Extremism is rising in Europe's security forces

Subject Extremism in security forces. Significance According to recent news reports, Germany's military intelligence agency launched investigations into 550 cases involving far-right extremism in the armed forces in 2019. The figures shed light on the risks of radicalisation and infiltration of armed and other security forces by far-right extremists. Across Western Europe, the risk of far-right violence has increased, prompting investigations into security forces personnel. Infiltration of armed services poses a security threat by giving extremists access to weapons, training and sensitive information. Impacts Extreme right groups are becoming better organised and equipped. Far-right political parties are unlikely to show support for individuals found guilty of extremism within the security forces. The risk of Islamist radicalisation within the security forces is greater in France than other countries.

Subject The decline of the Greens across Western Europe. Significance Green parties have been weakened in recent years in Europe and are suffering from the current economic and cultural context, caught between the rising far right and radical left. This regression in influence is also a regression in power at the European level, where the new European Parliament (EP) and European Commission are much less Green. Although European citizens are still attached to environmental values, there is little doubt that European environmental parties are now facing the risk of irrelevance. Impacts European policy will become less inclined to integrate environmental concerns, despite the aspirations of most European citizens. The Greens' loss of power may also weaken Europe's global leadership on environmental policy, especially climate change mitigation. The UK Green Party's surge in membership may owe more to a protest vote ahead of the May election than support for ecological issues.


Subject Military reform plans. Significance The declining intensity of Colombia's civil war has encouraged politicians and security officials to re-assess the function and structure of the armed forces. Military leaders have sought to diversify into new activities, such as policing and reconstruction in order to avoid budget cuts. In its latest announcement, the government declared that, for now, troop numbers will not be reduced. However, in the context of declining combat operations and a costly post-conflict reconstruction programme, cuts to the military budget are possible over the medium term. Impacts A permanent end to the civil war may precipitate a reduction in military purchases of helicopters and other counterinsurgency equipment. Nevertheless, armed crime groups will present an ongoing security threat, potentially justifying the maintenance of high military spending. Any future efforts to cut back military powers and budgets will provoke resistance from the institution and its congressional allies. Military supporters may seek to offset its decline by calling for greater army intervention in urban areas during peaks of gang violence.


Subject Boko Haram outlook. Significance The Nigerian Air Force announced on August 20 that it carried out “massive” bombing attacks earlier this month against Boko Haram forces regrouping around their former stronghold in the Sambisa Forest. This follows soon after the military allegedly killed Momodu Bama, second-in command to Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau. Yet despite these renewed military efforts, the Nigerian army faces two still-capable Boko Haram factions, each of which has staged multiple deadly attacks in recent months. Impacts The Islamic State-linked Boko Haram faction has emerged as the most dangerous security threat in the Lake Chad Basin in the short term. The military will struggle to differentiate between Boko Haram factions, undermining operational efficacy. Leadership turnover within the security forces will not overcome the systemic problem of under-equipped and underprepared troops. Neighbouring countries, such as Niger and Cameroon, will bolster border security amid worsening Boko Haram and other criminal threats.


Significance Security forces have inflicted serious damage on Colombia’s main criminal organisations in recent years. However, the enduring cocaine economy is providing new opportunities for smaller gangs to emerge. With links to national groups such as Los Urabenos, street gangs operating in small-scale drug trafficking (microtrafico) are thriving and, according to top prosecutor Luis Gonzalez, now pose the greatest threat to citizen security. Impacts High-profile gang killings risk tarnishing Colombia's recently improved image, weighing on tourism prospects. Urban population growth and rising gang violence will increase pressure for investment and infrastructure in cities. A major coca eradication drive would push up the street value of cocaine, making urban gang activity more lucrative.


Subject 'FARC' revival. Significance Nine dissidents formerly of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were reportedly killed on August 30, in an air strike President Ivan Duque claimed would send a “clear message” to rearming rebels. The operation followed the publication of a video on August 29 in which former FARC commander and lead peace negotiator Luciano Marin, alias ‘Ivan Marquez’, rejected his group’s peace process, calling upon former rebels to join a “new phase of the armed struggle”. Impacts Duque will portray the group as mere criminals, but its self-identification as the FARC will stick, to the detriment of the peace process. The remaining leadership of the demobilised FARC political party has condemned the calls to rearm but could face reprisals. While alliances would strengthen the new ‘FARC’, failure to achieve such deals may lead to conflict with FARC splinter groups or the ELN. Rebel attacks will increase as the new group establishes itself, especially in the lead-up to October’s elections.


Subject The militarisation of policing in Mexico. Significance On December 8, Defence Minister Salvador Cienfuegos questioned the government’s domestic security strategy, saying that insecurity and violent crime “are not issues you can resolve with gunfire”. His remarks come ten years after the launch of a military campaign against organised crime, championed by former President Felipe Calderon (2006-12). Since then, criticism has grown from the military regarding the lack of progress made in restructuring and improving the effectiveness of civilian security forces, and the apparent lack of political will to regulate the role of the army, which is still at the heart of the government’s security policy. Impacts Frustration within the armed forces will continue for the remainder of the administration as police reform makes slow progress. The forces’ continued lack of legal protection in carrying out their law enforcement duties will leave them exposed to allegations of abuse. Without strengthening the justice system's ability to keep convicts in prison, no security forces will succeed against organised crime.


Subject Military perceptions. Significance Residents of Acajete, Puebla, on September 9 reportedly attacked a group of soldiers guarding a warehouse that contained stolen train cargo. As ordered, the armed forces initially refused to retaliate, but the standoff eventually led President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) to authorise a proportional response. The following day the defence ministry (SEDENA) said any further incidents of this nature would be met with force. Similar attacks have nevertheless taken place in several states since. Impacts Negative rhetoric about the security forces could foster tensions between the government and the military if the latter feel unsupported. Failure to develop effective civilian police forces to work with communities and gather local intelligence will hinder crime prevention. Further deterioration of the security situation may hit AMLO’s popularity, as he will increasingly be unable to blame predecessors.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 433-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felipe Pathe Duarte

Purpose This paper aims to understand whether Portugal, being a relatively peripheral country – in political, economic and military terms – of Southwest Europe, was recently a target of hybrid threats. The prevalence of a specific type of threat was found. Thus, this paper analyses the non-kinetic hybrid threats in Portugal, in a temporary hiatus of two years (2017-2018). Design/methodology/approach This study has two parts: a conceptual analysis of hybrid threats created by us and, based on the typology previously presented, an analysis of the hybrid threats in Portugal between 2017 and 2018. The first part relied on source analysis, as the result of a desk review methodology, supported by monographs, declassified official documents and reports. The second part is also the result of source analysis, but more extensive. In addition to the desk review methodology, the study included semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders from the Portuguese security and armed forces, who asked not to be quoted. Media content analysis was also carried out – for trends and fact-check – mostly for the events related to the “narratives led operations” (for propaganda, misinformation, counter-information and strategic leaks). Findings To date, Portugal – compared with other European states – has not been a significant target for hybrid threats. It is diluted in the Portuguese geopolitical dimension. Nevertheless, not escaping what is happening in Europe, it has also been the target of non-kinetic hybrid threats, especially in cyberspace. In the field of so-called “narrative-driven operations”, there have been some occurrences – whether related to fake news, far-right movements or strategic leaks. In addition, cyberattacks from foreign groups for information and data gathering have increased in recent years, making governmental and private critical infrastructures more vulnerable. Research limitations/implications One of the characteristics of hybrid threats is their difficult identification. Therefore, information is scarce, which has complicated the research, leading us to assume, in many cases, speculation about the threat. It should also be taken into account that, in the case of cyberspace, until 2018, 90% of the occurrences were not reported, and the study has dealt with only official numbers. Originality/value It is not a policy paper. Although it neither points out national vulnerabilities to this type of threat nor makes procedural recommendations or considerations, it is fundamental in identifying the peculiarity of hybrid threats in a democratic state.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-3

Purpose This paper aims to review the latest management developments across the globe and pinpoint practical implications from cutting-edge research and case studies. Design/methodology/approach This briefing is prepared by an independent writer who adds their own impartial comments and places the articles in context. Findings While news reports are full of Russia-related items, they rarely focus on the development or otherwise of Russian companies. Acres of newsprint and screen space is taken up with alleged plots to poison former agents, engage in cyber crime, and rig foreign elections, but very little is reported on commercial growth in Russia and how it is competing with other companies in the former Soviet Union, or indeed Western Europe. Yet the transition from Communist super-state to a much more capitalist footing is perhaps one of the most interesting stories yet to be told in mainstream media. Originality/value The briefing saves busy executives, strategists and researchers hours of reading time by selecting only the very best, most pertinent information and presenting it in a condensed and easy-to-digest format.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Williams ◽  
Gamze Oz-Yalaman

PurposeThe dominant theorisation of the informal economy views participants as rational economic actors operating in the informal economy when the expected benefits exceed the perceived costs of being caught and punished. Recently, an alternative theory has emerged which views participants as social actors operating in the informal economy due to their lack of vertical trust (in governments) and horizontal trust (in others). The aim of this paper is to evaluate these competing theorisations.Design/methodology/approachTo do so, data are reported from special Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 2007, 2013 and 2019 in eight West European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).FindingsUsing probit regression analysis, the finding is that increasing the expected likelihood of being caught and level of punishment had a weak significant impact on the likelihood of participating in the informal economy in 2007, and there was no significant impact in 2013 and 2019. However, greater vertical and horizontal trust is significantly associated with a lower level of participation in the informal economy in all three time periods.Practical implicationsThe outcome is a call for a policy to shift away from increasing the expected level of punishment and likelihood of being caught, and towards improving vertical and horizontal trust. How this can be achieved is explored.Originality/valueEvidence is provided in a Western European context to support a shift away from a rational economic actor to a social actor approach when explaining and tackling the informal economy.


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