Ownership structure, board independence and auditor choice: evidence from GCC countries

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Moncef Guizani ◽  
Gaafar Abdalkrim
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Choice ◽  
Gcc Countries ◽  
Big 4

PurposeThis paper investigates the role of board independence in determining the relationship between firm ownership and auditor choice.Design/methodology/approachThe research uses a logistic regression to test the direct and indirect effects of ownership structure on the decision to hire a high-quality (Big 4) audit firm. The sample consists of 207 non-financial firms listed on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries stock markets between 2009 and 2016.FindingsEmpirical findings show that family ownership is associated with a negative and significant coefficient suggesting that an increase in family ownership decreases the likelihood that the firm will employ a Big 4 auditor. This finding suggests that family owners are reluctant to impose external monitoring. Furthermore, we find a positive relationship between institutional ownership and auditor choice supporting the conjecture that institutional investors are more likely to choose a Big 4 auditor. The results also reveal that the effects of family and institutional ownership on auditor choice are partially mediated by independent directors.Practical implicationsThis study has important implications for GCC economies whose policymakers and regulators may need to address the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. It provides guidance for firms in the construction and implementation of their own corporate governance policies. Furthermore, the study findings may be useful to investors, assisting them in making better informed decisions and aids other interested parties in gaining a better understanding of the role played by ownership structure in the quality of auditors. Finally, the paper highlights the importance of the composition of the board of directors in increasing the likelihood of hiring a high-quality audit firm.Originality/valueThe main contribution of the present paper is to examine the board composition as a potential mediating variable between ownership structure and auditor choice. Moreover, it highlights the issue of improving governance mechanisms.

Choosing an external auditor: does the composition of boards of directors matter?

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 394-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mishari M. Alfraih
Keyword(s):  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Choice ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
External Auditor

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the association between the composition of boards of directors and the choice of external auditor among companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) in 2013. Design/methodology/approach Consistent with prior research, audit quality is represented by two proxies, namely, a Big 4 and Non-Big 4 audit firm. Independence, diversity, interlocks, size and role duality are used as proxies for board composition. To accommodate the dichotomous dependent variable (auditor choice), a logistic regression model is used to test the hypothesized associations between board composition and auditor choice. Findings After controlling for firm-specific characteristics, results show that independence, diversity and size are statistically significant and increase the likelihood that a KSE-listed company selects a high-quality (Big 4) audit firm. Role duality is also statistically significantly but decreases the likelihood of choosing a Big 4 audit firm. Practical/implications This research has implications for regulators, shareholders, boards and academics. The paper underlines the importance of the composition of the board in increasing the likelihood of hiring a high-quality audit firm. Regulators can draw upon these results when assessing the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. Originality/value This paper is among the first to study the association between auditor choice and board composition using data from the frontier market of Kuwait, thus responding to the call for empirical research into the issue in less-developed markets. Overall, it sheds light on the effectiveness of board composition and provides empirical evidence that it is an important element in the choice of auditors. The findings indicate that board composition may be a mechanism that can promote demand for high audit quality.

Ownership structure and audit quality: the mediating effect of board independence

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Moncef Guizani ◽  
Gaafar Abdalkrim
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Mediating Effect ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Government Ownership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose This study aims to examine the mediating effect of board independence on the relationship between ownership structure and audit quality. Design/methodology/approach The research uses generalized methods of moments regression to test the relationship between ownership structure and audit quality. The sample consists of 162 non-financial firms listed on the Gulf Cooperation Council stock markets between the years of 2009 and 2016. To test the significance of the mediating effect, this paper uses the Sobel test. Findings Empirical findings show that companies with higher family ownership are less likely to demand extensive audit services and, as a result, pay lower audit fees. Conversely, this study finds that companies with higher active and passive institutional ownership are more likely to engage high-quality auditors and pay larger audit fees. As for government ownership, it has no significant impact on audit fees. The results also reveal that the negative (positive) effect of family (institutional) ownership on audit quality follows the path through reducing (enhancing) board independence. Further tests are conducted and support the main findings. Practical implications This study has important implications for policymakers and regulators to address the conflict between controlling shareholders and minorities by promoting higher standards of audit quality. The study findings may be useful to investors, assisting them in making better-informed decisions and aids other interested parties in gaining a better understanding of the role played by ownership structure in audit quality. The study also contributes to the strategic board behavior by bringing a new perspective on how boards engage in monitoring by requesting external audit services. This behavior is likely to be influenced by the type of controlling shareholder. Originality/value The main contribution of the present paper is to examine the board composition as a potential mediating variable between ownership structure and audit quality. Moreover, it highlights the issue of improving governance mechanisms.

Ownership structure and auditor selection

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (8) ◽  
pp. 1121-1142
Author(s):  
Curtis M. Hall ◽  
Benjamin W. Hoffman ◽  
Zenghui Liu
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Industry Expert ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Private Banks ◽  
Public Banks

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the effect that ownership structure (public vs private) has on the demand for high-quality auditors, specifically in the US banking industry. Design/methodology/approach The authors predict that public banks are more likely to hire a high-quality auditor than private banks and pay a higher audit fee premium for that high-quality auditor (due to higher agency costs, more demand for financial information and higher litigation risk). The authors analyze 2008–2014 banking data from the Federal Reserve using probit and OLS regression analysis to examine if there is a higher probability that public banks choose higher quality auditors and pay higher audit fees when they do so. Findings The results show that private banks are less likely to hire Big 4 auditors and industry-expert auditors than public banks. The authors also find that both private and public banks pay higher audit fees for Big 4 and industry-expert auditors, and that public banks pay a higher premium for Big 4 auditors and industry experts than private banks. Research limitations/implications The findings may not be fully generalizable to other types of firms, as banking is a heavily regulated and complex industry. However, inferences from this study may be generalizable to other similar industries such as insurance or health care. Practical implications The results of this paper imply that public and private banks have differing priorities when hiring their financial statement auditor. This may be of interest to investors and auditing regulators. Social implications The findings of this paper underscore the value of hiring an industry-expert auditor in an industry that is highly complex and regulated. This may be of interest to managers and policymakers. Originality/value Due to data restrictions, the emphasis of prior literature on the banking industry has been on public banks. This study is the first to analyze the differences between public and private banks’ demand for audit services.

Ownership concentration, family control, and auditor choice

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salim Darmadi
Keyword(s):  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Auditor Choice ◽  
Big 4

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to extend the existing, yet limited, literature on the influence of ownership concentration and family control on the demands for high-quality audits. This study focusses on an emerging market, namely, Indonesia, where ownership concentration and family control are relatively higher than those in developed markets. Design/methodology/approach – The sample consists of 787 firm-year observations of public firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Following prior studies, a firm is considered using a higher quality audit when its external auditor is one of the Big 4 audit firms. Logistic regressions are employed to test research hypotheses. Findings – Empirical evidence obtained reveals that firms with higher ownership concentration are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor. Hence, in such firms, high-quality audits are employed to mitigate agency issues. However, when the controlling shareholder is a family, the association between ownership concentration and the demands for high-quality auditors turns negative, implying that family-controlled firms tend to sustain opaqueness gains by hiring lower quality auditors. Originality/value – Previous empirical studies examining the influence of ownership concentration and family control on auditor choice are relatively limited in the literature and are heavily focussed on developed economies. In addition, the present study is one of the first to investigate the association between family control and auditor choice in the context of a developing economy.

Corporate governance and payout policy: evidence from India

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 1117-1132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Rajput ◽  
Shital Jhunjhunwala
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Significant Positive Influence

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance on dividend policy in emerging markets, like India. The study also analyses the moderation effects of board independence between ownership and dividend payout. Design/methodology/approach The data set of 1,546 Indian firms over the period of 2006-2017 has been used in this study. Tobit and logistic regression methods has been used. The data used in this study are collected from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) Prowess database. The sample firms are listed on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and National Stock Exchange (NSE). Findings First, the study finds a significant positive influence of corporate governance on the decision to pay dividend and is an important determinant of the payout decision. Second, the study finds a significant negative relationship of family ownership with dividend payout decisions which indicates that family firms pay lower dividend. Finally, the result from the interaction effect of board independence with family ownership has significant positive influence on dividend policy. Originality/value This is one of the first attempt to show that there is an interaction between independent board and ownership structure. It shows that more independent and non-executive directors in the board of family controlled firms are likely to pay more dividends.

How does ownership structure affect the financing and dividend decisions of firm?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tahar Tayachi ◽  
Ahmed Imran Hunjra ◽  
Kirsten Jones ◽  
Rashid Mehmood ◽  
Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al-Faryan
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Debt Financing ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Ownership structure deals with internal corporate governance mechanism, which plays important role in minimizing conflict of interests between shareholders and management Ownership structure is an important mechanism that influences the value of firm, financing and dividend decisions. This paper aims to examine the impact of the ownership structures, i.e. managerial ownership, institutional ownership on financing and dividend policy. Design/methodology/approach The authors use panel data of manufacturing firms from both developed and developing countries, and the generalized method of moments (GMM) is applied to analyze the results. The authors collect the data from DataStream for the period of 2010 to 2019. Findings The authors find that managerial ownership and ownership concentration have significant and positive effects on debt financing, but they have significant and negative effects on dividend policy. Institutional ownership shows a positive impact on financing decisions and dividend policy for sample firms. Originality/value This study fills the gap by proving the policy implications for both firms and investors, as managers prefer debt financing, but at the same time try to ignore dividend payment. Therefore, investors may not invest in firms with a higher proportion of managerial ownership and may choose to invest more in institutional ownership, which lowers the agency cost.

Audit firms and industry specialization in an emerging economy

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 338-362
Author(s):  
Karim Hegazy ◽  
Mohamed Hegazy
Keyword(s):  
Financial Services ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Brand Name ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms

PurposeThis study aims to investigate the implications of audit industry specialization on auditor’s retention and growth within an emerging economy. Factors such as whether the firm is a Big 4, a firm with international affiliation, a local firm and the type of industry were studied to analyse the reasons behind audit firm retention and growth.Design/methodology/approachThis research is based on a field study related to audit firms providing services to listed companies in an emerging economy. The sample includes the top 100 publicly held companies’ in the Egyptian stock market during 2006-2011 for which their annual reports are analysed to determine the audit firms’ retention and growth. An assessment of the continuity of the auditors and the increase in the number of audit clients were also measured.FindingsThe results confirm that industry specialization has an important effect on the auditor’s retention, especially for industries where capital investment is significant such as buildings, construction, financial services, housing and real estate. Big 4 audit firms retained their clients because of their industry specialization and brand name. Evidence was found that good knowledge of accounting and auditing standards resulted in audit firms with international affiliation competing with the Big 4 for clients’ retention and growth.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the existing literature, as it is among the first to provide empirical evidence on auditor retention, growth and auditor’s dominance in an emerging economy such as Egypt.

scholarly journals Board structure and institutional ownership at the time of IPO

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (9) ◽  
pp. 950-965 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suman Neupane ◽  
Biwesh Neupane
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Critical Time ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Institutional Holdings ◽  
Foreign Institutional Investors ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of mandatory regulatory provisions on board structure and the influence of such board structure on institutional holdings. Design/methodology/approach The study uses unique hand-collected data set of Indian IPOs during the 2004-2012 period after the corporate governance reforms with the introduction of clause 49 in the listing agreements in 2001. Using OLS regression, the paper empirically analyses the determinants of board size and board independence at the time of the IPOs and the influence of such a board structure on shareholdings by domestic and foreign institutional investors. Findings The authors find that complying with mandatory regulatory provisions does not impede firms from structuring their boards to reflect the firms’ advising and monitoring needs. The authors also find that complying with provisions have positive implication for the firm, as firms with greater board independence appear to attract more foreign institutional investors. Originality/value To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first study to examine the issue in a regime where regulation mandates the composition of the board of directors. The paper also extends the literature on institutional holdings by providing evidence on the impact of board structure on institutional ownership at a critical time in a firm’s life cycle when concerns for endogeneity for empirical investigations are weaker.

Deposits structure, ownership concentration and corporate governance disclosure in GCC Islamic banks

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rihab Grassa
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Far East ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Gcc Countries ◽  
Transparency And Disclosure ◽  
Governance Disclosure

Purpose This paper aims to assess the effects of deposits structure and ownership structure on the GCC Islamic banks’ corporate governance disclosure (CGD) practices. Design/methodology/approach The study is based on a sample of 38 Islamic banks operating in five Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and the authors observed them over the period from 2006 to 2011. The authors used the transparency and disclosure score, developed by Standard & Poor’s (S&P), to identify the sample’s CGD scores. Findings This paper’s findings suggest that the level of CGD is lower for Islamic banks with higher ownership concentration, for levered Islamic banks and for Islamic banks with greater concentration of nonprofit-sharing investment accounts (PSIA) and is higher for Islamic banks with greater concentrations of PSIA; the Islamic bank size; the bank age; listed bank and the country transparency index. By disaggregating the total CGD into the three sub-categories, the authors are able to specify, also, the components of corporate governance (CG) impacted by various determinants. Research limitations/implications This paper is subject to a number of limitations. First, there is manual scoring of annual reports (subjectivity). Second, the research focuses exclusively on the GCC context and excludes the other Middle East, Southeast Asia and Far East countries, where ownership structure and deposits structure might affect CGD differently. Third, the governance score, which is used in this research, is developed by S&P and does not take into account the characteristics of Islamic banks. Practical implications The findings of this paper suggest many policy implications. First, through the optimization of ownership structure, GCC countries’ regulators have to improve the Islamic banking system’s CG mechanisms through the optimization of ownership structure (dispersed ownership) to promote transparency and disclosure. Second, regulators and policymakers should revise guidelines with the main purpose of protecting PSIA’ holders (considered to be minor shareholders without voting power) through promoting disclosure and transparency. Third, the findings can be useful for many international supervisory bodies, like the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), in evaluating transparency and disclosure standards. Originality/value This study is expected to be useful for all market participants, namely, investors, financial analysts, managers, marker regulators and many international Islamic supervisory bodies, such as the IFSB and AAOIFI, by providing new requirements on CGD in the GCC region and in better understanding its determinants for Islamic banks in this region.

Independent directors and firm value of group-affiliated firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amrinder Khosa
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Value Relevance ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Indian Setting

Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of board independence on firm valuation of group-affiliated firms in distinct Indian setting. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a sample of 317 listed firms comprising 1,350 firm-year observations for the period 2008-2012. The value-relevance model is used to examine the effect of board independence on market value of equity. Findings The distinct finding of an inverse relationship between board independence and firm value of group-affiliated firms in India illustrates that effective monitoring by outside directors is largely influenced by the institutional setting and ownership structure. This study does not find any evidence of different valuation when comparing non-family CEOs and family CEOs. Practical implications Independent directors play an important role to stop abusive use of related-party transactions in an environment where principal–principal conflict exists. The study’s findings will prove useful in determining whether one should rely merely on the independent status of outside directors or the influence of institutional setting on effective governance. Originality/value This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: it helps to gain a better understanding of business groups which are characterised by unique governance structures and the dominance of controlling families on the board, which makes the external governance mechanisms (i.e. independent directors and non-family CEOs) ineffective and it illustrates that effective monitoring by outside directors is largely influenced by the institutional setting and ownership structure.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document