scholarly journals Study on Cooperative Mechanism of Prefabricated Producers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tongyao Feng ◽  
Shuangliang Tai ◽  
Chengshuang Sun ◽  
Qingpeng Man
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Initial Cost ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Evolution Trend

Good cooperation mechanism is an important guarantee for the advancement of industrialization construction. To strengthen the partnership between producers, we analyze the behavior evolution trend of both parties using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the original model, the mechanism of coordination and cooperation between prefabricated producers is explained under the condition of punishment and incentive. The results indicate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both cooperation and noncooperation, and the evolutionary results are influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes. The government can support the production enterprises to establish a solid partnership through effective punishment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the initial cost in the supply chain of prefabricated construction, resulting in a win-win situation.

An Analysis of Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components Using Evolutionary Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Liu ◽  
Chenyao Lv ◽  
Hong Xian Li ◽  
Yan Li ◽  
Zhen Lei ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Liability Insurance ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Social Benefits ◽  
Simulation Calculation ◽  
The Government

Managing quality risks of prefabricated components is one of the challenges for prefabricated construction. The Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components (QLIPC) is an effective approach to transfer such risks; however, limited research has been conducted regarding the development of QLIPC. This study introduces an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)-based approach incorporating decisions from both the government and insurance companies. In the EGT model, a payoff matrix under disparate strategies is constructed, and the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) are deduced. The simulation calculation is then carried out by MATLAB using sample virtual data to demonstrate the analysis. The results show that the government should act as the game promoter because the QLIPC can reduce governance cost and has significant social benefits. This research contributes a theoretical framework to analyze the QLIPC development using the EGT theory, and it could help the government to make long-term strategies for developing the QLIPC market.

Trust strategy simulation of corporation–NPO cross alliance using evolutionary game theory

Kybernetes ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 450-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yidan Chen ◽  
Lanying Sun
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Trust Relationships

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamics and evolution of trust in organizational cross alliances. Design/methodology/approach In alliances between corporations and nonprofit organizations, trust in decision-making is a dynamic process. Using the replicated dynamics model of evolutionary game theory, this paper provides a trust decision model and analyzes four scenarios under different parameters. A numerical simulation is developed to present an intuitive interpretation of the dynamic development of trust decisions and the effects of incentive and punishment mechanisms. Findings Under different parameters, bounded rationality and utilities result in different but stable evolutionary strategies; the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy leads directly to whether participants adopt the strategy when the system reaches stability after continued games; and incentive and punishment mechanisms can significantly reduce the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy where the system evolves to meet stable state needs. Practical implications The establishment of trust relationships is an important influence on the stable and coordinated development of an alliance. The proposed model can help the alliance build closer trust relationships and provide a theoretical basis for the design of the trust mechanism. Originality/value Incentive and punishment bound by some degree of trust are introduced to address the problems of trust decisions and their dynamics; the model created reflects the bounded rationality and utility of each game stage. Useful evolutionary stable strategies using different variables are proposed to address the decision-making problems of trust in cross alliances.

scholarly journals Using Evolutionary Game Theory to Study Behavioral Strategies of the Government and Carriers Under Different Transshipment Modes

IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 18514-18521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lijuan Yang ◽  
Yu Zhang ◽  
Raymond Chiong ◽  
Sandeep Dhakal ◽  
Qiangqiang Qi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
The Government

Analysis and evaluation of incentive mechanisms in P2P networks: a spatial evolutionary game theory perspective

2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (12) ◽  
pp. 3044-3064 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guanghai Cui ◽  
Mingchu Li ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Jiankang Ren ◽  
Dong Jiao ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
P2p Networks ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Analysis And Evaluation

scholarly journals Enhanced Cooperation among Stakeholders in PPP Mega-Infrastructure Projects: A China Study

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 2791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Long Li ◽  
Zhongfu Li ◽  
Lei Jiang ◽  
Guangdong Wu ◽  
Daojin Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Simulation Method ◽  
Infrastructure Projects ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Benefit Allocation

Despite the consensus that enhanced cooperation among stakeholders is critical to the successful delivery of public-private partnership (PPP) mega-infrastructure projects, there has been a limited utilization of the quantitative approach to explore the cooperation mechanism. Drawing on research and the actual practice of PPP projects in China, a quantitative mathematical model using evolutionary game theory is constructed to explore the internal cooperation mechanism. Numerical simulation is implemented to investigate the impact of the punitive mechanism and allocation mechanism on the enhanced cooperation. The simulation result indicates that reasonable benefit allocation and a strong punitive mechanism are crucial to enhanced cooperation. Action research supported by a case study in Dalian was conducted to verify the scientific practicalities of the simulation method. An enhanced cooperation framework was proposed. The role conversion of the government and the private sectors makes the enhanced cooperation feasible. This evolution model and cooperation framework can facilitate enhanced cooperation in PPP mega-infrastructure projects.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Effects of Problem Size and the Problem Proposing Mechanism on the Problem Processing Mechanism in a New Main Manufacturer–Supplier Collaborative System

Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (7) ◽  
pp. 588
Author(s):  
Ming Zhang ◽  
Jianjun Zhu ◽  
Ponnambalam Kumaraswamy ◽  
Hehua Wang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Problem Size ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Collaborative System ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
Processing Mechanism

This paper analyzed the effects of the problem size and the problem proposing mechanism on the decision-making processes, for the manufacturer and the supplier, regarding processing a problem in a new main manufacturer–supplier collaborative system using evolutionary game theory. Unpredicted problems may arise in the process of collaborative research and development (R&D) of complex products, like big passenger aircrafts, without any relative advanced contract, and either player will take risks to announce it. In addition to the factors of traditional cost and income, we take another two factors (i.e., the problem size and the problem proposing mechanism) into account in the examination of the problem processing mechanism. With evolutionary game theory applied, we can obtain the stable decision-making states of both players and how these two factors affect the problem processing mechanism. From the result, we find that the problem size has little effect on the two players’ decisions, while the problem processing mechanism has an impact when the experiences or the capacities of the manufacturer and the supplier are unbalanced. This paper contributes to manufacturer and supplier in a newly-established collaborative system to consider how to behave when unpredicted problems come.

scholarly journals A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (21) ◽  
pp. 11624
Author(s):  
Jida Liu ◽  
Yanan Guo ◽  
Shi An ◽  
Chenxi Lian
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Natural Disasters ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Shared Resources ◽  
Cooperative Relationships ◽  
Selection Strategies ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
The Stability

Natural disasters have obvious cross-regional and compound characteristics. Cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters deepens the diversification of coordination relations and the complexity of interaction modes among emergency response organizations, including horizontal and vertical organizational interactions. In order to clarify the cooperation mechanism of emergency organizations during cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters and to explore the key factors that affect the cooperative relationships of emergency organizations, in this study, a game model is constructed based on evolutionary game theory, which is composed of local, neighboring, and central governments. Then, the stability of the emergency game strategy is analyzed. On this basis, a numerical simulation is used to simulate the dynamic evolution trajectory of the game system. The results show that there is an embedded mutual promotion mechanism that evolves towards a positive emergency strategy combination among the game subjects. The selection strategies of the game subjects show the characteristics of consistency and the following: enhanced cooperation efficiency between local and neighboring governments, emergency capital stock, and shared resources, therefore, guiding social emergency forces to actively participate in emergency operations. Strengthening the emergency dispatching strength of the central government and the effectiveness of central–local emergency dispatching, can support the performance of cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters. Furthermore, the efficiency of cooperation between local and neighboring governments will be enhanced.

scholarly journals Cooperation Mechanism in Blockchain by Evolutionary Game Theory

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Jinxin Zhang ◽  
Meng Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Normal Growth ◽  
Network Games ◽  
Long Term Stability ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
Expected Benefits

In the blockchain network, to get rewards in the blockchain, blockchain participants pay for various forms of competition such as computing power, stakes, and other resources. Because of the need to pay a certain cost, individual participants cooperate to maintain the long-term stability of the blockchain jointly. In the course of such competition, the game between each other has appeared invisibly. To better understand the blockchain design of cooperation mechanisms, in this paper, we constructed a game framework between participants with different willingness, using evolutionary game theory, and complex network games. We analyzed how the behavior of participants potentially develops with cost and payoff. We consider the expected benefits of participants for the normal growth of the blockchain as the major factor. Considering the behavior of malicious betrayers, the blockchain needs to be maintained in the early stage. Numerical simulation supports our analysis.

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