Research on the Stability of Photovoltaic Industrial Chain under the Condition of Bounded Rationality

2011 ◽  
Vol 361-363 ◽  
pp. 1279-1284
Author(s):  
Wei Min Sun ◽  
Jin Sheng Shen
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Primary State ◽  
Industrial Chain ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Stable Development ◽  
Spontaneous Evolution

Under the condition of bounded rationality, make use of evolutionary game theory to analyze the stability between node enterprises of photovoltaic industrial chain. In the process of spontaneous evolution, the strategy of upstream and downstream enterprises of photovoltaic industrial chain depends on their primary state strongly. However, under the guidance of government policy, all upstream and downstream enterprises in photovoltaic industrial chain adopt cooperative strategy to guarantee its stable development, which reflects the important roles of government policy orientation in the development of emerging industrial chain.

Trust strategy simulation of corporation–NPO cross alliance using evolutionary game theory

Kybernetes ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 450-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yidan Chen ◽  
Lanying Sun
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Trust Relationships

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamics and evolution of trust in organizational cross alliances. Design/methodology/approach In alliances between corporations and nonprofit organizations, trust in decision-making is a dynamic process. Using the replicated dynamics model of evolutionary game theory, this paper provides a trust decision model and analyzes four scenarios under different parameters. A numerical simulation is developed to present an intuitive interpretation of the dynamic development of trust decisions and the effects of incentive and punishment mechanisms. Findings Under different parameters, bounded rationality and utilities result in different but stable evolutionary strategies; the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy leads directly to whether participants adopt the strategy when the system reaches stability after continued games; and incentive and punishment mechanisms can significantly reduce the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy where the system evolves to meet stable state needs. Practical implications The establishment of trust relationships is an important influence on the stable and coordinated development of an alliance. The proposed model can help the alliance build closer trust relationships and provide a theoretical basis for the design of the trust mechanism. Originality/value Incentive and punishment bound by some degree of trust are introduced to address the problems of trust decisions and their dynamics; the model created reflects the bounded rationality and utility of each game stage. Useful evolutionary stable strategies using different variables are proposed to address the decision-making problems of trust in cross alliances.

A dynamic evolutionary game model of web celebrity brand eWOM marketing control strategy

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mengjie Liao ◽  
Jian Zhang ◽  
Ruimei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Media ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretical Research ◽  
Dynamic Visualization ◽  
Formal Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Marketing Environment

PurposeThis paper aims to recognize whether government policy supervision or social network platform supervision can effectively promote the control of misconducts of web celebrity brand eWOM marketing and to identify the key factors influencing the unhealthy web celebrity marketing environment.Design/methodology/approachTheoretical research was employed to develop a practical approach for applying evolutionary game theory to eWOM marketing controlling strategies modeling via dynamic visualization, systematic simulation experiments.FindingsEvolutionary game theory combined with dynamic simulation modeling can provide a formal approach to understanding web celebrity brand eWOM marketing decision-making in social media, which can thus support the control of unhealthy web celebrity marketing environment. The results demonstrate that the reasonable control of social platform control costs may be more effective than the government policy on web celebrity fake brand eWOM marketing behaviors.Originality/valueThe study enriches the research on the management and control of eWOM marketing as well as provides guidance for the sustainable development of the web celebrity economy in social media.

Research on Organization Tacit Knowledge Transferring: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis

2013 ◽  
Vol 756-759 ◽  
pp. 2597-2601
Author(s):  
Dan Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Tacit Knowledge ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Stability

The transfer and the management of the tacit knowledge is one of the most important issues in the knowledge transferring context to create organizational competitive advantage in the fast growing competitive world. As we know, organization tacit knowledge transferring is a dynamic game process, this research applies evolutionary game theory to analyze the tacit knowledge transferring activities among organizations and the stability balance issue in organization knowledge transferring. Based on the theory of games, this paper constructs the evolutionary game process model for organization tacit knowledge transferring. And through the equilibrium point of the model, the different knowledge transferring bodies game replicated dynamics and stability are analyzed. With this model, the reason why tacit knowledge is hard to be transferred and the path of tacit knowledge transferring is analyzed.

PATENTING OR SECRET? THE INTERACTION BETWEEN LEADING FIRMS AND FOLLOWING FIRMS BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND MULTI-AGENT SIMULATION

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (07) ◽  
pp. 1950068 ◽  
Author(s):  
XIAOYANG ZHAO
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Imitation Strategy

Firms who want to appropriate innovation often need to make decision facing the trade-off between patenting and secret. This paper explores how leading firms make trade-off between patenting and secret through the view of the interaction between leading firms and following firms who have the option of imitation or substitution, based on the evolutionary game theory. Then, a simulation model is built combining the evolutionary game model and agent-based modelling method, which allows us to implement bounded rationality and interactivities. The simulation is run with different gain parameters and the results are checked by cross-validation. It is found that leading firms are more likely to adopt patenting strategy with well developed patent protection regime. While depending on variations on patent protection effectiveness, technological characteristics, and leading firms’ investment in patent portfolio development, following firms may choose imitation strategy or substitution strategy. Considering bounded rationality, firms could choose sub-optional strategies and leads to scenarios other than evolutionary equilibrium solutions, which provide deeper insights of strategic choices of leading firms and following firms. This paper makes contributions to theory by using the perspective of multi-agent view and integrating bounded rationality in the simulation. Finally, this paper draws conclusion and puts forward some suggestions.

scholarly journals SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY FOR QUALITY SUPERVISION AMONG CONSTRUCTION STAKEHOLDERS

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengyu Guo ◽  
Pan Zhang ◽  
Jianying Yang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
System Dynamics Model ◽  
Dynamics Model ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Impact

To address the gap, that is, few studies have explored the influence of the participants’ interactions with one another during construction quality supervision, this paper proposes a system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory to describe the complex and dynamic interactions among tripartite stakeholders in China, including the project owner (PO), construction supervising engineer (CSE), and construction contractor (CC). First, the replicated dynamic equation set is established in terms of expense targets. Second, the equilibrium solutions of the equation set are obtained to test strategy options. The trends of system fluctuations caused by penalty and reward changes are also analyzed. Finally, the stability of the proposed model is improved by integrating a dynamic penalty–reward scenario into the evolutionary strategy of the PO. Simulation results show that: 1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in initial interactions, 2) the degrees of penalty and reward considerably affect the CC’s rate variable, and 3) the dynamic penalty–reward scenario could effectively improve the stability of the proposed model. The unsteadiness of the quality supervision system and the stability control scenario could help in understanding the impact of interactions among stakeholders and provide suggestions for optimizing quality supervision procedures.

scholarly journals A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (21) ◽  
pp. 11624
Author(s):  
Jida Liu ◽  
Yanan Guo ◽  
Shi An ◽  
Chenxi Lian
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Natural Disasters ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Shared Resources ◽  
Cooperative Relationships ◽  
Selection Strategies ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
The Stability

Natural disasters have obvious cross-regional and compound characteristics. Cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters deepens the diversification of coordination relations and the complexity of interaction modes among emergency response organizations, including horizontal and vertical organizational interactions. In order to clarify the cooperation mechanism of emergency organizations during cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters and to explore the key factors that affect the cooperative relationships of emergency organizations, in this study, a game model is constructed based on evolutionary game theory, which is composed of local, neighboring, and central governments. Then, the stability of the emergency game strategy is analyzed. On this basis, a numerical simulation is used to simulate the dynamic evolution trajectory of the game system. The results show that there is an embedded mutual promotion mechanism that evolves towards a positive emergency strategy combination among the game subjects. The selection strategies of the game subjects show the characteristics of consistency and the following: enhanced cooperation efficiency between local and neighboring governments, emergency capital stock, and shared resources, therefore, guiding social emergency forces to actively participate in emergency operations. Strengthening the emergency dispatching strength of the central government and the effectiveness of central–local emergency dispatching, can support the performance of cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters. Furthermore, the efficiency of cooperation between local and neighboring governments will be enhanced.

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