An Evolutionary Game Theory Strategy for Carbon Emission Reduction in the Electricity Market

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (04) ◽  
pp. 1850008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryle S. Perera
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Unique Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Stable Equilibria ◽  
The Government

We study how a government can manage a policy of environmental sustainability in a competitive electricity market. We assume that the government plays a Stackelberg game as leader, to study the evolutionary stable equilibria of the problem under this game theory paradigm. We then analyze a bimatrix coordination game to have many equilibria when no single power plant has incentives to deviate when the others reduce carbon emissions. In fact for power plants the adapted behavior is to avoid heavy tariffs, preserve the market share and minimize the environmental impact. We use the notion of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) in the case of bounded rationality to obtain a unique Nash equilibrium known as the centroid-dominant equilibrium of the game. This proposed quantitative framework can be applied by policy makers to determine incentives and tariffs to meet the environmental obligations in the electricity market.

scholarly journals How to Promote Compliance Management in the Electricity Market? An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Cheng Chen ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Yuanyuan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises' choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies' choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

An Analysis of Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components Using Evolutionary Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Liu ◽  
Chenyao Lv ◽  
Hong Xian Li ◽  
Yan Li ◽  
Zhen Lei ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Liability Insurance ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Social Benefits ◽  
Simulation Calculation ◽  
The Government

Managing quality risks of prefabricated components is one of the challenges for prefabricated construction. The Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components (QLIPC) is an effective approach to transfer such risks; however, limited research has been conducted regarding the development of QLIPC. This study introduces an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)-based approach incorporating decisions from both the government and insurance companies. In the EGT model, a payoff matrix under disparate strategies is constructed, and the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) are deduced. The simulation calculation is then carried out by MATLAB using sample virtual data to demonstrate the analysis. The results show that the government should act as the game promoter because the QLIPC can reduce governance cost and has significant social benefits. This research contributes a theoretical framework to analyze the QLIPC development using the EGT theory, and it could help the government to make long-term strategies for developing the QLIPC market.

scholarly journals Modeling the Role of Government, Firm, and Civil Society for Environmental Sustainability

2020 ◽  
pp. 62-83
Author(s):  
Humaira Yasmeen ◽  
Ying Wang ◽  
Hashim Zameer ◽  
Hina Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Environmental Responsibility ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
The Government

The objective of this article is to design a game theory-based model to outline the role of the government, firm and civil society for environmental sustainability. The study used the dynamic game theory of complete information. Based upon the equilibrium analysis, the study highlights that when the punishment for non-compliance with environmental responsibility is smaller, the role of civil society would be higher for environmental sustainability. On the other hand, when the environmental responsibility cost is higher, then the role of a government is also higher for the implementation of environmental responsibility and to ensure the punishment. However, the authors found from model analysis that if the cost is low, the probability of firm to fulfill environmental responsibility is higher. In real life, the high cost of environmental responsibility is the main reason that the firm does not fulfill environmental responsibility. Under the high cost, the firm often has the phenomenon of bribery to the government and other means to avoid environmental responsibility. This article is a valuable policy guide for policy makers to cope with global environmental challenges.

scholarly journals Analysis of Fallow Farming Decision-Making Behavior of Farmers Based on Hawk-Dove Game Theory: The Case of Guizhou Province

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (14) ◽  
pp. 3821
Author(s):  
Hualin Xie ◽  
Qing Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Guizhou Province ◽  
Ecological Environment ◽  
Cultivated Land ◽  
Successful Development ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
The Government ◽  
Decision Making Behavior

Implementing a land fallow policy is of great significance for ensuring China’s food security and promoting the improvement of the ecological environment. The implementation of a fallow project involves different stakeholders. Farmers are the main participants in the fallow project. The decision of farmers to practice fallow is the key factor for the successful development of the fallow project. Therefore, this study theoretically reveals the decision-making mechanism of farmers’ participation in cultivated land fallow by utilizing the hawk-dove evolutionary game theory among farmers and explains some challenges in the implementation of fallow in Guizhou Province. We drew the following conclusions: (1) The behavior of farmers will be affected by other farmers in the same situation, and the effects of mutual incentives and imitations between the groups of farmers are affected by their interests; (2) in the fallow project, the rate of choosing either fallow or unfallow depends on the ratio of fallow income to planting income. If the income of participating in fallow is higher, the demonstration effect of farmers participating in fallow is stronger, and the strategy of continued cultivation is adopted. The fewer unfallow farmers there are, the more consolidated the results of fallow will be; and (3) the government should protect the income of farmers after fallow as much as possible, implement flexible subsidy policies, and formulate corresponding policies to successfully consolidate the fallow results.

scholarly journals Using Evolutionary Game Theory to Study Behavioral Strategies of the Government and Carriers Under Different Transshipment Modes

IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 18514-18521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lijuan Yang ◽  
Yu Zhang ◽  
Raymond Chiong ◽  
Sandeep Dhakal ◽  
Qiangqiang Qi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
The Government

scholarly journals Factors Influencing Engineers’ Attitude towards Environmental Sustainability

2018 ◽  
Vol 65 ◽  
pp. 04003
Author(s):  
Siti Nur Fazillah Mohd Fauzi ◽  
Nor’Aini Yusof ◽  
Hanizam Awang ◽  
Mohd Nurfadzli Mat Nah
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Peninsular Malaysia ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Responsible Attitude ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Relationship

Engineers have a vital role in addressing environmental degradation in construction projects. Therefore, engineers’ positive attitude towards the environment is important to ensure that construction projects are carried out responsibly. The objective of this paper is to investigate the factors that influence engineers’ attitude towards green practice. Six factors; Knowledge, Self-initiative, Firm Support, Government Support, Board of Engineers Support and Client Attributes were assumed to influence the engineers’ attitude towards green practice. A self-administered survey with 37 items was distributed to engineering firms in Peninsular Malaysia and 128 usable responses were received. The results show a moderate relationship with 32 percent of the variances in the relationship between the six factors and engineers’ attitude. The results reveal that self-initiative and government support have a significant and positive impact on the engineers’ attitude towards green practice with the higher effect coming from the support from the government (f2 = 0.210) as compared to self-initiative (f2 = 0.058). In contrast, the results provide insufficient evidence about the relationship between Knowledge, Firm Support, Board of engineers Support and Client Attributes and engineers’ attitude towards green practice. The results serve as a guide to the policy makers and engineers to ensure responsible attitude can be adopted towards the environment.

scholarly journals Study on Cooperative Mechanism of Prefabricated Producers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tongyao Feng ◽  
Shuangliang Tai ◽  
Chengshuang Sun ◽  
Qingpeng Man
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Initial Cost ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Evolution Trend

Good cooperation mechanism is an important guarantee for the advancement of industrialization construction. To strengthen the partnership between producers, we analyze the behavior evolution trend of both parties using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the original model, the mechanism of coordination and cooperation between prefabricated producers is explained under the condition of punishment and incentive. The results indicate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both cooperation and noncooperation, and the evolutionary results are influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes. The government can support the production enterprises to establish a solid partnership through effective punishment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the initial cost in the supply chain of prefabricated construction, resulting in a win-win situation.

scholarly journals Evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games for Sanitation Boards

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rocío Botta ◽  
Gerardo Blanco ◽  
Christian E. Schaerer
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cost Models ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Community Projects ◽  
The Cost

In a group of individuals that come together to produce a good or provide a service, the cooperators (who pay to produce the good) are often exploited by those who receive the benefit without paying the cost. Models were developed over time using incentives (reward or punishment) and the option of abandoning the initiative to promote and stabilize the cooperation. In this paper we analyze several models based on the evolutionary game theory and public good games. We compare and organize them in a taxonomic table following their main characteristics to select the most suitable for a specific problem. The analyzed models are compared by using a public good problem in community projects for water supply. We have reasonable assurance that phenomena that appear on mod- els also occurs in these community projects. Therefore, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be a useful tool for policy-makers in order to improve cooperation and discourage defection in sanitation boards.

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