Russia's Syria intervention will empower jihadists

Significance Russia is primarily attacking the Syrian opposition, forcing rebel groups to rely more heavily on Syrian al-Qaida-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) for military support. Meanwhile, Russia is launching relatively few strikes on Islamic State group (ISG), which is emphasising its hostility towards Russia in order to recruit, and to advance militarily. Impacts Russia's escalation will prolong Syria's civil war for several years, thereby promoting further radicalisation. Its continuation will ensure numerous extremist groups, including ISG, retain sanctuary in Syria. Russia will use ISG-linked terrorist attacks in the West to justify its expanded military presence in the Middle East. ISG will likely increase efforts to develop regional affiliates to gain strategic resilience. Russia will increase its leverage internationally, even as it exacerbates the security threat posed by ISG and al-Qaida.

Significance The June 26 suicide attack inside the Imam al-Sadiq Mosque killed 27 people and was Kuwait's worst terrorist attack in over three decades. The attack, claimed by Islamic State group (ISG) and carried out by a Saudi citizen, was intended to inflame sectarian tensions that have spiralled in recent years. US officials have long identified Kuwait as an epicentre of funding and other forms of materiel assistance for participants in the Syrian civil war. However, unlike Qatar and Saudi Arabia, where support largely has flowed in one direction toward Sunni rebel groups, Kuwaitis have provided high-profile support to both the opposition and the Assad regime. Impacts The government will use the attack to reinforce its narrative that the bidun constitute a security threat rather than a human rights issue. Initial solidarity among Kuwait Sunni and Shia could dissipate quickly into political wrangling over the government's response. Kuwaiti salafi aid will boost hardline Islamist rebel groups in Syria. Key commercial and business interests, and oil installations are unlikely to be affected seriously by the rising terrorist threat. Reinforced security measures will further restrict political freedoms in the GCC's most open state.


Subject Lone-actor terrorist motivations. Significance Recent lone-actor terrorist attacks in Orlando, Nice, Munich and elsewhere have made this threat salient for the public and policymakers alike. The number of lone-actor attacks has almost trebled since 1990 -- from a base rate of 5-6 per year, according to recent research. Yet the authorities find these types of attacks difficult to detect and disrupt ahead of time. Impacts Lone-actor attacks are likely to recur in the West while authorities struggle to respond. Islamic State group (ISG)-inspired lone-actor attacks may incentivise far-right lone actors to respond violently and vice-versa. The rise of encrypted messaging services and the dark net will fuel the debate around policing this problem without curbing free speech.


Subject Assessment of the 'Khorasan Group' Significance The US-led coalition's airstrikes in Syria since 2014 have focused on the Islamic State group (ISG). However, they have also struck the 'Khorasan Group' -- a collection of veteran al-Qaida operatives that allegedly plots terrorist attacks abroad, and that operates on the edges of Syria's al-Qaida affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN). Beginning in late 2014, Washington warned repeatedly that the Khorasan Group was plotting attacks in Europe and the United States, and that it was recruiting holders of Western passports who would be able to enter and transit Western countries more easily. Impacts Al-Qaida outside Syria will likely pursue terrorist attacks that punish the West for its policies in the Muslim world. ISG will also carry out terrorist attacks in an effort to assert its leadership over the global jihadist movement. Without an imminent threat from the Khorasan Group, the West will have difficulty making a case for targeting JaN. JaN will retain a base of Syrian opposition support so long as it does not invite international retaliation by supporting an attack abroad.


Significance The past year witnessed further jihadi gains amid the political turmoil in the Middle East that has followed the Arab uprisings -- most significantly the Islamic State Group (ISG)'s conquest of Sunni provinces Iraq in June and proclamation of a caliphate. However, the advance is not even across the board; the threat remains centred on regional targets, more than those in the West. More spillover from a metastasising jihadism in the Middle East is to be expected, including sporadic high-profile attacks in the West. Impacts The international reputation of Syria's Assad regime will gradually improve as the West remains focused on the threat of the ISG. Authoritarian regimes will exploit the jihadist threat to justify internal security crackdowns and delay democratic reforms. US-Iranian collaboration against ISG will reinforce the perception of an anti-Sunni conspiracy -- a key feature of jihadi propaganda. The US shale oil revolution will continue to offset disruption to oil supplies by the ISG. Tourism in affected countries, particularly Egypt, will continue to suffer.


Subject The outlook for terrorism. Significance Terrorist activity has been increasing in recent years. The rise of the Islamic State group (ISG) has reinvigorated jihadism and inspired attacks in the West. Jihadist attacks there make a disproportionately small proportion of terrorist attacks worldwide, yet these might be the ones with the greatest global effect. Impacts ISG's loss of territory and financial sources may only result in a slow decline of global terrorism. Much will depend on governance build-up in Iraq. Additional counterterrorism funding and new laws strengthening existing measures will continue apace. Knee-jerk and over-reactive measures focusing too heavily on the symptoms of terrorism are unlikely to produce sustainable progress.


Author(s):  
L. L. FITUNI

The article is an attempt to predict the main trends of the political, cultural and ideological development of the Middle East in the  medium and long term, taking into account the impact of  international terrorism. To provide optimal solutions possible the  author identifies a number of core components. Basing this selection  he offers his vision of the likely behaviour of key state and non-state  actors as well as the forthcoming fate of the objects of their attention. In preparing the scenarios, the main methods of  predictive analytics were used: statistical analysis, intellectual  analysis of data, analysis of patterns and models conducted within  the framework of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research project  “The Phenomenon of the Islamic State” in the context of the development of a modern Eastern society. “The article is based  on an interpretation of the main conclusions and results of using those methods and methodologies. The article asserts that the recent growth of radical Islam in the East and political populism  in the West are close root causes. Despite all the differences in the  rhetoric and the outward forms, they represent a defensive response  on the part of those segments of Eastern and  Western societies that have failed to adjust to rigid paradigms of  globalization. Intra- and inter-confessional conflicts may become the  prevailing form of military threats in the region, beginning around  the 2020s. Their heralds are already visible in conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and, to a lesser extent, in Lebanon, Bahrain and on the east  coast of the Arabian Peninsula. Interstate Shiite-Sunni contradictions have so far been limited by political-ideological  confrontation and diplomatic demarches, sometimes accompanied by various embargoes, such as the recent Qatar crisis. Even the physical destruction of the selfproclaimed Islamic pseudo-state in MENA will take some time. Under favorable circumstances, ISIS units may be squeezed out of the important settlements of Syria and Iraq  within a year. This will not mean the end of ISIS. The experience of  the war with terrorist groups in Libya, Algeria, West Africa, Somalia,  Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia shows that even when driven out  into the desert or sparsely populated areas, fragmented but linked  groups of terrorists continue for quite some time to inflict harassing attacks on government forces and objects, to make long  sorties and to arrange spectacular acts of terrorism. Most likely, the  forces interested in maintaining the problems of international terrorism high on the agenda will not sit idly by but will  undertake spectacular and noteworthy actions to keep terrorism  issues in the limelight. As a result, the intensity of terrorist attacks in  the West may increase, since even limited terrorist attacks in  Europe cause more media coverage in the world media than any acts of terrorism in the Middle East. To achieve these goals, new channels and forms of imple mentation of terrorist attacks will  be used, such as terrorist acts involving children, ordinary means of  transport, during the course of mass and symbolic political events, elections, etc.


Subject ISG infiltration of refugee flows. Significance Refugee arrivals in Europe in 2016, large if not at 2015 levels, will put yet more pressure on the EU, which is already struggling to address economic crises, political polarisation and inter-state divisions on how to address security crises in Ukraine and the Middle East. Suspicions have grown that among the refugees are operatives of the Islamic State group (ISG). Impacts ISG's foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria will seek to expand their relationships with existing extremist networks in Europe. Speculation over ISG's presence within refugee flows will continue, especially as far-right parties continue to perform well in elections. The EU-Turkey deal may slow refugee flows, but the existing numbers of refugees will continue to attract suspicion from authorities.


Subject Russia's diversified military capacity in Syria. Significance Russian armed forces played an active role in the Syrian government's recapture of Palmyra in March, despite the partial withdrawal of Russian aircraft from Syria. As well as air strikes, months of Russian military training and arms deliveries enhanced the Syrian army's combat capacity, contributing to a rapid collapse of Islamic State group (ISG) resistance. The operation showed how Russia has widened the instruments available: it can scale conventional air strikes up or down, provide fire support from helicopters or artillery, and use these elements to compensate for deficiencies in the Syrian military, while supplying weaponry, training and coordination to local forces. Impacts Russian military support can ensure the Syrian regime's survival, but that will require a long-term presence. The recapture of Aleppo would constitute a near fatal blow to the Syrian rebel movement. The Russian military will learn lessons about weaponry and coordination from the Syrian operation. Elements of these lessons including control of proxy forces may be applied in future foreign interventions. The use of mercenaries, trialled in Syria, offers Moscow a useful and deniable instrument abroad.


Subject Iran's role in Yemen. Significance Yemeni and US officials have long claimed that Iran backs the northern Huthi movement, which follows the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam. Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his Gulf allies fear that Iran is helping the group to overthrow Hadi's government as part of an attempt to establish an arc of Iranian interference in the Arab Middle East, from Lebanon and Syria to the Gulf. However, the Huthis deny any such ties with Tehran, and, until now, Yemen has remained low down on Tehran's regional agenda. Impacts Iran will use the Saudi intervention as an opportunity to build its networks inside Yemen in order to gain more leverage in the Gulf. More tangible Iranian interference in Yemen is likely to stoke further sectarian tensions in the region. Rising sectarianism within Yemen would enable al-Qaida and Islamic State group to gain greater traction in the country. Iran will refrain from military intervention so long as the nuclear negotiations continue. Tehran will lobby diplomatically to boost Shia rights and Huthi representation in any future government.


Subject Prospects for the Middle East in the second quarter. Significance With average oil prices in 2015 likely to be 30-40% lower than in 2014, most countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region will see a huge change in their financial performance. Oil exporters could face major falls in fiscal revenue and foreign exchange earnings, while oil importers will receive a welcome boost to their budgetary and external accounts. On the security front, regional governments will focus on the threat from an expanding Islamic State group (ISG), and the fallout from a possible nuclear deal between the P5+1 world powers and Iran.


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