Kim has the initiative in US-North Korea relations

Significance This followed Pyongyang’s breach of its 17-month moratorium on missile testing with two volleys on May 4 and May 9, each personally supervised by Kim and both including short-range ballistic missile launches. Impacts Kim has given Washington until the end of the year to rethink its stance; that is possible but unlikely. Pyongyang’s new missile may be able to penetrate South Korean missile defences. South Korea will persevere with cooperation efforts for now, despite Pyongyang’s rebuffs.

Headline NORTH KOREA/SOUTH KOREA: Balloon ban may improve ties


Subject North Korea's politics and foreign relations. Significance North Korea on May 9 announced its first ever test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Separately, Pyongyang has yet to comment on allegations by South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) on May 13 that the North's defence minister, Hyon Yong-chol, was publicly executed using anti-aircraft guns around April 30, apparently for disrespect and disobedience to Kim. Impacts Delivering on pledges of economic improvement would buy Kim loyalty, but there are reasons for pessimism. The new missile threat will raise North Korea's place on the list of US priorities. Decisions on missile defence in South Korea will become more urgent.


Significance No warning was given to shipping. With rare speed, owing to Chinese fury at the timing of this during the G20 summit in Hangzhou, the next day the UN Security Council (UNSC) condemned Pyongyang's "flagrant disregard" of past UNSC resolutions. With no sign that Kim Jong-un will heed this latest UN rebuke any more than previous ones, the current Western and global hard line towards North Korea is having no visible impact. Impacts North-South relations will probably remain abysmal till then, though opportunistic U-turns by either Korea cannot be entirely ruled out. Chinese enforcement of sanctions will remain patchy, especially given Beijing's hostility to US missile deployment in South Korea. Regular deployment of SLBMs by Pyongyang would be a game-changer for the region. South Korean predictions of regime collapse are premature.


Significance North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited China during January 7-10. He spent his 35th birthday in Beijing and met Chinese President Xi Jinping for the fourth time in ten months. Meanwhile, Pompeo implied on January 11 that sanctions on North Korea could be eased, with a focus on removing its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat to the United States rather than full denuclearisation. Impacts Xi might make an overdue return visit to Pyongyang in April, perhaps before Kim’s promised first visit to Seoul. Other Asian leaders may visit Pyongyang too, conferring legitimacy on Kim. South Korea may once again challenge China for influence in North Korea.


Subject North Korea-US relations. Significance The ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) held a Plenum on December 28-31. Supreme leader Kim Jong-un’s uncompromising keynote speech included an explicit abrogation of his two-year moratorium on nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests, plus a pledge to reveal an unspecified “new strategic weapon” soon. Personnel changes, both announced and apparent, also suggest a turn away from diplomacy. Impacts Chinese economic support will be vital for North Korea, despite Kim’s rhetoric of self-reliance. Nuclear testing would anger Beijing, whose cooperation Kim needs, so an ICBM launch is likelier. South Korea, unmentioned in Kim’s speech, will be sidelined; President Moon Jae-in’s peace process is in tatters.


Significance While Russia worries about the risk of instability triggered by a strict sanctions regime, its role in the North Korea crisis is limited to supporting China's calls for restraint on all sides. It has supported previous UN sanctions but is against US proposals for tougher action, partly because it insists the July 4 test was of an intermediate-range rather than intercontinental ballistic missile. Impacts Moscow will support the current UN sanctions regime while trying to block expansion and occasionally flouting the rules. South Korean automotive and hi-tech investment is more likely in European Russia than eastern Russia. Russia has neither the will nor the ability to keep North Korea provided with essential goods.


Significance It resulted in a short (400-word) joint statement that contained no new specific pledges. It did not contain Trump's surprise announcements in the ensuing press conference that "we will be stopping the war games" and "I want to get our soldiers out". Trump also said North Korea "is already destroying a major missile engine testing site"; this too was not in the document. Impacts South Korean conservatives will strongly oppose Trump's 'war games' pledge, seeing it as a threat to national security. The summit's outcome will cause anxiety in Tokyo; neither of Japan's two main concerns (abductees and short-range missiles) were addressed. China has gained; Trump's military moves are de facto acceptance of its 'freeze for freeze' proposal.


Subject South Korea's international relationships. Significance South Korea’s government is celebrating the success of its response to COVID-19, but the country’s four key foreign relationships all face difficulties -- those with the United States, China, Japan and North Korea. No other countries or regions are vital to Seoul, despite vaunted ‘Southern’ and ‘Northern’ initiatives. Impacts A prolonged deadlock on funding the US military presence in South Korea could push Seoul closer to Beijing. If President Xi Jinping visits South Korea later this year, Washington could easily misread this. Substantial fence-mending with Japan may have to await new leaderships in both countries. South Korean President Moon Jae-in may have tacitly given up on North Korea, which has visibly given up on him.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 92-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joon-heon Song

Purpose The purpose of this study is to explore the essential cause for the policy failure of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in South Korea. Design/methodology/approach To substantiate the claims made for the failure of the policy, this paper focuses on the differences in policy preferences among the government ministries and agencies involved in TAA. Findings The failure in the TAA policy, according to this study, was attributed to the conflicts and miscoordination arising from the differences in policy preferences among government ministries and agencies. To rectify this failure, the South Korean government had to revise its laws and regulations several times over a short period. Originality/value Drawing on the analytical framework of the literature on policy failure, this paper examines the causal relationships between outcomes of TAA policy and the conflicts or miscoordination among government bodies at each stage: initiatives and planning, implementation and operation of the policy.


Significance It also benefits from policies that heavily favour the domestic arms industry. This has resulted in a well-equipped modern military and a high degree of self-reliance in equipping it. However, this model may be unsustainable. Impacts Seoul will likely attempt to expand armaments collaboration with other countries to gain additional resources, technologies and markets. China’s military modernisation is an increasing concern, including in the context of potential war with China’s ally, North Korea. Threats from North Korea make air and missile defence the top procurement priorities.


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