Advanced Integrity Management Framework for Pipelines

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Len LeBlanc ◽  
Walter Kresic ◽  
Sean Keane ◽  
John Munro
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Improvement ◽  
Program Effectiveness ◽  
Level Structure ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Management Framework ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
High Level

This paper describes the integrity management framework utilized within the Enbridge Liquids Pipelines Integrity Management Program. The role of the framework is to provide the high-level structure used by the company to prepare and demonstrate integrity safety decisions relative to mainline pipelines, and facility piping segments where applicable. The scope is directed to corrosion, cracking, and deformation threats and all variants within those broad categories. The basis for the framework centers on the use of a safety case to provide evidence that the risks affecting the system have been effectively mitigated. A ‘safety case’, for the purposes of this methodology is defined as a structured argument demonstrating that the evidence is sufficient to show that the system is safe.[1] The decision model brings together the aspects of data integration and determination of maintenance timing; execution of prevention, monitoring, and mitigation; confirmation that the execution has met reliability targets; application of additional steps if targets are not met; and then the collation of the results into an engineering assessment of the program effectiveness (safety case). Once the program is complete, continuous improvement is built into the next program through the incorporation of research and development solutions, lessons learned, and improvements to processes. On the basis of a wide range of experiences, investigations and research, it was concluded that there are combinations of monitoring and mitigation methods required in an integrity program to effectively manage integrity threats. A safety case approach ultimately provides the structure for measuring the effectiveness of integrity monitoring and mitigation efforts, and the methodology to assess whether a pipeline is sufficiently safe with targets for continuous improvement. Hence, the need for the safety case is to provide transparent, quantitative integrity program performance results which are continually improved upon through ongoing revalidations and improvement to the methods utilized. This enables risk reduction, better stakeholder awareness, focused innovation, opportunities for industry information sharing along with other benefits.

Early Experience With Integrity Management Inspections for US Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Hansen ◽  
Jeff Wiese ◽  
Robert Brown
Keyword(s):  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Quality Data ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Require Time ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
The Right ◽  
High Level ◽  
Pipeline Safety ◽  
Integrity Assessments

In 2000 and 2002, the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) published new regulations requiring integrity management programs for hazardous liquid pipeline operators. OPS had four fundamental objectives: 1) to increase the level of integrity assessments (i.e., in-line inspection or pressure testing) for pipelines that can affect high consequence areas; 2) to improve operator integrity management systems; 3) to improve government oversight of operator integrity management programs; and 4) to improve public assurance in pipeline safety. At the core of this new rule is a set of management-based requirements (referred to as “Program Elements” in the rule) that are fundamentally different from the existing, largely prescriptive pipeline safety requirements. The evaluation of operator compliance with these requirements requires the examination of management and analytical processes-aspects of operator’s business that are not reviewed in standard OPS compliance inspections. OPS realized a fundamentally different approach to oversight was needed to assure operators are developing and implementing effective integrity management programs. This paper describes the comprehensive changes to the OPS inspection program that were developed to perform integrity management inspections. OPS completed the initial integrity management inspection of all large hazardous liquid pipeline operators in early 2004, and is making progress in reviewing the programs of smaller liquid operators. During this initial year OPS gained substantial knowledge about the state of hazardous liquid pipeline operator integrity management programs. At a high level, OPS learned that operators generally understand what portions of their pipeline systems can affect high consequence areas, and are making the appropriate plans and progress in conducting integrity assessments for these areas. However, the development of effective management and analytical processes, and quality data and information to support these processes takes time. While most operators appear to be headed in the right direction, fundamental changes to management systems require time. OPS recognizes this situation and has developed an inspection and enforcement approach that not only assures compliance with the rule requirements, but also fosters continuous improvement in operator integrity management programs. This paper describes the lessons learned from the initial inspections, and OPS expectations for future integrity management program development. Finally, the intial year of integrity management inspections provided some valuable insights about how to perform these new type of inspections and improve external communication. This paper also addresses what OPS learned about its inspection program, and how this program is being positioned to support on-going inspections of hazardous liquid operator integrity management programs.

Implementing a Geohazard Integrity Management Program: Statistics and Lessons Learned Over 15 Years

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Baumgard ◽  
Tara L. Coultish ◽  
Gerry W. Ferris
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Proactive Approach ◽  
Oil Pipelines ◽  
Pipeline Networks ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Pipeline Failures ◽  
Program Challenges

Over the last 15 years, BGC Engineering Inc. has developed and implemented a geohazards Integrity Management Program (IMP) with 12 major pipeline operators (consisting of gas and oil pipelines and of both gathering and transmission systems). Over this time, the program has been applied to the assessment of approximately 13,500 individual hydrotechnical and geotechnical geohazard sites spanning approximately 63,000 km of operating pipelines in Canada and the USA. Hydrotechnical (watercourse) and geotechnical (slope) hazards are the primary types of geohazards that have directly contributed to pipeline failures in Canada. As with all IMPs, the core objectives of a geohazard management system are to ensure a proactive approach that is repeatable and defensible. In order to meet these objectives, the program allows for varying levels of intensity of inspection and a recommended timescale for completion of actions to manage the identified geohazards in accordance with the degree of hazard that the site poses to the pipeline. In this way, the sites are managed in a proactive manner while remaining flexible to accommodate the most current conditions at each site. This paper will provide a background to the key components of the program related specifically to existing operating pipeline systems, present pertinent statistics on the occurrence of various types of geohazards based on the large dataset of inspections, and discuss some of the lessons learned in the form of program results and program challenges from implementing a geohazard integrity management system for a dozen operators with different ages of systems, complexity of pipeline networks, and in varied geographic settings.

Creating a Quality Management Program

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard P. Dutton
Keyword(s):  
Quality Improvement ◽  
Continuous Improvement ◽  
Healthcare Providers ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Adverse Outcomes ◽  
Culture Of Safety ◽  
Anesthesia Practice ◽  
Reference Guide ◽  
Or Practice ◽  
High Level

This chapter provides an overview of how to create a quality improvement (QI) program. It is intended as a high-level reference guide for a department, division or practice quality improvement officer. It covers the topics of recruiting allies; finding, aggregating and creating data; basic analytic techniques; mechanisms for feedback of QI data to healthcare providers; implementing cyclical QI activities; managing individual adverse events and complications; and benchmarking to outside data sources. A template quality capture form for an anesthesia practice is included, and examples of reporting graphics and strategies are included. Woven throughout the chapter are specific thoughts on how the QI officer can create a “culture of safety” within the group, such that practitioners feel safe in reporting adverse outcomes and expect to see continuous improvement efforts within their systems.

Molecular engineering of Surfaces Using Self-Assembled Monolayers

2005 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
George M. Whitesides ◽  
Jennah K. Kriebel ◽  
J. Christopher Love
Keyword(s):  
Surface Science ◽  
Self Assembly ◽  
Mammalian Cells ◽  
Molecular Level ◽  
Level Structure ◽  
Molecular Engineering ◽  
Gold Silver ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Macroscopic Properties ◽  
High Level

The self-assembly of molecules into structurally organized monolayers (SAMs) uses the flexibility of organic chemistry and coordination chemistry to generate well-defined, synthetic surfaces with known molecular and macroscopic properties. The process of designing monolayers with a specified structure gives a high level of control over the molecular-level composition in the direction perpendicular to a surface; soft lithographic technique gives useful (if lower) resolution in the plane of the surface. Alkanethiolates adsorbed on gold, silver, mercury, palladium and platinum are currently the best-defined systems of SAMs. They provide substrates for a number of applications-from studies of wetting and electron transport to patterns for growing mammalian cells. SAMs have made organic surfaces a central part of surface science. Understanding the principles by which they form, and connecting molecular-level structure with macroscopic properties, opens a wide range of areas to study and exploitation.

Key Aspects of the H12 Safety Case

2000 ◽  
Vol 663 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiroyuki Umeki
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Fuel ◽  
General Public ◽  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Atomic Energy Commission ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Geological Disposal ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
Geological Formation ◽  
High Level ◽  
Key Aspects

ABSTRACTIn Japan, as outlined in the overall high-level radioactive waste (HLW) management program defined by the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, 1994), HLW from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel will be immobilized in a glass matrix and stored for a period of 30 to 50 years to allow cooling. It will then be disposed of in a deep geological formation. Pursuant to the overall HLW management program, an organization with responsibility for implementing HLW disposal will be established around the year 2000. This will be followed by site selection and characterization, demonstration of disposal technology, establishment of the necessary legal infrastructure, relevant licensing applications and repository construction, with the objective of starting repository operation by the 2030s and no later than the mid 2040s.The HLW disposal program is currently in the research and development (R&D) phase and the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been assigned as the leading organization responsible for R&D activities. The aim of the R&D activities at the current stage is to provide a scientific and technical basis for the geological disposal of HLW in Japan and to promote understanding of the safety concept not only in the scientific and technical community but also by the general public. One of the features of the R&D program is that its progress is documented at appropriate intervals, with a view to clearly determining the level of achievement of the program and to promote understanding and acceptance of the geological disposal strategy by the general public. As a major milestone, the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC, now JNC) submitted a first progress report, referred to as H3 (PNC, 1992), in September 1992.

Enhanced Pipeline Integrity at Lower Cost: A Pipeline Integrity Prioritization Model

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ron S. Burdylo ◽  
Audrey L. L. Van Aelst
Keyword(s):  
Program Effectiveness ◽  
Lower Cost ◽  
Cost Effective ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Mitigation Strategy ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Useful Life ◽  
Mitigation Techniques

Strategic, focussed application of pipeline integrity monitoring and mitigation techniques will significantly improve pipeline integrity program effectiveness while reducing overall maintenance costs. These achievements have been demonstrated through the development of Maintenance Prioritization Models (MPM) that pinpoint areas along the pipeline with the highest susceptibility to failure and identify the most cost effective mitigation strategy. A MPM identifies areas along the pipeline that exhibit a higher relative susceptibility to failure and consequence in the event of a pipeline rupture. Used as part of the owner’s pipeline integrity management program, it assists with optimization, planning and focusing of integrity related preventative maintenance activities. Areas that require short-term mitigation are identified and maintenance budgeting and planning can be prioritized while long-term planning needs are forecast. It enables integrity engineers to manage resources more efficiently by focusing on areas of highest need, thereby extending the useful life of the pipeline section that will, in turn, extend its revenue generation capabilities.

IMP 2.0: The Evolution of PHMSA’s Approach for Improving Pipeline Integrity

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Wiese ◽  
Linda Daugherty
Keyword(s):  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Hazardous Material ◽  
The Future ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Future Direction ◽  
Pipeline Safety

This paper discusses the original motivations and objectives of the Integrity Management Program (IMP), the lessons learned from the first decade of implementing IMP, the drivers for improving and expanding IMP (“IMP 2.0”), actions that the Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) is already taking under the IMP 2.0 umbrella, as well as the future direction the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) expects IMP 2.0 to take in the next few years.

Total Pipeline Integrity Management System Implemented for KOC Pipelines: A Case Study

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Robb Isaac ◽  
Saleh Al-Sulaiman ◽  
Monty R. Martin ◽  
Sandeep Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Significant Loss ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Initial Assessment ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Transit System ◽  
Integrity Assessment ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Integrity Management

In early 2005, Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) initiated a Total Pipeline Integrity Management System (TPIMS) implementation in order to carry out a major integrity assessment of its operating facilities, equipment, buried plant piping and pipeline network and to establish a continuing integrity management program. KOC Transit System is a complex infrastructure consisting of over three hundred pipelines, thousands of wellhead flow lines, and consumer and offshore lines for which there was a significant loss of data when the facilities were destroyed during a military invasion in 1990. An initial pipeline system assessment identified issues and actions regarding condition of the pipelines, corridors, requirements on in-line inspection (ILI), documentation, RISK assessment, status of international code compliance, and overall state of the system. Following recommendations from that initial assessment led to the development of a long term strategy; the execution of which required the implementation of a comprehensive integrity management program. This case study discusses the results obtained after five years of implementation of TPIMS at KOC. It will demonstrate some of the complex components involved in managing the integrity of the Transit System that have been made possible through the implementation of the system. The general concept and structure of TPIMS will be described, and how it deals with the complexity of the KOC pipeline system. The system made it possible to integrate and manage data from various sources, by conducting integrity assessment using ILI, Direct Assessment and hydrostatic testing, as well as structure a comprehensive RISK & Decision Support mechanism. This is one of the world’s first implementations of this magnitude which encompasses such a wide range of services and variables; all being managed in a single environment and utilized by a multitude of users in different areas at KOC. The biggest challenge in a project of this scope is data management. Examples will be shown of the integration structure to illustrate the benefits of using a single comprehensive and versatile platform to manage system requirements; ultimately providing system reliability and improving overall operational efficiency.

Integrity Management of Flange Connections Using Reliability Model

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Haider ◽  
Millan Sen ◽  
Doug Lawrence ◽  
Angela Rodayan
Keyword(s):  
Data Gathering ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Reliability Model ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Design Concepts ◽  
Failure Data ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Transmission Pipeline ◽  
Integrity Management

Abstract There is demonstrated potential for failures to occur on station piping assets in facilities, therefore it is critical to take measures to manage preventable releases. In 2018, Enbridge developed a reliability model that uses available asset information to quantify the likelihood of failure of station piping assets. Enbridge based this model on the CFER PIRIMID software, with some modifications to minimize the use of default values and to meet the company’s integrity management program requirements. With successful implementation of station piping model, Enbridge realized opportunity to develop a much-needed flange model leveraging the station piping model. Historical leak data indicates that flanged connections often experience a higher leak frequency than other assets in a facility. While there are industry guidelines that provide guidance for the assembly of process flange connections in a facility, there are few that discuss integrity management of flange connections once they are operational. Most published condition assessment flange models require inputs which are not readily available, e.g. condition of flange faces and gaskets. These inputs often require the flange to be disassembled just to obtain the data. For pipeline operators, data gathering is even more challenging as there are stations (with numerous flanges) that are spread out along the entire pipeline. Given the high number of flange connections and their wide variation in parameters within transmission pipeline facilities, there is benefit in developing a reliability-based model to guide the integrity management of flange connections. A reliability model that works in two stages was developed for this purpose. The pre-inspection assessment stage was designed to utilize available inputs to prioritize groups of flanges for inspection, and the post-inspection assessment (second) stage is then applied to select the specific flanges that require maintenance action. Enbridge utilized industry guidelines, relevant standards, historical failure data, and subject matter experts’ inputs to develop the station piping and flange models. This paper will discuss the design concepts, model architectures, the contributing factors, and their sensitivities to the likelihood of failure results. These concepts may be utilized by any operator managing such assets, and the model designs may be tailored to suit a wide range of facility environments.

The Role of Effective Collaboration in the Advancement of EMAT Inline Inspection Technology for Pipeline Integrity Management: A Case Study

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Sutherland ◽  
Stephan Tappert ◽  
Richard Kania ◽  
Karlheinz Kashammer ◽  
Jim Marr ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Predictive Performance ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
The Past ◽  
Ongoing Work ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Effective Collaboration ◽  
Major Pipeline

Over the past three years there has been increasing industry interest and profile regarding the role and pipeline integrity management potential of EMAT crack inspection technology in the Oil & Gas pipeline industry. This paper outlines the stages and results of the effective collaboration of a major pipeline operator and a service company to advance the true predictive performance of the EMATScan Gen III crack inspection technology. The paper will also summarize and provide examples of lessons-learned from this collaboration across all stages of EMAT based SCC integrity management program. The paper will similarly outline ongoing work in progress regarding the assessment of the ILI data relative to hydro-testing equivalency, detection of injurious defects and the related analysis and reporting improvements made over the past three years.

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