This study modeled spite sensitivity (the worry that others are willing to incur a loss to hurt you), which is thought to undergird suspiciousness and persecutory ideation. Two samples performed a parametric, non-iterative trust game known as the Minnesota Trust Game (MTG). The MTG is designed to distinguish suspicious decision-making from otherwise rational mistrust by incentivizing the player to trust in certain situations. Individuals who do not trust even under these circumstances are particularly suspicious of their potential partner’s intentions. In Sample 1, 243 undergraduates who completed the MTG showed less trust as the amount of money they could lose increased. However, for choices where partners had a financial disincentive to betray the player, variation in the willingness to trust the partner was associated with suspicious beliefs. To further examine spite sensitivity, we modified the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) inequity aversion model, which compares unequal outcomes in social decision-making tasks, to include the possibility for spite sensitivity. In this case, an anticipated partner’s dislike of advantageous inequity (i.e., guilt) parameter could take on negative values, with negative guilt indicating spite. We hypothesized that the anticipated guilt parameter would be strongly related to suspicious beliefs. Our modification of the Fehr-Schmidt model improved estimation of MTG behavior. We isolated the estimation of partner’s spite-guilt, which was highly correlated with choices most associated with persecutory ideation. We replicated our findings in a second sample, where the estimated spite-guilt parameter correlated with self-reported suspiciousness. The “Suspiciousness” condition, unique to the MTG, can be modeled to isolate spite sensitivity, suggesting that spite sensitivity is separate from inequity aversion or risk aversion, and may provide a means to quantify persecution. The MTG offers promise for future studies to quantify persecutory beliefs in clinical populations.
A Computational Model of Non-optimal Suspiciousness in the Minnesota Trust Game
