A dynamic evolutionary game model of web celebrity brand eWOM marketing control strategy

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mengjie Liao ◽  
Jian Zhang ◽  
Ruimei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Media ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretical Research ◽  
Dynamic Visualization ◽  
Formal Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Marketing Environment

PurposeThis paper aims to recognize whether government policy supervision or social network platform supervision can effectively promote the control of misconducts of web celebrity brand eWOM marketing and to identify the key factors influencing the unhealthy web celebrity marketing environment.Design/methodology/approachTheoretical research was employed to develop a practical approach for applying evolutionary game theory to eWOM marketing controlling strategies modeling via dynamic visualization, systematic simulation experiments.FindingsEvolutionary game theory combined with dynamic simulation modeling can provide a formal approach to understanding web celebrity brand eWOM marketing decision-making in social media, which can thus support the control of unhealthy web celebrity marketing environment. The results demonstrate that the reasonable control of social platform control costs may be more effective than the government policy on web celebrity fake brand eWOM marketing behaviors.Originality/valueThe study enriches the research on the management and control of eWOM marketing as well as provides guidance for the sustainable development of the web celebrity economy in social media.

Trust strategy simulation of corporation–NPO cross alliance using evolutionary game theory

Kybernetes ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 450-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yidan Chen ◽  
Lanying Sun
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Trust Relationships

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamics and evolution of trust in organizational cross alliances. Design/methodology/approach In alliances between corporations and nonprofit organizations, trust in decision-making is a dynamic process. Using the replicated dynamics model of evolutionary game theory, this paper provides a trust decision model and analyzes four scenarios under different parameters. A numerical simulation is developed to present an intuitive interpretation of the dynamic development of trust decisions and the effects of incentive and punishment mechanisms. Findings Under different parameters, bounded rationality and utilities result in different but stable evolutionary strategies; the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy leads directly to whether participants adopt the strategy when the system reaches stability after continued games; and incentive and punishment mechanisms can significantly reduce the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy where the system evolves to meet stable state needs. Practical implications The establishment of trust relationships is an important influence on the stable and coordinated development of an alliance. The proposed model can help the alliance build closer trust relationships and provide a theoretical basis for the design of the trust mechanism. Originality/value Incentive and punishment bound by some degree of trust are introduced to address the problems of trust decisions and their dynamics; the model created reflects the bounded rationality and utility of each game stage. Useful evolutionary stable strategies using different variables are proposed to address the decision-making problems of trust in cross alliances.

Research on the Stability of Photovoltaic Industrial Chain under the Condition of Bounded Rationality

2011 ◽  
Vol 361-363 ◽  
pp. 1279-1284
Author(s):  
Wei Min Sun ◽  
Jin Sheng Shen
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Primary State ◽  
Industrial Chain ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Stable Development ◽  
Spontaneous Evolution

Under the condition of bounded rationality, make use of evolutionary game theory to analyze the stability between node enterprises of photovoltaic industrial chain. In the process of spontaneous evolution, the strategy of upstream and downstream enterprises of photovoltaic industrial chain depends on their primary state strongly. However, under the guidance of government policy, all upstream and downstream enterprises in photovoltaic industrial chain adopt cooperative strategy to guarantee its stable development, which reflects the important roles of government policy orientation in the development of emerging industrial chain.

scholarly journals A review on graphical evolutionary game for information diffusion on social networks

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-271
Author(s):  
Benliu Qiu ◽  
Ningxuan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Networks ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Information Diffusion ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Biological Evolution ◽  
Technology Research ◽  
Static State ◽  
Content Type

Purpose With the recent development of science and technology, research on information diffusion has become increasingly important. Design/methodology/approach To analyze the process of information diffusion, researchers have proposed a framework with graphical evolutionary game theory (EGT) according to the theory of biological evolution. Findings Through this method, one can study and even predict information diffusion. Originality/value This paper summarizes three existing works using graphical EGT to discuss how to obtain the static state and the dynamics of information diffusion in social network.

scholarly journals Evolutionary information dynamics over social networks: a review

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-59
Author(s):  
Hangjing Zhang ◽  
Yan Chen ◽  
H. Vicky Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Networks ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Information Diffusion ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Information ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Information Dynamics ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Rumor Control

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to have a review on the analysis of information diffusion based on evolutionary game theory. People now get used to interact over social networks, and one of the most important functions of social networks is information sharing. Understanding the mechanisms of the information diffusion over social networks is critical to various applications including online advertisement and rumor control. Design/methodology/approach It has been shown that the graphical evolutionary game theory (EGT) is a very efficient method to study this problem. Findings By applying EGT to information diffusion, the authors could predict every small change in the process, get the detailed dynamics and finally foretell the stable states. Originality/value In this paper, the authors provide a general review on the evolutionary game-theoretic framework for information diffusion over social network by summarizing the results and conclusions of works using graphical EGT.

Wholesale-retail pricing strategies under market risk and uncertain demand in supply chain using evolutionary game theory

Kybernetes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 1178-1201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashkan Hafezalkotob ◽  
Reza Mahmoudi ◽  
Elham Hajisami ◽  
Hui Ming Wee
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Wholesale Pricing

Purpose Nowadays, uncertainty in market demand poses considerable risk to the retailers that supply the market. On the other hand, the risk-averse behaviors of retailers toward risk may have evolved over time. Considering a supply chain including a manufacturer and a population of retailers, the authors intend to investigate how the population of retailers tends to evolve toward risk-averse behavior. Moreover, this study aims to evaluate the effects of wholesale-retail price of manufacturer on evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the retailers. Design/methodology/approach Due to market uncertainty, a supply chain with a population of risk-averse and risk-neutral retailers was investigated. The wholesale pricing strategy is determined by a manufacturer acting as a leader, while retailers who make order quantity decisions act as followers. An integrated Cournot duopoly equilibrium and evolutionary game theory (EGT) approach has been used to model this situation. Findings A numerical real-world case study using Iran Khodro Company is analyzed by applying the proposed EGT approach. The study provides managerial insights to the manufacturer as well as retailers in developing their strategies. Results showed that risk behavior of retailers significantly affects optimal wholesale/retail price, profits and ESS. In the long term, the retailers tend to have a risk-neutral behavior to gain more profit. In the short term, if a retailer choses risk-averse strategy, in the long term, it will change its strategy to obtain more profit and remain in the competitive market. Originality/value The contributions in this research are fourfold. First, ESS concept to investigate the risk-averse or risk-neutral attitudes of the retailers was used. Second, the uncertain risk behavior of the competing retailers was considered. Third, the effect of varying wholesale pricing was investigated. Fourth, the equilibrium wholesale and retail prices have been obtained by considering uncertainty demand and risk.

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