Immigration policy could topple Swedish government

Significance This is a lower forecast than the 170,000 the agency predicted in October, before Sweden reimposed controls at its border with Denmark. The immigration issue is causing strains within the minority two-party coalition government. The junior Green Party has lost several key battles in the last couple of months and is said to be questioning its participation in the government. Some scepticism has crept into the ranks of the Social Democrats as well, with several senior members encouraging the leadership to form a new government with the Moderate Party. Impacts With so many asylum seekers already in the country, Sweden's infrastructure will be pushed to the limit. Every misstep will cause further problems for the government. The Greens will either be allowed to push their own agenda within the government, or will break away. With polls showing a clear majority for the opposition, the temptation to bring down the government may prove too hard to resist. If the opposition joins forces to submit a budget proposal in the autumn, the current minority government must resign.

Subject Denmark's new government. Significance On June 26, Denmark’s Social Democrats (SD) led by Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen formed a single-party minority government with the support of the Social Liberals, the Socialist People’s Party and the Red-Green Alliance, its three allies in the centre-left 'red bloc'. The government's plans primarily focus on ambitious climate reform, welfare reform and a broad continuation of Denmark’s strict immigration policy. Impacts Immigration will remain a top electoral concern for decades, with the immigrant population forecast to grow faster than the national one. In order to reclaim lost support, the anti-immigrant Danish People’s Party (DPP) will need to adopt a pro-environmental policy. Even if relations within the red bloc worsen, the parties that support the SD will be reluctant to collapse the government.


Significance This autumn, bitter conflict between the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Save Romania Union (USR) ended a brief period of centre-right rule, after years of domination by the Social Democrats (PSD). Former army chief Nicolae Ciuca heads the government, which the PSD dominates alongside a much-weakened PNL. Impacts The government may struggle to persuade a suspicious populace to back vaccination, given previous PSD reluctance for anti-COVID-19 measures. The pandemic may deter civil society from mobilising against abuses of power to the extent it did during the last PSD government. The government's dilemma will be curbing the justice system's independence without provoking a strong EU reaction.


Subject Austria's election implications. Significance The Austrian People’s Party (OVP) will stay in power after winning 37.54% of the vote in the September 29 snap elections -- a gain of over 5 percentage points from the 2017 election. Its objective is now to form a coalition. It could either renew the centre-right alliance with the Freedom Party (FPO), or realign itself towards the centre by going into government with the Social Democrats (SPO) or the Green Party. Finding a coalition that provides a balance between stability and policy cohesion will be difficult. Impacts Foreign intelligence services may remain sceptical about cooperating with Austria if the far-right FPO returns to government. The rise of the Green Party will put pressure on the OVP to pay more attention to popular climate and environmental policies. Austria will continue to support the strengthening of the EU’s external borders and fast-tracking the repatriation of illegal migrants.


Subject Sweden's new government. Significance On January 16, Sweden’s Social Democrats formed a minority coalition with the Green Party, with support from the centre-right Liberal and Centre parties. It also has reluctant support from the Left party, which may not play any role in policy. The agreement marks the end of four months of cross-party negotiations after September’s general election delivered a hung parliament. The left-right alliance attempts to prevent the populist and anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats, which won 17.5% in the election, from entering government. The coalition parties could eventually face a no-confidence vote tabled by the Left party over their support for centre-right policies, while a failure to tackle crime and immigration will serve to strengthen the Sweden Democrats' profile in opposition. Impacts The fragile nature of the government could be a deterrent for future investors in the Swedish economy. The UK departure from the EU and the perceived strengthening of the German-Franco alliance may increase support for Sweden’s own EU exit. Sweden will stop selling weapons to 'undemocratic countries' -- a reference to Saudi Arabia.


2003 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Csaba Nikolenyi

After the 1998 general elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, the largest party, the Social Democrats, formed a minority government. The formation of this government was puzzling for at least four reasons. First, according to the so-called Opposition Pact, the minority government was supported from the outside by the conservative Civic Democratic Party, the principal opponent of the Social Democrats in the party system. Second, the grand legislative coalition was not followed by the sharing of executive portfolios between the two largest parties. Third, the two parties entered into this agreement only weeks after they had explicitly stated their unwillingness to govern together. Fourth, neither theories of coalition formation nor those of minority government formation provide an accurate prediction for this outcome. This article provides a solution for these puzzles based on a game theoretic analysis.


Significance The Portuguese government presented its 2017 budget to parliament on October 14. The EU agreed in August to waive fines over its excessive budget deficits, but Portugal remains under pressure to increase its budgetary consolidation efforts. Impacts A ratings downgrade by DBRS would exclude Portugal from the ECB's bond-buying programme. Portugal's banking sector remains a source of concern as low interest rates, high costs and low asset quality squeeze profit margins. The ruling Socialist Party is likely to maintain its lead in polls over the Social Democrats, the main opposition party.


Subject Romanian government policy in a slowing economy. Significance Economic developments have allowed the senior coalition party, the Social Democrats, to claim a measure of success in the last few years, despite acute cabinet instability and controversial judicial reforms. However, growth is widely expected to slow in 2019. Despite upbeat projections in the budget, passed belatedly and in the face of presidential opposition in mid-March, the government is struggling to fund ambitious wage increases, as the budget deficit comes perilously close to breaching EU limits. Impacts The banking and energy sectors are bearing the brunt of interventionist policies. Legal instability could damage investment. Long-term underinvestment in infrastructure and lack of institutional modernisation will become more evident and difficult to tolerate.


Author(s):  
I. Grishin

Traditional stability of the Swedish legislative and executive authorities functioning, manifested in the almost complete absence of parliamentary and governmental crises, was questioned by results of the general elections in September 2014. The Alliance of four center-right parties who ruled Sweden from 2006 to 2014 suffered a defeat having lost 32 of 173 mandates. Simultaneously, the informal coalition of three center-left parties that opposed to the Alliance in 2006-2014 increased its representation in the Riksdag from 156 to 159 deputies only. Thus, none of the two inter-party blocks has the absolute parliamentary majority (175) needed for the formation of the own government. At the same time, Sweden Democrats who first entered the Riksdag in 2010 have significantly increased their faction (from 20 to 49 deputies) and thereby strengthened their king maker position (holding the balance of power) in the new parliament. Yet this party is isolated and excluded from the cross-party interaction in the Riksdag because of its Islamofobia and anti-immigrant attitudes. The new government of minority (the Social Democrats and the Green Party) was approved by the Riksdag due to the negative parliamentarism principle which means that the government shall be deemed approved if it does not receive the absolute majority of votes against it. However, many subsequent government bills submitted to the Riksdag are likely to be rejected by the opposition parties of the Alliance with assistance of the Sweden Democrats. To avoid such situation, the government parties have to bargain with smaller center-right parties on particular issues and thus to form a required ad hoc parliamentary majority. After the last elections, the political establishment parties became much more dependent in their interaction on the Sweden Democrats' unpredictable behavior than before. All of these factors greatly complicate the Riksdag's and the government's work as well as sharply increase risks of governmental and parliamentary crises even to the extent of the government's resignation and pre-term elections. It is unusual for Sweden where such elections last took place in 1958.


2006 ◽  
pp. 54-75
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Friedrich

Facing the decisive struggle between Nazism and Soviet communism for dominance in Europe, in 1942/43 Polish communists sojourning in the USSR espoused anti-German concepts of the political right. Their aim was an ethnic Polish ‘national communism’. Meanwhile, the Polish Workers’ Party in the occupied country advocated a maximum intensification of civilian resistance and partisan struggle. In this context, commentaries on the Nazi judeocide were an important element in their endeavors to influence the prevailing mood in the country: The underground communist press often pointed to the fate of the murdered Jews as a warning in order to make it clear to the Polish population where a deficient lack of resistance could lead. However, an agreed, unconditional Polish and Jewish armed resistance did not come about. At the same time, the communist press constantly expanded its demagogic confrontation with Polish “reactionaries” and accused them of shared responsibility for the Nazi murder of the Jews, while the Polish government (in London) was attacked for its failure. This antagonism was intensified in the fierce dispute between the Polish and Soviet governments after the rift which followed revelations about the Katyn massacre. Now the communist propaganda image of the enemy came to the fore in respect to the government and its representatives in occupied Poland. It viewed the government-in-exile as being allied with the “reactionaries,” indifferent to the murder of the Jews, and thus acting ultimately on behalf of Nazi German policy. The communists denounced the real and supposed antisemitism of their adversaries more and more bluntly. In view of their political isolation, they coupled them together, in an undifferentiated manner, extending from the right-wing radical ONR to the social democrats and the other parties represented in the underground parliament loyal to the London based Polish government. Thereby communist propaganda tried to discredit their opponents and to justify the need for a new start in a post-war Poland whose fate should be shaped by the revolutionary left. They were thus paving the way for the ultimate communist takeover


2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-40
Author(s):  
Vera Eccarius-Kelly

The article examines trends in voting preferences and voting behavior of Turkish-origin German voters. Despite only representing a small percentage of the total German electorate, Turkish-origin voters are gaining an opportunity to shape the future political landscape. While the Social Democrats have benefited most directly from the minority constituency so far, this author suggests that the Green Party is poised to attract the younger, better educated, and German-born segment of the Turkish-origin voters. All other dominant national parties have ignored this emerging voting bloc, and missed opportunities to appeal to Turkish-origin voters by disregarding community-specific interests. 


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