Using integrated system theory approach to assess security for SCADA systems cyber security for critical infrastructures: A pilot study

Author(s):  
Suhaila Ismail ◽  
Elena Sitnikova ◽  
Jill Slay
2020 ◽  
pp. 446-464
Author(s):  
Suhaila Ismail ◽  
Elena Sitnikova ◽  
Jill Slay

Past cyber-attacks on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems for Critical infrastructures have left these systems compromised and caused financial and economic problems. Deliberate attacks have resulted in denial of services and physical injury to the public in certain cases. This study explores the past attacks on SCADA Systems by examining nine case studies across multiple utility sectors including transport, energy and water and sewage sector. These case studies will be further analysed according to the cyber-terrorist decision-making theories including strategic, organisational and psychological theories based on McCormick (2000). Next, this study will look into cyber-terrorist capabilities in conducting attacks according to Nelson's (1999) approach that includes simple-unstructured, advance-structured and complex-coordinated capabilities. The results of this study will form the basis of a guideline that organisations can use so that they are better prepared in identifying potential future cybersecurity attacks on their SCADA systems.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 79-95
Author(s):  
Suhaila Ismail ◽  
Elena Sitnikova ◽  
Jill Slay

Past cyber-attacks on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems for Critical infrastructures have left these systems compromised and caused financial and economic problems. Deliberate attacks have resulted in denial of services and physical injury to the public in certain cases. This study explores the past attacks on SCADA Systems by examining nine case studies across multiple utility sectors including transport, energy and water and sewage sector. These case studies will be further analysed according to the cyber-terrorist decision-making theories including strategic, organisational and psychological theories based on McCormick (2000). Next, this study will look into cyber-terrorist capabilities in conducting attacks according to Nelson's (1999) approach that includes simple-unstructured, advance-structured and complex-coordinated capabilities. The results of this study will form the basis of a guideline that organisations can use so that they are better prepared in identifying potential future cybersecurity attacks on their SCADA systems.


Author(s):  
Sajid Nazir ◽  
Shushma Patel ◽  
Dilip Patel

Autonomic computing paradigm is based on intelligent computing systems that can autonomously take actions under given conditions. These technologies have been successfully applied to many problem domains requiring autonomous operation. One such area of national interest is SCADA systems that monitor critical infrastructures such as transportation networks, large manufacturing, business and health facilities, power generation, and distribution networks. The SCADA systems have evolved into a complex, highly connected system requiring high availability. On the other hand, cyber threats to these infrastructures have increasingly become more sophisticated, extensive and numerous. This highlights the need for newer measures that can proactively and autonomously react to an impending threat. This article proposes a SCADA system framework to leverage autonomic computing elements in the architecture for coping with the current challenges and threats of cyber security.


2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1679-1693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saurabh Amin ◽  
Xavier Litrico ◽  
S. Shankar Sastry ◽  
Alexandre M. Bayen

Author(s):  
Petar Radanliev ◽  
Rafael Mantilla Montalvo ◽  
Razvan Nicolescu ◽  
Michael Huth ◽  
Stacy Cannady ◽  
...  

This paper is focused on mapping the current evolution of Internet of Things (IoT) and its associated cyber risks for the Industry 4.0 (I4.0) sector. We report the results of a qualitative empirical study that correlates academic literature with 14 - I4.0 frameworks and initiatives. We apply the grounded theory approach to synthesise the findings from our literature review, to compare the cyber security frameworks and cyber security quantitative impact assessment models, with the world leading I4.0 technological trends. From the findings, we build a new impact assessment model of IoT cyber risk in Industry 4.0. We therefore advance the efforts of integrating standards and governance into Industry 4.0 and offer a better understanding of economics impact assessment models for I4.0.


Author(s):  
Ana Kovacevic ◽  
Dragana Nikolic

We are facing the expansion of cyber incidents, and they are becoming more severe. This results in the necessity to improve security, especially in the vulnerable field of critical infrastructure. One of the problems in the security of critical infrastructures is the level of awareness related to the effect of cyberattacks. The threat to critical infrastructure is real, so it is necessary to be aware of it and anticipate, predict, and prepare against a cyber attack. The main reason for the escalation of cyberattacks in the field of Critical Infrastructure (CI) may be that most control systems used for CI do not utilise propriety protocols and software anymore; they instead utilise standard solutions. As a result, critical infrastructure systems are more than ever before becoming vulnerable and exposed to cyber threats. It is important to get an insight into what attack types occur, as this may help direct cyber security efforts. In this chapter, the authors present vulnerabilities of SCADA systems against cyber attack, analyse and classify existing cyber attacks, and give future directions to achieve better security of SCADA systems.


2021 ◽  

Cybersecurity is a central challenge for many companies. On the one hand, companies have to protect themselves against cyberattacks; on the other hand, they have special obligations towards third parties and the state in critical infrastructures or when dealing with personal data. These responsibilities converge with company management. This volume examines the duties and liability risks of management in connection with cyber security from the perspective of corporate, constitutional and labour law. The volume is based on a conference of the same name, which took place in cooperation with the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung für die Freiheit on 23 and 24 October 2020 at Bucerius Law School in Hamburg. With contributions by Andreas Beyer, Marc Bittner, Alexander Brüggemeier, Anabel Guntermann, Katrin Haußmann, Dennis-Kenji Kipker, Christoph Benedikt Müller, Isabella Risini, Darius Rostam, Sarah Schmidt-Versteyl and Gerald Spindler.


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