GP is liable only for costs of harm related to her advice in case of “wrongful birth,” say Supreme Court judges

BMJ ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. n1609
Author(s):  
Clare Dyer
Keyword(s):  
2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-196
Author(s):  
Carmel Shachar

The New Jersey Supreme Court has continually avoided making moral judgments about the value of life and emphasized that such decision making should be the province of the potential parents. Recently, in Acuna v. Turkish, the court elaborated on the limitations of the decision-making right of the potential parents, and its decision demonstrated that New Jersey courts were only willing to require physicians to disclose all relevant medical information, and not moral statements that had not been agreed upon by the state's medical community, people, or legislature. Acuna might be read as a departure from the trend displayed by New Jersey courts in “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life” actions toward empowering potential parents to decide if they want to bring the pregnancy to term. However, the decision actually fits squarely within this trend in that the reluctance to expand the information to which potential parents are entitled from their physicians can be directly tied to the reluctance of the New Jersey Supreme Court to weigh in on the value of life in wrongful birth and wrongful life suits.


2109 ◽  
pp. 5-17
Author(s):  
Szymon Bondaruk

The article closely analyses the very first wrongful conception action brought before the Polish Supreme Court in 2003. The court recognized the case as a precedent. When justifying its verdict it largely referred to the foreign case law and doctrine. The judgment clearly distinguished between the sheer fact of a baby being born as a generally positive event and the possible liability of a medical professional in wrongful conception cases, which allows for such cases to be heard before Polish courts. The judgment also established the scope of possible compensation as all expenses related to the pregnancy and birth and the loss of income stemming from them. Furthermore, the court established the right to seek moral compensation as a part of wrongful conception action claims. The judgment served as a trailblazer for future wrongful conception and wrongful birth verdicts.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-205
Author(s):  
Megan Cleary

In recent years, the law in the area of recovered memories in child sexual abuse cases has developed rapidly. See J.K. Murray, “Repression, Memory & Suggestibility: A Call for Limitations on the Admissibility of Repressed Memory Testimony in Abuse Trials,” University of Colorado Law Review, 66 (1995): 477-522, at 479. Three cases have defined the scope of liability to third parties. The cases, decided within six months of each other, all involved lawsuits by third parties against therapists, based on treatment in which the patients recovered memories of sexual abuse. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Hungerford v. Jones, 722 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1998), allowed such a claim to survive, while the supreme courts in Iowa, in J.A.H. v. Wadle & Associates, 589 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa 1999), and California, in Eear v. Sills, 82 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1991), rejected lawsuits brought by nonpatients for professional liability.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-203
Author(s):  
Kendra Carlson

The Supreme Court of California held, in Delaney v. Baker, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610 (1999), that the heightened remedies available under the Elder Abuse Act (Act), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15657,15657.2 (West 1998), apply to health care providers who engage in reckless neglect of an elder adult. The court interpreted two sections of the Act: (1) section 15657, which provides for enhanced remedies for reckless neglect; and (2) section 15657.2, which limits recovery for actions based on “professional negligence.” The court held that reckless neglect is distinct from professional negligence and therefore the restrictions on remedies against health care providers for professional negligence are inapplicable.Kay Delaney sued Meadowood, a skilled nursing facility (SNF), after a resident, her mother, died. Evidence at trial indicated that Rose Wallien, the decedent, was left lying in her own urine and feces for extended periods of time and had stage I11 and IV pressure sores on her ankles, feet, and buttocks at the time of her death.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-198
Author(s):  
Joseph R. Zakhary

In California Dental Association v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a nonprofit affiliation of dentists violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1998), which prohibits unfair competition. The Court examined two issues: (1) the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) jurisdiction over the California Dental Association (CDA); and (2) the proper scope of antitrust analysis. The Court unanimously held that CDA was subject to FTC's jurisdiction, but split 5-4 in its finding that the district court's use of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was inappropriate.CDA is a voluntary, nonprofit association of local dental societies. It boasts approximately 19,000 members, who constitute roughly threequarters of the dentists practicing in California. Although a nonprofit, CDA includes for-profit subsidiaries that financially benefit CDA members. CDA gives its members access to insurance and business financing, and lobbies and litigates on their behalf. Members also benefit from CDA marketing and public relations campaigns.


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