we are capable of genuine altruism. We can be motivated ultimately by a concern for others for their own sake, especially when empathizing with them. The evidence does not show that empathy blurs the distinction between self and other in a way that makes helping behavior truly egoistic or non-altruistic. Whether grounded in Christian love (agape) or the Buddhist notion of no-self (anātman), such self-other merging proposals run into empirical and conceptual difficulties.


1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Andre

Self-regarding acts are frequently classified as non-moral; even more frequently, they are assumed to have less moral weight than parallel other-regarding acts. I argue briefly against the first claim, and at greater length against the second. Our intuitions about the lesser moral weight of self-regarding acts arise from imperfectly recognized, and morally relevant, differences between acts which are ordinarily described in misleadingly parallel phrases. ‘Love of self,’ for instance, and ‘love of another’ are not symmetrical attitudes, in spite of the symmetrical grammar. More obviously, one cannot steal from, lie to, nor force oneself in the same way one can do these things to others. I conclude, therefore, that difference in moral weight never stems merely from a difference in the person concerned (myself or another), but rather from differences between the actions themselves; furthermore, that whatever it is wrong to do to a willing other, it is wrong to do to oneself.


2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
John T. Cacioppo ◽  
Catherine J. Norris ◽  
Jean Decety ◽  
George Monteleone ◽  
Howard Nusbaum

Prior research has shown that perceived social isolation (loneliness) motivates people to attend to and connect with others but to do so in a self-protective and paradoxically self-defeating fashion. Although recent research has shed light on the neural correlates of social perception, cooperation, empathy, rejection, and love, little is known about how individual differences in loneliness relate to neural responses to social and emotional stimuli. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we show that there are at least two neural mechanisms differentiating social perception in lonely and nonlonely young adults. For pleasant depictions, lonely individuals appear to be less rewarded by social stimuli, as evidenced by weaker activation of the ventral striatum to pictures of people than of objects, whereas nonlonely individuals showed stronger activation of the ventral striatum to pictures of people than of objects. For unpleasant depictions, lonely individuals were characterized by greater activation of the visual cortex to pictures of people than of objects, suggesting that their attention is drawn more to the distress of others, whereas nonlonely individuals showed greater activation of the right and left temporo-parietal junction to pictures of people than of objects, consistent with the notion that they are more likely to reflect spontaneously on the perspective of distressed others.


2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chae M. Jaynes ◽  
Thomas A. Loughran

Objectives: We examined the relationship between social preference game behavior and offender status and tested whether this relationship was attributed to genuine prosocial preferences or confounded by individual differences in future orientation, sensation seeking, and risk-taking. Methods: Offender and nonoffender samples played the dictator and ultimatum games. Ordered and generalized ordered logistic regression models were used to test the hypothesis that when compared to nonoffenders, offenders would demonstrate increased self-interest, while also considering competing theoretical mechanisms. Results: Offenders appeared to be more self-interested as indicated by smaller offers in the dictator game. This relationship, however, was attributed to differences in future orientation between the two groups rather than differences in social preferences. Net of demographic controls and competing theoretical mechanisms, however, offenders made smaller offers in the ultimatum game. We argue this finding revealed differences in strategic decision-making between the two groups. Conclusions: Results suggested that offenders were not distinguishable from nonoffenders by individual differences in social preferences. While nonoffenders made larger offers in both games, this finding was attributed to differences in temporal orientation and risk-taking rather than differences in prosocial preferences. This supported the rational choice assumption of self-interest and highlighted differences in strategic decision-making between offenders and nonoffenders.


2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 598-615
Author(s):  
Gavin Heron ◽  
Claire Lightowler

Abstract Concerns have been raised about the quality of child-care professionals’ critical thinking and analytical skills. This study examines the critical thinking demonstrated by professionals when discussing risk in relation to vulnerable children. Data were collected from thirty consultation meetings, each of which focused on assessing the risks of a child who presented a serious threat of harm to others. Discourse analysis is used to examine the way in which critical thinking about risk is discussed at the consultation meetings. The findings suggest that critical thinking is demonstrated by professionals in ways that differentiate between potential harm and actual harm, and in relation to harm children pose to themselves and to other people. Also, the willingness of professionals to ask relevant questions and challenge each other is an important way of prompting individuals to demonstrate critical thinking. However, professionals tend to demonstrate a relatively narrow conceptualisation of critical thinking. This narrow conceptualisation cannot be reduced solely to the abilities or traits of an individual or professional group and it is argued that the bureaucratic and procedural demands of organisations in relation to vulnerable children may be an important factor in limiting the way professionals demonstrate critical thinking.


2003 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
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AbstractDuring the past decades the Western countries have paid attention to their Mental Health legislation, in particular, by making changes concerning involuntary treatment. In Western countries legislation allows involuntary treatmentof the mentally ill. Involuntary psychiatric treatment is motivated by either potential harm to others (for the good of society) or by need for treatment and/or potential self-harm (for the good of the patient). The aims of this study were to describe to what extent the danger to others criterion is used as a motivation for involuntary hospitalization and detainment in Finland, and to what kind of patients this criterion is applied. The study involves a retrospective chart review of all the treatment periods of a six month admission sample in three Finnish university hospitals. We found that potential harm to others has been rarely used as a motivation for involuntary referral or detainment together with other motivations, and virtually never as the sole motivation. With the exception of gender, which was most often male, patients with potential harm to others did not differ significantly from other involuntarily treated patients. Coercion (defined as seclusion, the use of restraints, forced medication, physical restraint or restrictions in leaving the ward) was not used with these patients more regularly than with the patients motivated by the other criteria. Length of stay (LOS) in a psychiatric hospital did not differ between the patients determined harmful to others and the other involuntarily treated patients.


2020 ◽  
Vol 87 (9) ◽  
pp. S441
Author(s):  
Shengchuang Feng ◽  
George Christopoulos ◽  
Julia Julien ◽  
Pearl Chiu ◽  
Brooks King-Casas

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Bryant ◽  
Elpiniki Andrew ◽  
Mayuresh S. Korgaonkar

Abstract Background Prolonged grief disorder (PGD) has recently been recognized as a separate psychiatric diagnosis, despite controversy over the extent to which it is distinctive from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and major depressive disorder (MDD). Methods This study investigated distinctive neural processes underpinning emotion processing in participants with PGD, PTSD, and MDD with functional magnetic resonance study of 117 participants that included PGD (n = 21), PTSD (n = 45), MDD (n = 26), and bereaved controls (BC) (n = 25). Neural responses were measured across the brain while sad, happy, or neutral faces were presented at both supraliminal and subliminal levels. Results PGD had greater activation in the pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pgACC), bilateral insula, bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortices and right caudate and also greater pgACC–right pallidum connectivity relative to BC during subliminal processing of happy faces. PGD was distinct relative to both PTSD and MDD groups with greater recruitment of the medial orbitofrontal cortex during supraliminal processing of sad faces. PGD were also distinct relative to MDD (but not PTSD) with greater activation in the left amygdala, caudate, and putamen during subliminal presentation of sad faces. There was no distinction between PGD, PTSD, and MDD during processing of happy faces. Conclusions These results provide initial evidence of distinct neural profiles of PGD relative to related psychopathological conditions, and highlight activation of neural regions implicated in reward networks. This pattern of findings validates current models of PGD that emphasize the roles of yearning and appetitive processes in PGD.


Author(s):  
Harvey S. James

Although an extensive literature examines how moral character and environmental context relates to ethical awareness, judgment and behaviour, very little work focuses on the ethics of farmers. Understanding farmer ethics is important because farmers face unique pressures and constraints that affect their ethical judgments and behaviours. Research shows that there are different types of ethical problems that farmers have to deal with, such as actions that cause harm or potential harm to others, the environment and non-human animals, and actions that are defined as wrong by law, contract or agreement. Important pressures and constraints affecting farmer ethics include increasing production costs and land prices, rising debt and worsening financial health, more stringent government rules and regulations, and reduced options for producing and marketing agricultural products.


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