Turkey's neighbours may skew EU migrant deal

Significance As Bulgarian-Turkish relations have hit a low point in any case, the Bulgarian government can adopt a tough line without fear of alienating Turkey. In contrast to Bulgaria, Greece has seized on the EU deal as a chance to improve ties with Turkey. It may be Cyprus that turns out to be the spoiler. Impacts Frustrated in the Middle East, Turkey's zero-problems-with-neighbours policy is faltering in South-eastern Europe too. The EU deal will boost Greek-Turkish cooperation, which might spill over from migration to other areas. Bulgaria will step up efforts to join Schengen but the prospect of accession is far removed.

Significance In the weeks after the energy earthquake generated by Russian President Vladimir Putin's announcement that Russia was cancelling plans to construct the South Stream gas pipeline across the Black Sea, tremors and aftershocks are still reverberating around South-Eastern Europe. Hopes that the announcement was a bluff intended to increase Russia's bargaining power with Brussels, or that South Stream can be revived, seem misconceived. Impacts Passing the blame for the cancellation onto the EU is unlikely to work, in part thanks to the way in which Putin broke the news. Russia will lose significant leverage over the participant countries, particularly those in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The biggest winner could be the EU, assuming it steps into the energy vacuum and helps countries secure alternative supply routes.


Significance TAP is supplying gas to Greece via the Nea Mesemvria facility near Thessaloniki; Bulgaria through a temporary link from Kulata on the Greek border; and Italy, joining its network at Melendugno. This inaugurates the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), which has been central to EU efforts to enhance energy security by diversifying supplies away from Russia. Impacts Italy’s involvement in Balkan energy includes stakes in TAP and Greece’s DESFA, and investment in the Greece-Bulgaria interconnector. Russia will lose market share in South-eastern Europe during the 2020s, unless coal closures increase demand for gas. The switch from lignite may become a matter of contention between the EU and China, which is investing in coal in Serbia and Bosnia.


Subject Azerbaijan's rising profile in South-eastern Europe, both as hydrocarbons supplier and source of investment. Significance Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic's visit to Baku on April 13-15 to promote Azerbaijani investment in strategic infrastructure, agriculture and the chemicals industry is only the latest in a series of contacts. Relations with Azerbaijan are principally about the delivery and transit of gas, with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) coming on stream in 2019-20. However, Balkan countries are increasingly looking to Baku as a source of foreign investment and an export destination. Impacts Balkan countries will be key for the transit of Caspian gas to the EU. Azerbaijan will continue working with them, in order to diversify its diplomatic and economic relations. In a region still suffering prolonged recession, governments will scramble to build and capitalise on ties with Baku.


Subject Russian espionage in the Balkans. Significance Spy scandals have rocked Bulgaria in recent months and have already led to the expulsion of three Russian diplomats. Moscow sees South-eastern Europe as a weak spot in the Western alliance. Scrutinised by the West, the government in Sofia is under pressure to take a tougher stand on Moscow’s influence in the country. Impacts The new Bulgarian prosecutor general’s anti-graft campaign will exclude the energy sector, where Russia’s clout is extensive. It is the United States, not the EU, that will lead the pushback against Russian influence. The spy scandals are unlikely to cause irreparable damage to Russia’s interests in South-eastern Europe.


SEER ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-18
Author(s):  
Jens Becker ◽  
Ina Kulić

Many societies are still in the stranglehold of the coronavirus. China, South Korea and Taiwan have apparently overcome the pandemic but problems that are almost impossible to resolve are piling up in Europe. Despite the joint vaccination procurement campaign, the EU in particular is struggling to regulate the crisis domestically. The states of the western Balkans which have been relying on an EU perspective for years and which have repeatedly been put off, have also been hit hard, piling problems on top of health services that are, for a number of reasons, already seriously jeopardised. In view of the worsening situation - countries in central and south-eastern Europe are over-represented among those with the highest numbers of Covid-19 related deaths - we take a closer look at current practicalities and political realities in these ‘high incidence areas’, as the region is currently known (according to the Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft). This article focuses on the role of the EU, and how views of this are changing in the region, as well as that being played by other, apparently more nimble and agile, powers.


Subject Prospects for Central-Eastern Europe in 2017. Significance In the absence of robust business confidence, Central Europe and the Baltic states (CEB) will implement short-term monetary and fiscal policies to support growth; GDP growth will suffer from global market vicissitudes and rising political tensions in key trading partners inside and outside the EU. The crisis in the EU will continue to bear down on South-Eastern Europe (SEE), bringing an effective end to the policy of enlargement.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-42
Author(s):  
Arben Mustafa ◽  
Valentin Toçi

Abstract This paper uses the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic to provide empirical evidence on the impact of competitive behaviour of banks on risk-taking, using the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition Method on panel data of banks in 15 Central and South-Eastern Europe countries during the period 1999-2009. The findings suggest that banking sector competition has had a negative impact on banks’ risk-taking implying that competition contributed to the improvement of the loan-portfolio quality. However, the results differ significantly when distinguishing between the EU and non-EU countries of the CESEE region. While for the EU countries the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking remains negative, this relationship is positive for the non-EU countries of the region, suggesting that an increase of competition in the non-EU countries may be detrimental for the stability of the banking sector in these countries. These results are robust to different model specifications and measures of competition


Author(s):  
Iustina Alina Boitan ◽  
Teodora Cristina Barbu

The chapter focuses on the innovative financial technology called FinTech and explores its prospects for becoming a catalyst for financial inclusion. The novelty of the research approach resides in being the first study computing an EU FinTech index for the EU member countries. The index gathers four dimensions and provides insights on whether the FinTech environment in one country is better or worse compared to other countries in the sample. Countries' ranking based on index scores computed for two different years show that Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, and Germany are always placed on the top of the hierarchy. Therefore, they exhibit real development opportunities in this regard. At the opposite are some countries in South-Eastern Europe that persistently record the lowest FinTech index scores; thus, there is still room for improvements in terms of market players' presence, existing regulation, access to digital financial inclusion.


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