Revenue Share Contract Design with Marketing Strategy Types of Supplier

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (02) ◽  
pp. 1840002
Author(s):  
Hua He ◽  
Changsong Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Marketing Strategy ◽  
Pareto Optimality ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Marketing Strategies ◽  
Supply Chain Collaboration ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Strategy Types

In this paper, we design a revenue share contract when a supplier is the leader and a retailer is the follower in a two-echelon supply chain. The innovation lies in dividing the supplier’s marketing strategies into two types: the profit oriented and the sales oriented to distinguish the different decision objectives from previous literatures assuming the supplier and retailer are both profit oriented. The paper uses the revenue share contract to reach supply chain coordination and Pareto optimality in the supply chain with the profit-oriented suppliers. However, the contract makes supply chain collaboration solutions and the Pareto improvement with the sales oriented supplier conditional. Numerical examples are given to illustrate these cases.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination Contracts under Double Sided Disruptions Simultaneously

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huan Zhang ◽  
Yang Liu ◽  
Jingsi Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Pricing Policy ◽  
Product Cost ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Supply Chain Contracts ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Key Factor

Supply chain coordination models are developed in a two-echelon supply chain with double sided disruptions. In a supply chain system, the supplier may suffer from the product cost disruption and the retailer suffers from the demand disruption simultaneously. The purpose of this study is to design proper supply chain contracts, under which the supply chain with double sided disruption can be coordinated. Firstly, the centralized decision-making models are applied to find the optimal price and quantity under three cases as the baseline. The different cases are divided by the different relationship between the product cost disruption and the demand disruption. Secondly, two different types of contracts are introduced to coordinate the whole supply chain. One is all-unit wholesale quantity discount policy (AQDP) contract, and the other one is capacitated linear pricing policy (CLPP) contract. And it is found out that the gap between the demand disruption and the product cost disruption is the key factor to influence the supply chain coordination. Some numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are given to illustrate the models. The AQDP contracts are listed out under different cases to show how to use it under double sided disruptions.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination under Stock- and Price-Dependent Selling Rates under Declining Market

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Sambhu Das ◽  
Manjusri Basu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Demand Rate ◽  
Time Price

We explore coordination issues of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a distributor and a retailer. The effect of revenue-sharing contract mechanism is examined under stock-time-price-sensitive demand rate. First, we investigate relationships between distributor and retailer under noncooperative distributor-Stackelberg games. Then we establish analytically that revenue sharing contact is able to coordinate the system and leads to the win-win outcomes. Finally, numerical examples are presented to compare results between the different models.

Contract design and supply chain coordination in the electricity industry

2013 ◽  
Vol 227 (3) ◽  
pp. 527-537 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando S. Oliveira ◽  
Carlos Ruiz ◽  
Antonio J. Conejo
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Electricity Industry

Coordination and Decision of Supply Chain Under

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 21-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangdong Liu ◽  
Tianjian Yang ◽  
Yao Wei ◽  
Xuemei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Decentralized System ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Future Work ◽  
Dependent Demand

In order to investigate supply chain coordination and decision under customer balking and stochastic demand, the article considers a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer with risk-neutral and one retailer with risk-neutral and develops two models in a centralized and a decentralized system and the three contracts are designed to coordinate supply chain and the optimal price and customer balking strategies are obtained. The results show that the revenue and cost-sharing contract can coordinate supply chain under customer balking and price-dependent demand and achieve the Pareto-improvement; the expected sales quantity and expected reduced sales quantity are influenced conversely by the threshold of inventory and probability of a sale under customer balking. In addition, numerical analysis is given to verify the effectiveness of revenue and cost-sharing contract and the paper gives some managerial insights and puts forward to the future work at last.

DECISION ANALYSIS FOR SUPPLIER IN TWO-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN WITH DISCRETE DEMAND VIA DYNAMIC GAME

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (04) ◽  
pp. 1450023 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIAN-TENG XU ◽  
SHAO-JIAN QU
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Marketing Strategy ◽  
Discount Rate ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Marketing Strategies ◽  
Cost Structure ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Quantity Discount ◽  
Numerical Tests ◽  
Optimality Properties

This paper analyzes noncooperative dynamic game behavior in a two-echelon supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer. The aim is to give supplier reasonable suggestions on decision making of marketing strategy. The challenge of dealing with this problem is the discreteness of demand. The main contributions of this paper are twofold: one is to address the necessary conditions in which supplier can choose quantity discount policy as marketing strategy; the second is to provide the solving methods of the equilibrium strategy and discount rate under quantity discount policy. Two types of quantity discount marketing strategies are considered. It is concluded that the strategy sets of production and procurement are independent of discount rate via analyzing the optimality properties. Numerical tests illustrate that incremental quantity discount policy is more widely considered than all-unit quantity discount policy, and whether the quantity discount policy can be chosen as the marketing strategy not only relates to supplier's own cost structure but also retailer's cost structure.

scholarly journals Closed-Loop Supply Chain Coordination under a Reward–Penalty and a Manufacturer’s Subsidy Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (22) ◽  
pp. 9329
Author(s):  
Sungki Kim ◽  
Nina Shin ◽  
Sangwook Park
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Supply Chain Collaboration ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Collection Rate ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Recyclable Resources

Government legislation significantly impacts closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) operations. This study examines the collection rate of and decisions on the product greening improvement level in a three-level CLSC with the government’s reward–penalty and a manufacturer’s subsidy policy. Four game-theoretic models are analyzed in order to evaluate the ways in which the policy and revenue-sharing contracts (RSCs) between the manufacturer and retailer affect the CLSC members’ optimal decisions and profits. We found that a reward–penalty and subsidy policy raise the collection rate, as well as the product greening improvement level. A manufacturer’s financial conflict of interest can be mitigated using RSCs. The RSCs between the manufacturer and the retailer also increase the profit of a recycling company that successfully coordinates the CLSC. An interesting result is that, when the RSCs are used under the subsidy policy, the collection rate is higher than it is in a centralized model. We also found that the subsidy level needs to be adjusted according to the price of the recycling resources, and that increasing the value of the recyclable resources and lowering the recycling costs in the early stages of the supply chain collaboration could lead to higher environmental sustainability. These results illustrate that using an RSC can effectively coordinate the CLSC, and can thus help policy implementation by governments.

SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION WITH UNCERTAINTY IN TWO-ECHELON YIELDS

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (01) ◽  
pp. 1250044 ◽  
Author(s):  
HONGJUN PENG ◽  
MEIHUA ZHOU ◽  
LING QIAN
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Profit Value ◽  
Production Decision

This paper researches the coordination models in the supply chain where there are uncertain two-echelon yields and random demand. We analyzed three contracts of revenue sharing (RS), overproduction risk sharing (OS), and combination of RS and OS (RO), and contrasted them with uncoordinated model. We studied the optimal order decision for downstream manufacturer and the optimal production decision for upstream manufacturer. Numerical examples were presented to illustrate the results. The study showed that the RS contract and OS sharing contract both have their advantages and disadvantages and the RO contract could benefit the whole supply chain best. We found out that the OS contract gives the upstream manufacturer incentive to produce more so as to maximize the profit value, but the upstream manufacturer may receive less as the price of overproduced part increases. We also found out that under most scenarios, the supply chain benefits from the yields and demand risks reduction and generates a higher profit. But sometimes in the OS contract the downstream manufacturer profit can increase as yields randomness increases. And, in the uncoordinated case and OS contract, the upstream manufacturer profit can increase as demand randomness increases.

Technology-Enabled Marketing and Supply Chain Collaboration

2020 ◽  
pp. 223-240
Author(s):  
Abdul Ali
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Marketing Strategies ◽  
Supply Chain Collaboration ◽  
Relational View ◽  
Collaborative Relationships ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Relationship Orientation

The concepts of marketing and supply chain management, despite their intertwined heritage, are treated in isolation in the literature. Several recent studies have endeavoured to demonstrate the synergies between them. However, the need for technology-enabled marketing for SC collaboration is still in its infancy. This chapter outlines the supply chain management, supply chain collaboration, and technology-enabled marketing. The chapter also highlights the need for technology-enabled marketing for supply chain collaboration. This study also extended the relational view theory in the context of relationship orientation to form collaborative relationships in the supply chain. This study suggested that an organisation could harness the synergy through integrating marketing strategies and SC collaboration.

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