CEO pay sensitivities in innovative firms

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Raghavan J. Iyengar ◽  
Malavika Sundararajan
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Innovative Firms ◽  
Compensation Committees

PurposeThis study aims to investigate whether compensation committees provide the chief executive officers (CEOs) with incentives to undertake “income-decreasing” but potentially “value-enhancing” innovation expenditures. The authors specifically analyze pay–performance relationships for innovative firms relative to all other firms. This study is critical because innovation is expensive and has uncertain outcomes.Design/methodology/approachUsing alternative accounting performance measures and market performance measures, the authors estimate an econometric model of CEO compensation in innovative firms that incorporates the interaction of endogenous innovation and firm performance.FindingsThe authors document an incremental positive association between changes in accounting performance measures and CEO compensation changes in innovative firms relative to other firms. This sensitivity of executive pay to firm performance is higher for firms that innovate. These results support the hypothesis that compensation committees provide incentives to carry out risky innovation by tying executive compensation more closely to firm performance. This finding survives a battery of sensitivity tests.Practical implicationsThe implications of this study are significant. Capital needs to support risky research and development investments (Tidd and Besant, 2018; Baldwin and Johnson, 1995) form the basis of innovative firms' operations. Considering these expenses, if CEOs, who play a critical role in the scanning, adapting and implementing innovative needs in a firm, are not protected and compensated for making risky choices, the entire investment itself will be threatened. Hence, the findings reiterate and support earlier findings that speak to the importance of compensating CEOs to make high-risk investments that will lead to long-term economic and financial gains for the firm when the innovative behaviors result in competitive market shares and profits.Originality/valueThe original work is related to the investigation of pay–performance sensitivity in the presence of innovation, which has not been fully investigated in prior literature.

scholarly journals Effects of ownership concentration on firm performance: Pakistani evidence

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qaiser Rafique Yasser ◽  
Abdullah Al Mamun
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Concentration Degree ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose – This paper aims to present an analysis of the association between five categories of concentrated ownership and firm performance in Pakistan. The connection between high ownership concentration and firm performance has attracted much attention, especially in emerging market, yet yielded many inconsistent empirical results. Design/methodology/approach – Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)-100 Indexed companies listed in KSE from 2007 to 2011 were selected as the sample, and correlation coefficient and regression model were used to inspect the relationship between ownership concentration degree and corporate performance. Findings – It was found that there is no significant association with ownership concentration and accounting-based performance, market-based performance measures and economic profit, in general. Originality/value – The first demonstration that the shareholding proportion of the single largest shareholder is the only variable having positive association with market-based performance measures.

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

scholarly journals Can compensation committees effectively mitigate the CEO horizon problem? The role of co-opted directors

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Ruonan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Horizon Problem ◽  
Accruals Management ◽  
Compensation Committees

Purpose This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem. Design/methodology/approach The author uses a sample of 7,280 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2011. Findings In this study, the author finds evidence of opportunistic research and development (R&D) reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, it is found that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation committees that are dominated by co-opted directors. The results suggest that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem. Originality/value The study reveals that co-opted directors are weak monitors. Moreover, the study adds empirical evidence to the debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Finally, the study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO compensation.

scholarly journals The structure of corporate ownership and firm performance: Sri Lankan evidence

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 723-734 ◽  
Author(s):  
Athula Manawaduge ◽  
Anura De Zoysa
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Sri Lankan ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Strong Positive Relationship ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure and concentration on firm performance in Sri Lanka, an emerging market in Asia. The study estimates a series of regressions using pooled data for a sample of Sri Lankan-listed firms to investigate the impact of ownership concentration and structure on firm performance based on agency theory framework, using both accounting and market-based performance indicators. The results of the study provide evidence for a strong positive relationship between ownership concentration and accounting performance measures. This suggests that a greater concentration of ownership leads to better performance. However, we found no significant impact using market-based performance measures, which suggests the existence of numerous market inefficiencies and anomalies. Furthermore, the findings of the study show that ownership structure does not have a significant distinguishable effect on performance.

The effectiveness of flexible manufacturing strategies

2009 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Therese A. Joiner ◽  
X. Sarah Yang Spencer ◽  
Suzanne Salmon
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Flexible Manufacturing ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Manufacturing Firms ◽  
Manufacturing Strategy ◽  
Organisational Performance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Performance Measures

PurposeAgainst a background of a customization imperative embraced by manufacturing firms in industrialised nations and the concomitant call for more balanced performance measurement systems (PMS), this study seeks to examine the mediating role of both non‐financial and financial performance measures in the relationship between a firm's strategic orientation of flexible manufacturing and organisational performance.Design/methodology/approachA path‐analytical model is adopted using questionnaire data from 84 Australian manufacturing firms.FindingsThe results indicate that, first, firms emphasising a flexible manufacturing strategy utilise non‐financial as well as financial performance measures; second, these performance measures are associated with higher organisational performance; and third, there is a positive association between a firm's strategic emphasis on flexible manufacturing and organisation performance via non‐financial and financial performance measures.Practical implicationsWhile there is agreement on the beneficial role of non‐financial performance measures in supporting strategic priorities associated with customization strategies, equivocal research results have emerged on the role of financial performance measures in this context. The study underscores the importance of both non‐financial and financial performance measures in this context.Originality/valueThe paper reinstates the value of financial performance measures for firms pursuing customization type strategies and adds to one's knowledge of PMSs by exploring the intervening role of such systems in linking flexible manufacturing strategy to organisation performance.

Private firm performance: do women directors matter?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahnoor Sattar ◽  
Pallab Kumar Biswas ◽  
Helen Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Small Firm ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Private Firm ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Women Directors ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Firm Profitability ◽  
Board Gender Diversity

Purpose This paper aims to examine the relationship between board gender diversity and private firm performance. Design/methodology/approach The authors test the association between board gender diversity and private firm performance by estimating pooled multivariate regressions using an unbalanced panel data set of 115,253 firm-year observations. Findings The authors find that younger, less busy and local women directors enhance private firm performance. Firms with 40% or more women directors report triple the economic benefits compared to boards with at least 20% women directors. Considering firm size, women directors significantly increase small firm profitability, and the effect is more pronounced for high-risk firms. Greater board gender diversity enhances small firm performance as the monitoring role of women directors benefits the firm even in the presence of busy men directors. Consistent with the agency theory framework, the authors find that women directors improve small firm profitability in the presence of agency costs. Research limitations/implications Due to the lack of availability of data about private firms, many factors are not directly observable. The analysis uses accounting-based performance measures that may be subject to managerial discretion. Nevertheless, the authors report highly significant results using cash-based performance measures that substantiate the overall findings. Practical implications The results of the present study point to the need for private firms to increase board gender diversity and consider women director busyness, age, nationality and firm size when making board director appointments. Originality/value This study adds to the scarce existent literature investigating private firms. The results contribute to the understanding of gender-diverse boards as well as the attributes of women directors that enhance private firm performance.

Pay-performance sensitivity and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence from Tunisia

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Meriem Ghrab ◽  
Marjène Gana ◽  
Mejda Dakhlaoui
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Simultaneous Equation ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Estimation Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Ceo Pay

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, termed as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the Tunisian context and to test the robustness of this relationship when corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are considered. Design/methodology/approach The consideration of past executive pay as one of the explanatory variables makes this estimation model a dynamic one. Furthermore, to avoid the problem of endogeneity, this study uses the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For robustness check, this study aims to use a simultaneous equation approach (three-stage least squares [3SLS]) to estimate the link between performance and CEO pay with a set of CG mechanisms to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies. Findings Using a sample of 336 firm-years from Tunisia over the 2009–2015 periods, this study finds strong evidence that the pay-performance relationship is insignificant and negative, and it becomes more negative or remains insignificant after introducing CG mechanisms consistently with the managerial power approach. The findings are robust to the use of alternative performance measures. This study provides new empirical evidence that CEOs of Tunisian firms abuse extracting rents independently of firm performance. Originality/value This study contributes to the unexamined research on PPS in a frontier market. This study also shows the ineffectiveness of the Tunisian CG structure and thus recommends for the legislator to impose a mandatory CG guide.

Accounting and Stock Price Performance in Dynamic CEO Compensation Arrangements

2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Boschen ◽  
Augustine Duru ◽  
Lawrence A. Gordon ◽  
Kimberly J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Financial Gain ◽  
Price Performance ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Initial Effect ◽  
Ceo Pay

In this study we examine the long-run effects of unexpected firm performance on CEO compensation. We find that unexpectedly good accounting performance is initially associated with increases in CEO pay. However, this initial effect soon reverses, and is followed by lower CEO pay in later years. Overall, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good accounting performance is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, unexpectedly good stock price performance is associated with increases in CEO pay for several years. Thus, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good stock price performance is positive and significant.

scholarly journals CEO Compensation in the U.S.: Are CEOs Underpaid or Overpaid ?

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 78
Author(s):  
Phillip James ◽  
Il-woon Kim
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Regression Models ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Multiple Regression Models ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Compensation Packages

This study investigates the adequacy of CEO compensation from the perspective of using accounting measures to assess the performance of CEOs. The main objective of this research is to determine to what extent compensation packages received by American CEOs represent an underpayment of CEOs based on the performance of their firms when firm performance is defined in terms of accounting measures. CEO compensation data are obtained from Compustat, 10K SEC filings, and Forbes listing of CEO data.  The analysis covers a two-phased time period i.e., before and after the financial crisis in the USA. CEO compensation data are analyzed for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 (pre-financial crisis) and for years 2009 to 2013 (post financial crisis). Multiple regression models consisting of six accounting performance measures are used to perform the analysis to determine the extent of CEO underpayment or overpayment. Having examined 1151 CEO compensation packages to determine if CEO underpayment exist in light of what is an overwhelming literature supporting CEO overpayment, the results show that 67.33% of the CEOs were in fact underpaid based on their firms performance, and only 32.67% (376 CEOs) were overpaid based on firm performance.

Limiting Executive Compensation: The Case of CEOs Hired after the Imposition of 162(m)

2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Balsam ◽  
David H. Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Internal Revenue ◽  
Compensation Package ◽  
Bonus Pay ◽  
Executive Officers

This study analyzes the effect of Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) on the compensation package of those chief executive officers (CEOs) hired after the imposition of this code section. Research documents that CEO compensation has increased dramatically since the imposition of section 162(m); yet, this research has not distinguished between the effects on the compensation of CEOs already in place when section 162(m) was imposed from those CEOs hired post-162(m) imposition. We focus our analysis on the compensation of CEOs hired after the imposition of section 162(m), because when firms hire a new CEO, they have a better opportunity to redesign the executive pay package. Consequently, we posit that section 162(m) will have its greatest effect when the affected companies change CEOs. Our analysis provides evidence that the increase in salary normally associated with the hiring of a new CEO has been mitigated and there has been an increase in the sensitivity of firm performance to bonus pay for CEOs appointed after 1994 in affected firms.

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