Property Rights, Institutions and Economic Development: An Islamic Perspective

The evolution of property right institutions and their consequence on investment decisions are central issues in the political economy of development. Effective and well‐defined property rights are deemed essential in providing the preconditions for economic growth. The importance of property right arrangements stems from the fact that they impact and alter the distribution of income. Economists are, therefore, in agreement that market transactions are more efficient when property rights are enforced. According to North and Thomas (1973), observed variations in economic performance across countries were related to the presence (or absence, for that matter) of property right institutions. Recently, Beseley (1995), and Feder and Feeny (1991), have argued that economic development and well‐established property right institutions are positively correlated. Meanwhile, there are two arguments in the literature in favour of establishing property rights institutions. First, assigning ownership of valuable assets and designating the parties bearing the rewards and costs is expected to strengthen market forces. In particular, the private control over assets and the ability to reap the rewards from exploiting these assets create incentives for investment and production. Second, enforcing contractual agreements is expected to provide economic agents with the incentives to use resources effectively and efficiently. When property rights are poorly defined, contracts become hard to enforce and fraud and corruption go unpunished. Bureaucrats responsible for formulating government policies will use their positions to influence the allocation of resources whereby, business managers find themselves forced to buy favours. The need to pay substantial bribes will, therefore, reduce the entrepreneur's incentives to invest and impose a significant burden on economic growth. Empirical evidence based on cross‐country comparisons does indeed suggest that corruption has large, adverse effects on private investment and economic growth. Mauro (1996) showed that when a country improves its standing on the corruption index, say, from 6 to 8 (0 being the most corrupt, 10 the least) it will experience a 4 percentage point increase in its investment rate and a 0.5 percentage point increase in its annual per capita GDP growth rate. These large effects suggest that policies that establish institutions to curb corruption could have significant payoffs. Political corruption will also undercut the government's ability to raise revenues from issuing licenses and permits, and lead to ever‐higher tax rates being levied on fewer and fewer taxpayers. This, in turn, reduces the government's ability to provide essential public goods, including the rule of law. When institutions are weak, bribes can alter outcomes of the legal and regulatory process by inducing the government either to fail to stop illegal activities (such as drug dealing or pollution) or unduly favour one party over another in court cases or other legal proceedings. Furthermore, theoretical and empirical studies have shown that corruption and political control usually raise transaction costs, uncertainty, and are associated with free‐rider problems. These costs will, therefore, constitute a dead‐weight loss to the society. Unless political and economic reforms are made, these inefficiencies will certainly hamper growth and development.