scholarly journals Research on Third-Party Collecting Game Model with Competition in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Complex Systems Theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Yuehong Guo
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Critical Value ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

This paper studied system dynamics characteristics of closed-loop supply chain using repeated game theory and complex system theory. It established decentralized decision-making game model and centralized decision-making game model and then established and analyzed the corresponding continuity system. Drew the region local stability of Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium, and a series of chaotic system characteristics, have an detail analysis of the Lyapunov index which is under the condition of different parameter combination. According to the limited rational expectations theory, it established repeated game model based on collection price and marginal profits. Further, this paper analyzed the influence of the parameters by numerical simulations and concluded three conclusions. First, when the collection price is to a critical value, the system will be into chaos state. Second, when the sale price of remanufacturing products is more than a critical value, the system will be in chaos state. Last, the initial value of the collection price is sensitive, small changes may cause fluctuations of market price. These conclusions guide enterprises in making the best decisions in each phase to achieve maximize profits.

scholarly journals Emergency Strategies of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Single Retailer Recycling under Demand Disruptions

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Jian Cao ◽  
Yuting Yan ◽  
Lingyuan Wang ◽  
Xihui Chen ◽  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Normal Operation ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Emergency Decision

The uncertainty caused by emergencies will influence the normal operation of the supply chain. Considering demand disruptions, a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two competing retailers based on decentralized decision-making is considered. In the supply chain, one retailer recovers end-of-life products while the other does not. Analytic results show that, when the disturbance of demand occurs, the manufacturer and retailers adjust the wholesale price and retail prices of products according to the direction of the market demand disruptions. Under demand disruptions, the retailer who participates in recovering can gain more profits, especially in the case of the positive disruption. Theoretic and pragmatic references for the emergency decision-making of closed-loop supply chain enterprises are provided.

scholarly journals Research on Services Decision-Making in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Dominated by a Logistics Provider

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Fei Chen ◽  
Liurui Deng ◽  
Yiwen Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Service Competition ◽  
Equipment Manufacturer ◽  
Manufactured Products ◽  
The Given

Abstract In this paper, we assume that a closed-loop supply chain consists of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) producing new products from raw materials, a remanufacturer producing re-manufactured products from used items directly collected from customers and a logistics provider which sells and distributes two products as a monopolist in the given market. By constructing game model in which logistics provider is a leader, OEM and remanufacturer are the equal status followers, we solve chain members’ optimal services decision-making. Finally, we analyze influence of service elasticities and intensities of service competition of two manufacturers on members’ equilibrium decision-making.

scholarly journals A Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Based on Third-Party Recycling

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (19) ◽  
pp. 5335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiafu Su ◽  
Chi Li ◽  
Qingjun Zeng ◽  
Jiaquan Yang ◽  
Jie Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

Taking an environment-friendly green closed-loop supply chain as the research object, this work established a two-stage closed-loop supply chain game model. Considering the influence of the environmental protection input on the whole supply chain, there are different decisions among the participants in the supply chain, and the different choices will have impacts on the benefits of the whole supply chain when manufacturers select a closed-loop supply chain model of third-party recycling. Hence, this work compared and analyzed the impact of centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making on the returns and pricing strategies of each participant. Finally, an optimized cooperative mechanism decision model considering a cost profit sharing contract was further designed. The model is conducive to obtaining the maximum profit value in centralized decision-making and avoids the negative impact of a “double marginal effect” on supply chain income in decentralized decision-making, and finally, improves the overall coordination and profit of a green closed-loop supply chain. The numerical examples are conducted to verify the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed models. This work provides a helpful decision support and guidance for enterprises and the government on the used products recycling decisions to better manage the green closed-loop supply chain.

scholarly journals Modelling dual-channel closed-loop supply chain considering production diseconomies

2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09002
Author(s):  
Shan Liu ◽  
Yan Xing ◽  
Fengmin Yao ◽  
Dongyan Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Waste Product ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Direct Sales ◽  
Coordination Strategies ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Optimal Pricing Strategy

This paper studies the pricing selection and coordination strategies for dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) considering production diseconomies. Under the centralized and decentralized decision-making, the decision models of CLSC of retailer recycling was constructed, the effects of the manufacturer’s production diseconomy and the sales competition between manufacturer and retailer on new product pricing and waste product recycling were analysed, the optimal pricing strategy of dual-channel CLSC was given, and a “two-part tariff” coordination contract was established based on centralized decision-making. The results indicate that the profits of each member are negatively correlated with the production diseconomy and positively correlated with the degree of sales competition, the direct sales volume of manufacturer is always more than twice that of retailer, and the stronger the competition degree is, the more obvious the advantage is. Further, within the range of contract parameters that the dominant manufacturer and retailer are willing to accept, the “two-part tariff” contract can effectively realize the coordination of dual-channel CLSC.

scholarly journals A Coordinated Revenue-Sharing Model for a Sustainable Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 3198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Zou ◽  
Jin Qin ◽  
Peng Yang ◽  
Bo Dai
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

This study takes a sustainable closed-loop supply chain composed of one manufacturer and two price-competitive retailers as the object and considers the two-way risk aversion characteristics of manufacturers and retailers in examining the coordination mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain. Using game theory, optimal decision-making on wholesale prices, retail prices, and recycling prices are explored under decentralized and centralized decision-making scenarios, and representative expressions are established. By analyzing the effects of the risk aversion coefficient on players’ optimal strategies, we found that the manufacturer’s and retailers’ risk aversion coefficients have different effects on the wholesale price, retail price, and recycling price under decentralized decision-making, while in a centralized decision-making scenario, the effects are the same. The comparison also found that the wholesale price and recovery price under the centralized decision-making scenario are higher than those under decentralized decision-making. To achieve closed-loop supply chain coordination, we propose a revenue-sharing contract that we demonstrate by coordinating price competition with risk aversion and analyze a range of parameters that influence the revenue-sharing contract. The results show that the proposed contract can increase the profits of supply chain members by identifying the optimal revenue-sharing ratio.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions in a Competitive Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Duopolistic Recyclers

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doo Ho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Experiment ◽  
End Of Life ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Game Model ◽  
New Materials ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Equilibrium Prices

In this study, we consider a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a collector, and two duopolistic recyclers. In the supply chain, the collector collects end-of-life products from consumers in the market. Then, both recyclers purchase the recyclable waste from the collector, and each recycler turns them into new materials. The manufacturer has no recycling facilities; therefore, the manufacturer only purchases the recycled and new materials for its production from the two recyclers. Under this scenario, price competition between recyclers is inevitable. With two pricing structures (Nash and Stackelberg) of the leaders group and three competition behaviors (Collusion, Cournot, and Stackelberg) of the followers group, we suggest six different pricing game models. In each of them, we establish a pricing game model among the members, prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium prices of the supply chain members, and discuss the effects of competition on the overall supply chain’s profitability. Our numerical experiment indicates that as the price competition between recyclers intensifies, the supply chain profitability decreases. Moreover, the greater the recyclability degree of the waste is, the higher the profits in the supply chain become.

scholarly journals Warranty Period Decision and Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chains Considering Remanufacturing and Consumer Behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 4237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Wei Li
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Period ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Decision Making Model

The closed-loop supply chain management model is an effective way to promote sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Increasing the sales volume of remanufactured products to stimulate green growth is a key issue in the development of closed-loop supply chains. By designing an effective warranty strategy, customer’s perceived value can be enhanced and market demand can be stimulated. This study cuts through the warranty period of closed-loop supply chain products. Based on the perspective of consumer behavior, game theory is used to construct the optimal decision-making model for closed-loop supply chains. The optimal warranty decision making for new products and remanufactured products under centralized and decentralized decision-making models is discussed. Further, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services and the design of contract coordination is also shown. We show that consumer preference has a positive impact on the sales of remanufactured products and the profits of enterprises; with the extension of the new product and remanufacturing warranty period, the profit of the supply chain system first increases and then decreases, and the value is maximized at the extreme point in the manufacturer-led decision-making model. Furthermore, the leader gains higher profits with bargaining power, but the profit of the supply chain system under decentralized decision model is less than that of the centralized decision model, reflecting the double marginalization effect. The revenue sharing contract and the two-charge contract designed in this study coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services, so that the member companies in the supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement.

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