A Study on the Influence of Institutional Investors on the Financing Policies of Listed Companies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cuifeng Wu ◽  
Yimeng Ren
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Financing Policies

scholarly journals A Study on the Influence of Institutional Investor Heterogeneity on the Executive Pay Stickiness——Based on the Perspective of Industrial Factor Intensity

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 168
Author(s):  
Qitong Yu ◽  
Shaoyang Fang ◽  
Jianjun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Inhibitory Effect ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Investor Heterogeneity ◽  
Pressure Sensitive ◽  
Pressure Resistance ◽  
Term Performance

Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012-2016, this paper empirically studies the influence of heterogeneous institutional investors on executive compensation stickiness of listed companies by using the method of multiple regression. The results show that the pay stickiness is very common in the listed companies. The overall institutional investor’s shareholding is promoting the executive compensation stickiness. The empirical results show that the institutional investors are divided into the pressure resistance institutional investors and the pressure sensitive institutional investors, according to whether the institutional investors have the commercial relationship with the listed companies. The empirical results show that they are compared to the pressure. Sensitive institutions, pressure resistance institutional investors can significantly inhibit the stickiness of executive compensation. However, different types of institutional investors have different preferences for the types of listed companies, and the enthusiasm of participating in corporate governance is different, and the pressure resistance institutional investors pay more attention to labor out of social responsibility. The long-term performance of a force intensive enterprise has a significant inhibitory effect on the stickiness of the executive compensation, while the pressure sensitive institutional investors actively manage and supervise the production and operation of the technology intensive enterprises for the consideration of the investment income, which has a restraining effect on the pay stickiness of the technology intensive enterprises.

NEW EQUITY RAISING METHODS FOR LISTED COMPANIES: JUMBOS AND RAPIDS—OPTIMISED RIGHTS OFFERS AND PLACEMENTS

2006 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 475
Author(s):  
J.D. Philips ◽  
V.E. Mathewson
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Traditional Methods ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
Rights Issue ◽  
A Company ◽  
Short Timeframe

Traditional methods of equity capital raising by listed companies may not always be the best way to meet the needs of both the companies and shareholders1. The timetable for a rights issue (being a pro rata offer to all shareholders to subscribe for shares) may be too long to fund an acquisition or project. A placement (being an offer to institutional investors for a certain number of shares), while giving a company certainty and a shorter timeframe, excludes the company's shareholders from participation in the capital raising.Innovative new capital raising structures have been developed. Two of these are known as the jumbo and the RAPIDs™ structures.Broadly, they both combine aspects of a rights offer and a placement. The rights offer is split into two stages; the first stage involves offering institutional investors on the company's share register their component of the rights offer, which can be done in a short timeframe. This institutional component of the rights offer is combined with a placement to other institutional investors through a bookbuild. The retail component of the rights offer is then conducted on the Australian Stock Exchange Limited's (ASX) normal (longer) timetable. The offer structures enable funds raised from the institutional rights offer and placement to be received quickly, while still enabling retail shareholders to participate in the offer and avoid dilution.

scholarly journals Institutional Shareholdings and Financial Characteristics of Malaysian Listed Companies

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shamsul Naharabdullah ◽  
Mohd Azlan Yahya ◽  
Faisol Elham
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Financial Ratios ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Growth Ratio ◽  
Primary Motivation ◽  
The Mean ◽  
Financial Characteristics ◽  
Institutional Shareholders

This study attempts to investigate the extent to which the financial characteristics of firms are related to institutional shareholdings. The primary motivation to carry out the study comes from an earlier paper by Hessel and Norman (1992), which showed that seven financial ratios discriminated between strongly-held and institutionally-neglected firms. As an extension of the study, the present study seeks to investigate the seven financial ratios among Malaysian companies by identifying differences in the means of the seven ratios between a group of companies with substantial institutional shareholdings against another group of companies with negligible institutional shareholdings. The findings, from a sample of KLSE listed companies, broadly support the findings by Hessel and Norman (1992), in which firms with significant institutional shareholdings exhibited a significantly higher profitability ratio against firms that were neglected by institutional investors.. This suggested that institutional investors placed greater emphasis on a firm's short-term results. Our evidence also did not indicate institutional shareholders' direct involvement in ensuring a firm's long-term growth and competitiveness, as shown by the insignificant differences in the mean of growth ratio between firms that had significant institutional shareholdings and those that were neglected by institutional investors.  

scholarly journals Institutional investors and cost of capital: The moderating effect of ownership structure

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. e0249963
Author(s):  
Xiaoping Huo ◽  
Hongying Lin ◽  
Yanan Meng ◽  
Peter Woods
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Cost Of Capital ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Moderating Effect ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Relationship

Guiding institutional investors to actively participate in corporate governance is a hot issue to improve the internal governance of China’s listed companies. This study seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the mechanism that underlies the governance effects of the heterogeneity of institutional investors on the cost of capital, and the influence of ownership structure on the relationship between them. Using an unbalanced panel data on A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen in China’s capital market during the 2014–2019 period, this study reveals how institutional investors with longer holding period and higher shareholding ratio are negatively associated with the cost of capital in China’s capital market. Furthermore, this study successfully confirms the moderating effect of ownership structure in the relationship between institutional investors and the cost of capital. China’s state-owned enterprises are more likely to introduce improvements at the corporate governance level, and ownership concentration weakens the negative influence of institutional investors on the cost of capital. The research contributes to a deeper understanding of the impacts of institutional investor’s heterogeneity and ownership structure on the cost of capital in China. In the process, the study yields useful implications for the theory and practice of corporate governance.

scholarly journals Determinants of compliance with audit committee rules: Evidence from Indonesia

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 609-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ari Kuncara Widagdo ◽  
Susela Devi Suppiah
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Foreign Institutional Investors

The main objective of this study is to investigate the extent of public listed companies compliance with the audit committee rules and to examine the association between Indonesian business characteristics and the compliance of public listed companies with the rules. The results indicate that the compliance of public listed companies with the rules is unsatisfactory. In terms of determinants of the compliance, the different types of family control have a different effect on the compliance of public listed companies with the rules. Additionally, public listed companies with politically connected independent commissioner are less likely to comply with the rules. In contrast, public listed companies with large genuine foreign institutional investors are more likely to comply with the rules

scholarly journals Executive salary stickiness, institutional investors and innovation investment -- Based on the empirical data of listed companies

2021 ◽  
Vol 292 ◽  
pp. 02013
Author(s):  
Ding xin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Empirical Data ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Private Enterprises ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Corporate Innovation ◽  
Enterprise Innovation ◽  
The Impact

This paper takes China’s A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2019 as the research object, and empirically tests the impact of executive compensation stickiness on enterprise innovation investment. It is found that executive compensation stickiness is positively correlated with the innovation investment of corporate and it is more significant in private enterprises. In addition, Institutional investors participate in corporate governance to play a positive governance effect, and strengthen the positive correlation between the stickiness of executive compensation and corporate innovation investment.

scholarly journals Impact Of Shareholder Activism On Corporate Governance In China: Evidence From Companies Listed On The Shenzhen Stock Exchange “A” Shares

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 114
Author(s):  
Shaokai Huang ◽  
Rui Xie
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Shareholder Activism ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Empirical Estimation ◽  
Positive Behaviors ◽  
Share Structure

This paper investigates impact of shareholder activism on corporate governance in China. The separation of ownership and management of companies often to some extent causes agency problems between shareholders and company managers. In Western countries, shareholders of a company usually actively participate in the company’s management and closely monitor management issues in order to enhance the company’s performance. At present, China’s securities market, along with institutional investors, is undergoing a rapid development. Nevertheless, problems in corporate governance among listed companies have been hindering the development of capital markets in China. Meanwhile, institutional investors have experienced significant growth. Moreover, national policies, as well as the split-share structure reform, further encourage the growth of institutional investors and their active participation in corporate governance for further promotion of the development of capital markets. Making empirical contribution, this paper tests how effective institutional investors participate in the governance of listed companies on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) “A” Shares after share reform in China. Results of empirical estimation indicate that China’s institutional investors do participate in corporate governance, but only to some extent. Positive behaviors of Chinese shareholders have played a favorable role in improving corporate governance.

Concerns About the Quality and Influence of Proxy Advisors, and Its Implications for the Preparations of the Shareholders Meeting

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 794-819
Author(s):  
Albert F. Verdam
Keyword(s):  
American Literature ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
The State ◽  
Advisory Services ◽  
Proxy Advisors ◽  
Shed Light

After highlighting the importance of the votes cast by institutional investors in shareholders meetings of listed companies, and the role proxy advisors play in this respect, this article turns to the points of criticism that are strongly emphasized in American literature, as well as to the state of regulation on both sides of the Atlantic, also including the stern action the SEC has been taken recently with respect to proxy advisors. On the basis of a questionnaire issued to Dutch listed companies, I shed light on the perception of listed companies of the actions of proxy advisory services. I will conclude with a few reflective remarks, also about the consequences of the growing role of proxy advisors for the preparation of the shareholders meeting dynamics surrounding the shareholders meeting.

Institutional Investors' Representativeness and Earnings Management

2021 ◽  
pp. 27-45
Author(s):  
Pietro Fera ◽  
Nicola Moscariello ◽  
Michele Pizzo ◽  
Giorgio Ricciardi
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Mere Presence ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Institutional Shareholders

In contexts characterized by high ownership concentration, institutional investors may lose their monitoring role and might not be effective in constraining earnings management. So, this study investigates whether directors appointed by institutional shareholders are more effective in inhibiting earnings management for companies with a high ownership concentration, rather than the mere presence of institutional investors. Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, findings suggest a negative relationship between minority directors appointed by institutional shareholders and abnormal accruals, while no relationship is found between the latter and the mere presence of institutional investors. Moreover, results also highlight that the difference between strategic and no strategic institutional investors does not count in a context characterized by high ownership concentration. Overall, this study suggests that institutional investors, regardless of their characteristics, are more effective in constraining earnings management when they can count on an agent on the board of directors.

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