Swiss Roll (A)

Author(s):  
Jayanth R. Varma

In September, 2011, to prevent its currency from appreciating after the Global Financial Crisis, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) decided to peg its currency to EUR and announced that it would not let CHF go beyond 1/1.20 EUR. Maintaining the peg required the SNB to purchase foreign currency assets virtually endlessly in response to the worsening Eurozone crisis. By end of 2014, its foreign currency exchange reserves amounted to almost 80% of its GDP. In an attempt to deter capital flows and reduce its balance sheet size, in December, 2014, the SNB first bought the interest rate on commercial bank deposits to negative levels and then, facing impending quantitative easing by the European Central Bank, announced the removal of the peg on January 15, 2015. The case describes the backdrop and the circumstances leading up to removal of the peg.

Author(s):  
Yilmaz Akyüz

The preceding chapters have examined the deepened integration of emerging and developing economies (EDEs) into the international financial system in the new millennium and their changing vulnerabilities to external financial shocks. They have discussed the role that policies in advanced economies played in this process, including those that culminated in the global financial crisis and the unconventional monetary policy of zero-bound interest rates and quantitative easing adopted in response to the crisis, as well as policies in EDEs themselves....


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-59
Author(s):  
Mirosław Wypych

AbstractThe system transformation which started in the last decade of the previous century and the accompanying transition into market oriented economy have contributed to the increase of foreign investors’ interest in committing their capital in Poland. The interest grew even more after Poland joined the European Union. With limited national financial resources and great demand for the same, foreign investment has been a desirable factor supporting and accelerating economic growth.The objective of this paper is to evaluate the changes in the level and structure of foreign capital in Poland in the years 2008–2013, that is during the period of economic downturn following the global financial crisis. The point is, first of all, to find an answer to the following question: to what extent has the economic destabilisation caused by the crisis influenced the decisions of foreign investors concerning investing their capital in Poland? This allows to verify the following scientific hypothesis: during crisis stability of the financial system of the country in which parent companies have their seats is more important for foreign investors than financial security of the host country. The analysis covers total foreign capital, that is both direct and portfolio investment, as well as derivatives and credit facilities. The empirical part of the study has been based on the information published by the National Bank of Poland.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-46
Author(s):  
Andrea Cecrdlova

The latest global crisis, which fully erupted in 2008, can have a significant impact on central banks credibility in the long run. During the last crisis, monetary authorities encountered zero interest rate levels and, as a result, started to use non-standard monetary policy instruments. The Czech National Bank decided to use a less standard instrument in November 2013, when it started to intervene on the foreign exchange market in order to keep the Czech currency at level 27 CZK / EUR. However, the European Central Bank also adopted a non-standard instrument, when chose a path of quantitative easing in 2015 in order to support the euro area economy by purchasing financial assets. The question remains whether the approach of Czech National Bank or the approach of European Central Bank in the crisis and post-crisis period was a more appropriate alternative. With the passage of time from the global financial crisis, it is already possible to compare the approaches of these two central banks and at least partially assess what approach was more appropriate under the given conditions. When comparing the central banks approaches to the crisis, the Czech National Bank was better, both in terms of the rate of interest rate cuts and the resulting inflation with regard to the choice of a non-standard monetary policy instrument. The recent financial crisis has revealed the application of moral hazard in practice, both on behalf of the European Central Bank and the Czech National Bank, which may have a significant impact on their credibility and independence in the coming years.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-16
Author(s):  
Sayed M. Fadel ◽  
Jasim Al-Ajmi

The objectives of this study are to determine 1) the effect of global economic and financial crisis on risk management, 2) the severity of different types of risk facing Islamic banks, 3) the risk levels of Islamic financial modes, 4) risk assessment techniques, and 5) risk management techniques. The structure of the balance sheet, the nature of Islamic finance instruments and funding sources have a great impact on the level of risk exposure of banks and the instruments. Credit risk is found to be the most serious risk, followed by liquidity risk, market risk and operational risk, in descending order of importance. As for the riskiness of Islamic financing modes, mudarabah is perceived to be the riskiest, followed by musharakah, while murabahah ranked as the least risky mode. Moreover, Islamic banks are found to use traditional risk management techniques more than sophisticated measurements. They also adopt risk mitigation techniques that are used by conventional banks in preference to techniques that are considered to be unique to Islamic banks. This paper is the first to study the risk management practices of Islamic banks operating in Bahrain. It also provides evidence about these practices after the global financial crisis that affected all countries, including Bahrain.


Author(s):  
Alexia Thomaidou ◽  
Dimitris Kenourgios

This chapter investigates the impact of the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis in ETFs across regions and segments. In particular, two tests are taking place, with the first one to examine if there is evidence of contagion effect and the second one to test the affection of risks in each pair of ETFs. The evidence across the stable period and the two crisis periods suggests the existence of the transmission of shocks from the Global Financial ETF to regional and sectoral ETFs. However, there is evidence that some of the ETFs remain less unaffected during both crises and some of them are immune. Moreover, the authors examine the impact of several control variables, which represent various risks, to the correlation of each pair of ETFs and the results show the influence of the interest rate risk and interbank liquidity risk during the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.


2018 ◽  
Vol 68 (s2) ◽  
pp. 121-142
Author(s):  
György Surányi

Looking back to the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, Hungary was among the first countries to be forced to make use of financial assistance from the EU and the IMF. The government, the MNB (the central bank of Hungary) as well as the domestic and foreign analysts cited the high public debt and the volume of unsecured foreign-currency loans as the main reasons for the crises. Though these were real weaknesses, this diagnosis was false as much as the following treatment. First and foremost, it was the inadequate level of foreign exchange reserves that made Hungary to request outside financial assistance. The excessive fiscal tightening urged by the MNB only led to deepening of the crises. In general, the macropolicy – both fiscal and monetary policy – before, during and after the crises turned out to be painfully pro-cyclical. Due to the lack of sufficient reserves, the MNB became virtually powerless to intervene and could only watch from the side-lines as events unfolded. The orthodox mind-set after replenishing the forex reserves prevented it from implementing a broad scale of unconventional measures to ease the crises. The fiscal authority lost its capacity long before to reduce the severity of the crises. Thus, the excessive and incorrect structure of fiscal correction coupled with an unjustified orthodox monetary policy, the contraction of the Hungarian economy went much beyond the inevitable amount.


2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (6) ◽  
pp. 539-550
Author(s):  
Dario Pontiggia ◽  
Petros Stavrou Sivitanides

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to assess whether the rapid accumulation of bank deposits before the global financial crisis and their subsequent drastic reduction was the main driving force of the Cyprus house price cycle over the period 2006–2015.Design/methodology/approachTo this aim we estimate a three-equation model in which house prices are determined by housing loans, among other factors, and housing loans are determined by bank deposits. All equations are estimated using partial adjustment model specifications.FindingsOur findings indicate that housing loans, which capture the effect of credit availability on housing demand, had the smallest effect on house prices, thus providing little support to our proposition of a deposits-driven cycle in house prices.Research limitations/implicationsThe main limitation of the study is the use of the housing loan stock instead of the actual volume of housing loans in each period due to lack of such data. As a result our econometric estimates may not accurately capture the magnitude of the effect of housing loans on house prices.Practical implicationsThe study has important practical implications for policy makers as it highlights the importance of availability of credit in supporting effective demand for housing during periods of economic growth. Furthermore, it highlights the key role of house price increases in combination with the collateral effect in driving the house price cycle.Originality/valueThis is among the few studies internationally and the first study in Cyprus that attempts to link econometrically the credit and house price cycles that were caused by the global financial crisis.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Ball

PurposeThe New Zealand Government has progressively strengthened its balance sheet position since the mid-1990s, other than for the four years immediately following the global financial crisis and the Canterbury earthquakes. This paper describes the nature and the forecast and actual fiscal impacts of the COVID-19 response, and identifies the transparency mechanisms which reveal these impacts. It also expresses a viewpoint on the implications of the COVID-19 response for the future resilience of the Government's fiscal position.Design/methodology/approachThe paper draws on the suite of official budgetary documents to demonstrate both the transparency of the disclosures on the COVID-19 impact and the substance of the forecast and actual fiscal impacts.FindingsThe paper reveals the change in the long-term fiscal aspirations of the New Zealand Government from one of achieving and maintaining a significant net worth buffer, to one which accommodates in the long-term a markedly smaller buffer and lower level of net worth.Originality/valueThe public financial management system in New Zealand is notable for its transparency. The Government's response to the pandemic is used to illustrate the nature and extent of that transparency.


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