scholarly journals Is There a Statistical Relationship between Economic Crises and Changes in Government Health Expenditure Growth? An Analysis of Twenty‐Four European Countries

2012 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 2204-2224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Cylus ◽  
Philipa Mladovsky ◽  
Martin McKee
2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusuff Adebayo Adebisi ◽  
Aishat Alaran ◽  
Abubakar Badmos ◽  
Adeola Oluwaseyi Bamisaiye ◽  
Nzeribe Emmanuella ◽  
...  

Abstract Background The goal of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) is to ensure that everyone is able to obtain the health services they need without suffering financial hardship. UHC remains a mirage if government health expenditure is not improved. Health priority refers to general government health expenditure as a percentage of general government expenditure. It indicates the priority of the government to spend on healthcare from its domestic public resources. Our study aimed to assess health priorities in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) using the health priority index from the WHO’s Global Health Expenditure Database. Method We extracted and analysed data on health priority in the WHO’s Global Health Expenditure Database across the 15 members of the ECOWAS (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo) from 2010 to 2018 to assess how these countries prioritize health. The data are presented using descriptive statistics. Results Our findings revealed that no West African country beats the cutoff of a minimum of 15% health priority index. Ghana (8.43%), Carbo Verde (8.29%), and Burkina Faso (7.60%) were the top three countries with the highest average health priority index, while Guinea (3.05%), Liberia (3.46%), and Guinea-Bissau (3.56%) had the lowest average health priority in the West African region within the period of our analysis (2010 to 2018). Conclusion Our study reiterates the need for West African governments and other relevant stakeholders to prioritize health in their political agenda towards achieving UHC.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olaide Sekinat Opeloyeru ◽  
Temitope Olanike Faronbi ◽  
Isiaka Akande Raifu

Abstract The study investigated the role of institutional quality in the relationship between health expenditure and labour force participation (LFP) in Africa, taking into consideration two forms of health expenditures (government health expenditure (GHE) and out-of-pocket health expenditure (OOPHE)) and gender labour force participation dichotomy. We employed data of 39 African countries for the period between 2000 and 2018 using Panel Fixed Effects with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors and two-stage System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). The results revealed that government health expenditure yields an increasing effect on total, female, and male LFP. OOPHE, in most cases, leads to a decline in LFP. The institutional quality was found to be detrimental to LFP. The magnitude of the positive effect of government health expenditure on LFP is reduced by the interaction of institutional quality with government expenditure. In conclusion, we advocate for the improvement in institutional apparatuses across African countries. JEI CODE: E62; H51; J21; O43


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong Woo Lee

<p></p><p>Does intense electoral competition in electoral autocracies (EAs) increase the government health expenditure? Previous studies on EAs and public health expenditure focus on the presence of multiparty elections in EAs as a significant determinant on the expenditure. Most of elections in EAs often are unfair because those are for the victory of dictators; hence. multiparty elections <i>per se</i> do not capture well-known impact of elections, such as the electoral competition increasing health expenditure. Some EAs pay health expenditure less than others even though electoral competition is high. This paper analyzes the effect of electoral competition on the government health expenditure with the balanced panel data of 20 EAs from 2001 to 2017. There are two rival arguments on how electoral competition affect the expenditure according to previous studies; (a) a high level of electoral competition indicates a difficulty of dictatorial winning in elections. Autocrats, hence, gather various demands including health issues from voters, and can increase the government health expenditure; (b) Autocrats pursue the victory in elections. Pork and personal benefits to voters rather than programmed policies are helpful for the victory. Therefore, there is no incentive for autocrats to provide government health expenditure to voters when the level of electoral competition is high. Empirical findings demonstrate that electoral competition in EAs lead the decrease of government health expenditure. This paper concludes that electoral competition does not increase the public health expenditure; the higher level of competition in autocracies does not mean that voters can exert their power to autocrats to realize policies.</p><br><p></p>


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document