A CHALLENGE TO INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE FROM MORAL VIRTUE: THE CASE OF UNIVERSAL LOVE

2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 152-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTINE SWANTON
2020 ◽  
pp. 93-107
Author(s):  
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

This chapter defends the view that intellectual virtues are deep and enduring acquired intellectual excellences, supported by the underlying idea in Exemplarist Moral Theory that excellences are admirable traits, and admirable traits are those that people admire on reflection and that have features identified in empirical studies. The intellectual virtues require both admirable intellectual motivations and reliable success in reaching the truth, and the defense of this claim is that that is what people admire on reflection. The connection of intellectual virtue with moral virtue also explains admirable states like wisdom that are recently getting attention in philosophy and psychology after a long period of neglect.


1962 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-505
Author(s):  
Sister Mary William ◽  

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-295
Author(s):  
Gabe Avakian Orona

Virtue education is gaining popularity in institutions of higher education. Given this growing interest, several theoretical accounts explaining the process of virtue learning have emerged. However, there is scant empirical evidence supporting their applicability for intellectual virtue. In this study, we apply a theory of virtue learning to the development of intellectual curiosity among undergraduates. We find that learning why virtue is relevant and important to one’s education is consistently and moderately correlated with increases in intellectual curiosity across time points and analytic approaches. A weaker yet still positive association is found with increases in knowledge of intellectual curiosity. The implications of these results connect with pedagogical recommendations stressed across intellectual and moral virtue education.


2000 ◽  
Vol 182 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-80
Author(s):  
Brian Jorgensen

and therefore inevitably encourages moral virtue—or, if the college is a Nowhere Motel, vice. Since Aristotle and recent research on the human brain indicate that, throughout the college years, reason gains power to influence behavior, college is a logical place to study virtue. Many characteristics of college students suggest areas for attention to the teaching of moral virtue; but the essence of college is the development of intellectual virtue, which influences moral virtue. College teachers teach intellectual virtue through their approach to their subject, their conducting of the game or ritual of the classroom, and their moving back and forth between fact and spirit. Because the strongest intellectual virtues can go the most profoundly wrong, Socrates and Confucius suggest that, with the exceptionally gifted, the teacher keep in mind the Good, thought of as a light beyond being. Virtue is inevitably taught in college because real learning is learning to love, and love shapes virtue.


Author(s):  
Craig A. Boyd ◽  
Kevin Timpe

This chapter examines the intellectual virtues. The belief that there are specific intellectual virtues goes back as far as ancient Greece. Intellectual virtues are habits of the mind that facilitate the pursuit of truth, the avoidance of error, or other epistemic goods. Conversely, intellectual vices are habits of the mind that frustrate these goals. And it is possible that a person with intellectual virtue might not necessarily possess moral virtue. The chapter then considers different intellectual virtues: intellectual honesty; intellectual curiosity; intellectual open-mindedness; intellectual courage and perseverance; and intellectual charity.


Author(s):  
David Gillis

This chapter discusses the structural parallel between ‘Laws of the Foundations of the Torah’ and ‘Laws of Ethical Qualities’, the opening sections of the first book of Maimonides' Mishneh torah, the Book of Knowledge. In dividing intellectual virtue and moral virtue, ‘Laws of the Foundations of the Torah’ and ‘Laws of Ethical Qualities’ present an Aristotelian structure. Underlying this division of content, however, is a formal pattern whereby ‘Laws of the Foundations of the Torah’ represents the macrocosm, and ‘Laws of Ethical Qualities’ represents man as a microcosm. Supported by the idea of likeness to God common to both sections, this pattern implies a more holistic view of perfection, and is a way of introducing Platonic and Neoplatonic ideas. Both kinds of virtue emerge as ways in which a person becomes inwardly analogous to God, fulfilling the potential of being created in God's image. In the process, it was suggested, what is gained is not only virtue, but also knowledge.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-35
Author(s):  
Kevin M. Brien ◽  

This paper is the second phase of a project that was begun more than three years ago. The first phase culminated in the publication of a paper working toward a critical appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.1 Therein Aristotle famously argues that human wellbeing (eudaimonia) is constituted by “activity of the soul in accordance with moral and intellectual virtue.”2 This earlier paper brought into focus all the main lines of Aristotle’s theoretical web in the N. Ethics: including the nature of the soul, intellectual virtue, moral virtue, etc. That paper went on to give a developed critique of Aristotle’s theoretical web, and against that background it argued for a very different way of thinking about intellectual virtue, and it prepared the ground for different ways of thinking about moral virtue. This current paper explores the various conceptual understandings of “the mean” in Aristotelian and in Confucian thought. It begins with an explanatory sketch of “the mean” as understood in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and then in a second section goes on to explore “the mean” as presented in classical Confucianism. The third section of this paper offers some reflections oriented toward a tentative formulation of a modified conception of “the mean” as it might be construed from a humanistic Marxist perspective.


2020 ◽  
Vol 118 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Bai ◽  
Grace Ching Chi Ho ◽  
Jin Yan

Author(s):  
Aurelian Craiutu

Political moderation is the touchstone of democracy, which could not function without compromise and bargaining, yet it is one of the most understudied concepts in political theory. How can we explain this striking paradox? Why do we often underestimate the virtue of moderation? Seeking to answer these questions, this book examines moderation in modern French political thought and sheds light on the French Revolution and its legacy. The book begins with classical thinkers who extolled the virtues of a moderate approach to politics, such as Aristotle and Cicero. It then shows how Montesquieu inaugurated the modern rebirth of this tradition by laying the intellectual foundations for moderate government. The book looks at important figures such as Jacques Necker, Germaine de Staël, and Benjamin Constant, not only in the context of revolutionary France but throughout Europe. It traces how moderation evolves from an individual moral virtue into a set of institutional arrangements calculated to protect individual liberty, and explores the deep affinity between political moderation and constitutional complexity. The book demonstrates how moderation navigates between political extremes, and it challenges the common notion that moderation is an essentially conservative virtue, stressing instead its eclectic nature. Drawing on a broad range of writings in political theory, the history of political thought, philosophy, and law, the book reveals how the virtue of political moderation can address the profound complexities of the world today.


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