A transcendental argument from testimonial knowledge to content externalism

Two models of assertion are described and their epistemological implications considered. The assurance model draws a parallel between the ethical norms surrounding speech acts like promising and the epistemic norms that govern the transmission of testimonial knowledge. This model is rejected in favour of the view that assertion transmits knowledge by (intentionally) expressing belief. The expression of belief is distinguished from the communication of belief. The chapter goes on to compare the epistemology of testimony with the epistemology of memory, arguing that memory and testimony are mechanisms that can preserve the rationality of the belief they transmit without preserving the evidence on which the belief was originally based.

Robert Lockie: Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom

Metaphysica ◽

10.1515/mp-2019-2008 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 20 (1) ◽

pp. 137-143

Author(s):

Ingvar Johansson

Keyword(s):

Free Will ◽

Transcendental Argument

Reference-Securing Belief and Content Externalism

Acta Analytica ◽

10.1007/s12136-020-00427-z ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Huiming Ren

Keyword(s):

Content Externalism

The return of metaphysics as a subject matter of historical ontology: analytical review (ending)

The Digital Scholar Philosopher s Lab ◽

10.32326/2618-9267-2021-4-2-180-197 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 4 (2) ◽

pp. 180-197

Author(s):

Olga Stoliarova

Keyword(s):

Subject Matter ◽

Transcendental Argument ◽

Empirical Knowledge ◽

Theoretical Justification ◽

Historical Ontology ◽

New Realism ◽

Role Meaning ◽

Analytical Review ◽

Cognitive Experience ◽

Scientific Ontology

The second part of the article continues the analytical and historiographical overview of the problems that are substantively related to the question of the role, meaning and historical fate of metaphysics. The author focuses on the phenomenon of the return of metaphysics to the philosophy of our time. The author traces the gradual rehabilitation of metaphysical problems in post-positivist studies of sci-ence. An attempt is made to differentiate these studies from the viewpoint of the opposition between internalism and externalism. The author shows the limits of this differentia-tion and highlights the mixed type of re-search, which focuses on the interaction of “external” and “internal” determinants of knowledge. It is shown that the postpositivist idea of the background knowledge extends not only to scientific (empirical) knowledge, but also to its philosophical (theoretical) justification, which is recognized by many re-searchers as historically and culturally conditioned. This opens up the possibility of a historical critique of the ontological presuppositions of the epistemological (transcendental) justification of science. Such presuppositions are considered in relation to the dis-course of negative ontology, which prohibits the cognitive experience of transcendent be-ing. The author shows that the criticism of these assumptions is carried out in the form of a regressive transcendental argument, which, comparing them with a new, philo-sophically revised scientific ontology, reveals their historically limited character. Thus, the regressive transcendental argument allows us to go beyond the negative ontology of the transcendental justification of science. This leads to the replacement of historical epistemology, whose subject matter is limited to knowledge and its historically mobile structures, with historical ontology, which returns to the description and explanation of reality. The author considers the concepts of new re-alism in the context of historical ontology and traces the connection of the new realism with the post-metaphysical and metametaphysical discourses.

PHOTOGRAPHICALLY BASED KNOWLEDGE

Episteme ◽

10.1017/epi.2013.21 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 10 (3) ◽

pp. 283-297 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Dan Cavedon-Taylor

Keyword(s):

Pictorial Representation ◽

Perceptual Knowledge ◽

Testimonial Knowledge ◽

Epistemic Utility ◽

Sources Of Knowledge ◽

Novel Approach ◽

Aesthetic Pleasure ◽

Foundational Issue ◽

Do So

AbstractPictures are a quintessential source of aesthetic pleasure. This makes it easy to forget that they are epistemically valuable no less than they are aesthetically so. Pictures are representations. As such, they may furnish us with knowledge of the objects they represent. In this article I provide an account of why photographs are of greater epistemic utility than handmade pictures. To do so, I use a novel approach: I seek to illuminate the epistemic utility of photographs by situating both photographs and handmade pictures among the sources of knowledge. This method yields an account of photography's epistemic utility that better connects the issue with related issues in epistemology and is relatively superior to other accounts. Moreover, it answers a foundational issue in the epistemology of pictorial representation: ‘What kinds of knowledge do pictures furnish?’ I argue that photographs have greater epistemic utility than handmade pictures because photographs are sources of perceptual knowledge, while handmade pictures are sources of testimonial knowledge.

Self-Knowledge and Content Externalism

Rationalität, Realismus, Revision / Rationality, Realism, Revision ◽

10.1515/9783110805703.182 ◽

2000 ◽

pp. 182-187

Keyword(s):

Content Externalism ◽

Self Knowledge

Sartre’s Transcendental Phenomenology

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198755340.013.19 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Jonathan Webber

Keyword(s):

Transcendental Phenomenology ◽

Phenomenological Reduction ◽

Transcendental Argument ◽

Phenomenological Psychology ◽

The World

The first phase of Sartre’s philosophical publications displays an apparent ambivalence toward Husserl’s transcendental turn. Sartre accepts both major aspects of that turn, the phenomenological reduction and the use of transcendental argumentation. Yet his rejection of the transcendental ego that Husserl derives from this transcendental turn overlooks an obvious transcendental argument in favor of it. His books on emotion and imagination, moreover, make only very brief comments about the transcendental constitution of the world of experience. In each case, these appear at the end of the book and can seem to contradict the book’s central analysis. The problem underlying these features of his works of phenomenological psychology is clarified and resolved, however, when Sartre articulates his own transcendental phenomenology and ontology in Being and Nothingness a decade after he first encountered the work of Husserl. This resolution raises a new problem that animates the next phase of his philosophy.

Hegel’s Speculative Identity Thesis

Hegel's Concept of Life ◽

10.1093/oso/9780190947613.003.0003 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 65-122

Author(s):

Karen Ng

Keyword(s):

Three Dimensional ◽

The Self ◽

Transcendental Argument ◽

Philosophical Method ◽

Phenomenology Of Spirit ◽

Science Of Logic ◽

Early Presentation ◽

Identity Thesis ◽

Refutation Of Idealism ◽

Dimensional Argument

This chapter explores Hegel’s speculative identity thesis, defending the importance of Schelling for Hegel’s appropriation of Kant’s purposiveness theme. It provides an interpretation of Hegel’s first published text, the Differenzschrift, and analyzes the relation between “subjective subject-objects” and “objective subject-objects” as an early presentation of Hegel’s philosophical method. In addition to defending the contribution of Schelling, this chapter provides an interpretation of Fichte’s contribution via his notion of the self-positing activity of the I. It then turns to a reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, demonstrating that the notion of “negativity” can be understood along the lines of speculative identity. The chapter argues that Hegel presents life as constitutive for self-consciousness by way of a three-dimensional argument: the employment of an analogy; a transcendental argument; and a refutation of idealism argument. It concludes by briefly outlining how the speculative identity thesis is carried forward in the Science of Logic.

Heidegger

10.1093/oso/9780197605561.003.0007 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 241-296

Author(s):

Guy Elgat

Keyword(s):

Martin Heidegger ◽

Being And Time ◽

Necessary Condition ◽

Transcendental Argument

This chapter argues that Martin Heidegger can be read as providing a synthesis of sorts of the views considered in the previous chapters. Specifically, it focuses on Heidegger’s analysis of Being-guilty in his Being and Time and argues that while for Heidegger we are indeed not causa sui, as the naturalists hold, we are nevertheless guilty as such or are characterized by ontological guilt, as the metaphysicians hold, and this is because for Heidegger, not being causa sui is a condition of our ontological guilt. Moreover, it is our Being-guilty that makes our factical or empirical guilt possible. After introducing some of the main concepts and themes of Heidegger’s discussion, the chapter turns to reconstruct Heidegger’s transcendental argument to the effect that our Being-guilty is a necessary condition of the possibility of factical guilt. It then turns to discuss Heidegger’s concepts of the call of conscience and of wanting-to-have-a-conscience.