Rivals will use tribes to destabilise Syria’s Raqqa

Keyword(s):  
The Us ◽  

Significance Some 80% of the city, which was the de facto capital of Islamic State (IS) until its capture by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), was ruined in fighting and reconstruction efforts have been limited. With 90% of the governorate's population of tribal origin, the Kurdish-dominated SDF relies on clientelist networks with tribal leaders, all Sunni Arab, to maintain order and garner support. Impacts Local and regional actors will compete for tribal leaders’ loyalty, creating divisions within tribes and clans. The SDF will retain the support of Raqqa-based tribal leaders. Tribal leaders who have fled elsewhere will promote dissent in SDF areas of control. Some youths who sympathise with IS’s cause will cause instability in Raqqa.

Significance The province's capital, Ramadi, fell to ISG on May 17 after the group launched a knock-out blow against embattled Iraqi Security Force (ISF) units. These units had been fighting intensively for nearly eighteen months and were on the point of exhaustion when ISG launched its offensive on the city, carrying out 30 suicide truck bombs in a matter of days. ISF exhaustion combined with ISG shock tactics meant that a thousand jihadists were able to outfight government forces. Impacts Iraq will remain in a state of high-intensity conflict into 2017. Sunni Arabs will be incorporated into the Iraqi army and paramilitary units. The National Guard initiative will cause controversy among Iraqi factions. The US military is likely to intensify airpower and special forces presence in Iraq. The conflict will set back oil and gas development, such as new licensing rounds and Kirkuk oil field.


Significance The Kurdish-dominated SDF, with weapons and air support from the US-led coalition fighting IS in Iraq and Syria, on November 5 launched a campaign to encircle and eventually seize Raqqa. The Wrath of the Euphrates offensive made some progress against outlying villages to the north of the city, and on December 10 began a second phase to take territory to the west. Impacts Turkish-US relations could worsen as Ankara confronts the SDF and engages more deeply with Moscow. Turkey could use the non-jihadi Syrian opposition in Syria’s north more openly to confront the Kurdish forces. IS, although weakened, will survive into the medium term owing to cleavages and disputes among its many enemies.


Author(s):  
Francesca Manes-Rossi ◽  
Natalia Aversano ◽  
Paolo Tartaglia Polcini

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore a citizen-centered tool for public accountability, the popular report (PR). Elaborating on previous studies and on content analysis of a sample of municipalities in the USA, this paper aims to identify the qualitative characteristics and content elements that PR should have to serve as a legitimation tool. Design/methodology/approach The study adopts a mixed methodology. After the analysis of previous studies on PR and best practices in US municipalities, a list of content elements and qualitative characteristics of PR is compared with results emerging from the content analysis of PR published by of a sample of municipalities in the USA. Findings The analysis reveals that the PR should embed information about the government’s sources of revenues and taxes, expenditures, cost of government services, liveability and governance of the city. Research limitations/implications The paper offers new knowledge on reporting centered on citizens, framing the analysis in the legitimacy theory. Even though the research relates only to the US context, the results may assist standard setters in preparing guidelines for local governments to communicate financial data to citizens and stimulate further research in other contexts. Practical implications The results may encourage local governments to prepare a PR suitable to discharge accountability and gain legitimation. Originality/value This study is the first to discuss the PR within a theoretical framework, in this case, legitimacy theory. Moreover, a further novelty lays in the analysis carried out on the PRs published by US municipalities in order to derive qualitative characteristics and content elements with which the PR should comply.


Subject US Iraqi Train and Equip Fund. Significance The US Department of Defense has requested an additional 630 million dollars for the Iraqi Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) in the 2016-17 fiscal year. This fund, hurriedly brought into existence in the summer of 2014, was developed to provide assistance and training to the Iraqi army in the wake of its disastrous performance against Islamic State group (ISG) forces. Forces trained under the ITEF will be a key component of the planned offensive to retake the ISG stronghold of Mosul later this year. Impacts The programme is unlikely to continue once Mosul has been retaken -- although other funding streams will continue. Its success would strengthen the Iraqi army, thereby empowering central government against pro-Iran, hardline militias. Its failure would strengthen these militias and increase the prospects of a semi-permanent fragmentation of the Iraqi state.


Significance This is the first visit to Washington by a Thai prime minister since 2005. Thai-US relations have been much cooler since the mid-2014 military coup that Prayuth, as an army general, led to depose Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. The visit, therefore, had high symbolism. It was also controversial because Trump is warming ties with a coup leader who has instituted a new constitution that will weaken elected government in Thailand after the next election, which Prayuth told Trump would take place in 2018. Impacts Thailand’s election could be delayed to 2019: two of the required pre-poll ‘organic laws’ will not be passed until end-2018. Thai intellectual property protections will likely be strengthened to avoid sanctions under the US Trade Act’s Section 301. Thai-US anti-Islamic State cooperation will likely be slow to build, partly given southern Thailand’s Muslim-Buddhist conflict. Thailand will push for enhanced trade ties with the EU and post-Brexit United Kingdom.


Subject Al-Qaida's future in Afghanistan. Significance The death of two al-Qaida leaders in Afghanistan highlights the group's continuing presence in the country and raises questions about the Taliban's promise to cut links with foreign jihadists in exchange for a deal with Washington. The Taliban's loyalty to al-Qaida survived the US invasion of 2001 and the more recent arrival of Islamic State (IS) with its exclusive claim to lead global jihad. Impacts Statements from Taliban representatives suggest a willingness to sign the nearly ready agreement with Washington. The Afghan government will continue resisting a separate US-Taliban agreement. Attacks deep in Taliban territory will encourage other jihadists to ally with IS.


Subject Kirkuk oil. Significance The issue of control of Kirkuk's oil is moving to the centre of Baghdad's economic deal with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). KRG forces took full control of the city and some of the province's oil fields in the wake of the federal army's collapse in July 2014. In need of significant rehabilitation, the fields' current production of 320,000 barrels per day (b/d) is well below the 475,000 b/d production capacity estimated by the US Energy Information Agency (pre-2003 levels were 900,000 b/d). However, a fiscal crisis and lower oil prices mean that Kirkuk oil is now a key issue in talks on revenue-sharing between Baghdad and Irbil. Impacts The KRG could escalate further by seizing all of Kirkuk's oilfields, which might speed up exports of Kirkuk oil. The Kurds will control Kirkuk militarily for the foreseeable future. Broken Baghdad-KRG relations could slow down the liberation of Mosul.


Subject Assessment of the 'Khorasan Group' Significance The US-led coalition's airstrikes in Syria since 2014 have focused on the Islamic State group (ISG). However, they have also struck the 'Khorasan Group' -- a collection of veteran al-Qaida operatives that allegedly plots terrorist attacks abroad, and that operates on the edges of Syria's al-Qaida affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN). Beginning in late 2014, Washington warned repeatedly that the Khorasan Group was plotting attacks in Europe and the United States, and that it was recruiting holders of Western passports who would be able to enter and transit Western countries more easily. Impacts Al-Qaida outside Syria will likely pursue terrorist attacks that punish the West for its policies in the Muslim world. ISG will also carry out terrorist attacks in an effort to assert its leadership over the global jihadist movement. Without an imminent threat from the Khorasan Group, the West will have difficulty making a case for targeting JaN. JaN will retain a base of Syrian opposition support so long as it does not invite international retaliation by supporting an attack abroad.


Significance The meeting follows Turkey's launch of military strikes on July 24 against Islamic State group (ISG) in northern Syria and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq. Although Ankara says it is pursuing a broader strategy against terrorism, it has two asymmetrical goals. Against ISG, its measures remain largely defensive in nature, including driving ISG from the border and reducing the threat of blowback inside Turkey. Against the PKK, they appear more ambitious and appear designed to crush the organisation and use force rather than dialogue to resolve the demands of Turkey's Kurds for greater cultural and political rights. Impacts The US-led coalition may move the main platform for its air campaign in Syria and Iraq to Turkey, reducing flying times to targets. Ankara is likely to stop short of deploying ground troops in Syria. ISG may retaliate inside Turkey, particularly against its tourism sector. AKP may abandon coalition negotiations and go for the nationalist vote to recover its majority in early elections, possibly in November. Crackdown on ISG activities inside Turkey could weaken the group in Syria.


Significance Although resistance will likely be fiercer in the centre of the city, particularly from ISG snipers and booby traps, the spokesman was confident that they would take control of the city within days. Impacts Removing ISG bases from Libya is likely to benefit Tunisia in the long term -- most terrorist attacks there were organised in Libya. However, the dispersal of experienced ISG fighters could see them spread into the Sahel and join other militant groups. This could mean an increase in terrorist attacks elsewhere in the region, especially more vulnerable states such as Mali and Niger.


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