scholarly journals An Analysis of Pay-for-Performance Schemes and Their Potential Impacts on Health Systems and Outcomes for Patients

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Kwadwo Kyeremanteng ◽  
Raphaëlle Robidoux ◽  
Gianni D’Egidio ◽  
Shannon M. Fernando ◽  
David Neilipovitz

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have been introduced into the Canadian medical system in the last decades. This paper examines the underlying characteristics of P4P and describes both their advantages and drawbacks. Most P4P programs provide the advantage of rewarding medical acts, thus providing an incentive to take on complex patients. There is a variety of nuanced P4P initiatives, which provide financial incentive according to differing criteria, based on quality measures, incentives, and/or benchmark structures. However, there is no conclusive evidence demonstrating that P4P programs provide better value for money than traditional pay schemes, regardless of particular structural choices. Some evidence has even shown that P4P may be detrimental, especially in disadvantaged and high-risk populations. Additionally, there are a number of ethical and practical concerns that arise with the use of P4P, such as the risk of financial incentives being misused or misinterpreted and patients being refused or referred during treatment. P4P initiatives require careful examination and the creation of solid, evidence-based criteria for evaluation and implementation in Canadian medical systems.

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Meacock ◽  
Søren Kristensen ◽  
Matt Sutton

There is a long-term international trend towards linking payments more closely to providers’ performance. The US and England have been at the forefront of the design and introduction of such pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes. England’s experience is, however, likely to have greater salience for the Nordic countries’ health care systems due to the publicly funded finance structure. We review the development of five of England’s major schemes and summarise the available evidence on their impacts. These schemes are: the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF); Advancing Quality; the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) framework; Best Practice Tariffs; and the newest ‘non-payment’ policies. Much of the evidence is limited by the non-experimental way in which the schemes have been introduced, with limited data available prior to the introduction of the schemes and no experimentally unexposed providers to serve as controls. Nonetheless, the existing evidence suggests that P4P can result in modest short-term improvements in the incentivised aspects of performance. There is little evidence of effort diversion, yet some to suggest positive spillovers of these schemes onto non-incentivised aspects of performance. While there is some evidence of gaming and inequitable consequences, these do not appear to be widespread. The gains that can accrue across large patient populations as a result of relatively small financial incentives mean that P4P schemes can be cost-effective. P4P programmes are likely to be most effective when introduced as a supporting part to a wider quality improvement initiative, and when results are published to encourage a reputational as well as a financial incentive for improvement. Though the accumulation of evidence to support P4P has not been systematic or especially robust, it remains a popular policy tool with decision-makers in England, with its reach set to increase further in the future.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason L. Brown ◽  
Donald V. Moser

ABSTRACT Shareholder litigation is an important part of the regulation of securities markets that can influence corporate managers' reporting behavior. Prior research shows that conventional economic factors affect investors' litigation decisions. We use experimental markets to examine whether investors engage in costly litigation even without a direct financial incentive to do so and whether this affects managers' reporting decisions and managers' and investors' welfare. We find that investors frequently litigate when they can impose a financial penalty on managers for misreporting even though they cannot recover their legal fees or receive restitution for their losses. Moreover, this deters managers' shirking and misreporting and improves managers' and investors' welfare almost as effectively as when investors can recover their legal fees and receive restitution for their losses. Overall, our results indicate that, in addition to financial incentives, investors' desire to punish misreporting plays an important role in their litigation decisions, and that may yield substantial welfare benefits.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Fatima A Fagbenro ◽  
Tessa Lasswell ◽  
Sarah A Rydell ◽  
J Michael Oakes ◽  
Brian Elbel ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT Objective To report perspectives of participants in a food benefit program that includes FAS restrictions and FAS restrictions paired with F/V incentives. Design Randomized experimental trial in which participant perspectives were an exploratory study outcome. Setting Participants were randomized into one of three SNAP-like food benefit program groups - (1) Restriction: not allowed to buy FAS with benefits; (2) Restriction paired with incentive: not allowed to buy FAS with benefits and 30% financial incentive on eligible F/V purchased using benefits; or (3) Control: Same food purchasing rules as SNAP. Participants were asked questions to assess program satisfaction. Participants Adults in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN metropolitan area, eligible for but not currently participating in SNAP who completed baseline and follow-up study measures (n=254). Results Among remaining households in each group, most found the program helpful in buying nutritious foods (88.2%-95.7%) and were satisfied with the program (89.1%-93.0%). Sensitivity analysis results indicate that reported helpfulness and satisfaction with the program may in some instances be lower among the Restriction and the Restrictions paired with Incentive groups in comparison to the control group. Conclusions A food benefit program that includes restriction on purchase of FAS or restriction paired with a financial incentive for F/V purchases may be acceptable to most SNAP-eligible households with children.


BMJ Open ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. e026086
Author(s):  
Yasutake Tomata ◽  
Fumiya Tanji ◽  
Dieta Nurrika ◽  
Yingxu Liu ◽  
Saho Abe ◽  
...  

IntroductionPhysical activity is one of the major modifiable factors for promotion of public health. Although it has been reported that financial incentives would be effective for promoting health behaviours such as smoking cessation or attendance for cancer screening, few randomised controlled trials (RCTs) have examined the effect of financial incentives for increasing the number of daily steps among individuals in a community setting. The aim of this study is to investigate the effects of financial incentives for increasing the number of daily steps among community-dwelling adults in Japan.Methods and analysisThis study will be a two-arm, parallel-group RCT. We will recruit community-dwelling adults who are physically inactive in a suburban area (Nakayama) of Sendai city, Japan, using leaflets and posters. Participants that meet the inclusion criteria will be randomly allocated to an intervention group or a waitlist control group. The intervention group will be offered a financial incentive (a chance to get shopping points) if participants increase their daily steps from their baseline. The primary outcome will be the average increase in the number of daily steps (at 4–6 weeks and 7–9 weeks) relative to the average number of daily steps at the baseline (1–3 weeks). For the sample size calculation, we assumed that the difference of primary outcome would be 1302 steps.Ethics and disseminationThis study has been ethically approved by the research ethics committee of Tohoku University Graduate School of Medicine, Japan (No. 2018-1-171). The results will be submitted and published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal.Trial registration numberUMIN000033276; Pre-results.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (15) ◽  
pp. 1-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaby Judah ◽  
Ara Darzi ◽  
Ivo Vlaev ◽  
Laura Gunn ◽  
Derek King ◽  
...  

BackgroundThe UK national diabetic eye screening (DES) programme invites diabetic patients aged > 12 years annually. Simple and cost-effective methods are needed to increase screening uptake. This trial tests the impact on uptake of two financial incentive schemes, based on behavioural economic principles.ObjectivesTo test whether or not financial incentives encourage screening attendance. Secondarily to understand if the type of financial incentive scheme used affects screening uptake or attracts patients with a different sociodemographic status to regular attenders. If financial incentives were found to improve attendance, then a final objective was to test cost-effectiveness.DesignThree-armed randomised controlled trial.SettingDES clinic within St Mary’s Hospital, London, covering patients from the areas of Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster.ParticipantsPatients aged ≥ 16 years, who had not attended their DES appointment for ≥ 2 years.Interventions(1) Fixed incentive – invitation letter and £10 for attending screening; (2) probabilistic (lottery) incentive – invitation letter and 1% chance of winning £1000 for attending screening; and (3) control – invitation letter only.Main outcome measuresThe primary outcome was screening attendance. Rates for control versus fixed and lottery incentive groups were compared using relative risk (RR) and risk difference with corresponding 95% confidence intervals (CIs).ResultsA total of 1274 patients were eligible and randomised; 223 patients became ineligible before invite and 1051 participants were invited (control,n = 435; fixed group,n = 312; lottery group,n = 304). Thirty-four (7.8%, 95% CI 5.29% to 10.34%) control, 17 (5.5%, 95% CI 2.93% to 7.97%) fixed group and 10 (3.3%, 95% CI 1.28% to 5.29%) lottery group participants attended. Participants offered incentives were 44% less likely to attend screening than controls (RR 0.56, 95% CI 0.34 to 0.92). Examining incentive groups separately, the lottery group were 58% less likely to attend screening than controls (RR 0.42, 95% CI 0.18 to 0.98). No significant differences were found between fixed incentive and control groups (RR 0.70, 95% CI 0.35 to 1.39) or between fixed and lottery incentive groups (RR 1.66, 95% CI 0.65 to 4.21). Subgroup analyses showed no significant associations between attendance and sociodemographic factors, including gender (female vs. male, RR 1.25, 95% CI 0.77 to 2.03), age (≤ 65 years vs. > 65 years, RR 1.26, 95% CI 0.77 to 2.08), deprivation [0–20 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) decile vs. 30–100 IMD decile, RR 1.12, 95% CI 0.69 to 1.83], years registered [mean difference (MD) –0.13, 95% CI –0.69 to 0.43], and distance from screening location (MD –0.18, 95% CI –0.65 to 0.29).LimitationsDespite verification, some address details may have been outdated, and high ethnic diversity may have resulted in language barriers for participants.ConclusionsThose receiving incentives were not more likely to attend a DES than those receiving a usual invitation letter in patients who are regular non-attenders. Both fixed and lottery incentives appeared to reduce attendance. Overall, there is no evidence to support the use of financial incentives to promote diabetic retinopathy screening. Testing interventions in context, even if they appear to be supported by theory, is important.Future workFuture research, specifically in this area, should focus on identifying barriers to screening and other non-financial methods to overcome them.Trial registrationCurrent Controlled Trials ISRCTN14896403.FundingThis project was funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Health Services and Delivery Research programme and will be published in full inHealth Services and Delivery Research; Vol. 5, No. 15. See the NIHR Journals Library website for further project information.


10.2196/16711 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (8) ◽  
pp. e16711
Author(s):  
Brittney R Henderson ◽  
Carina M Flaherty ◽  
G Chandler Floyd ◽  
Jack You ◽  
Rui Xiao ◽  
...  

Background Poor adherence to inhaled corticosteroid medications for children with high-risk asthma is both well documented and poorly understood. It has a disproportionate prevalence and impact on children of minority demographics in urban settings. Financial incentives have been shown to be a compelling method to engage those in a high-risk asthma population, but whether adherence can be maintained by offering financial incentives and how these incentives can be used to sustain high adherence are unknown. Objective The aim of this study is to determine the marginal effects of a financial incentive–based intervention on inhaled corticosteroid adherence, health care system use, and costs. Methods Participants include children aged 5 to 12 years who have had either at least two hospitalizations or one hospitalization and one emergency department visit for asthma in the year prior to their enrollment (and their caregivers). Participants are given an electronic inhaler sensor in order to track their medication use over a period of 7 months. After a 1-month period of observation, participants are randomized to 1 of 3 arms for a 3-month period. Participants in arm 1 receive daily text message reminders, feedback, and gain–framed, nominal financial incentives; participants in arm 2 receive daily text message reminders and feedback only, and participants in arm 3 receive no reminders, feedback, or incentives. All participants are subsequently observed for an additional 3-month period with no reminders, feedback, or incentives to assess whether any sustained effects are apparent. Results Study enrollment began in September 2019 with a target sample size of N=125 children. As of June 2020, 61 children have been enrolled. Data collection is estimated to be completed in June 2022, and analyses will be completed by June 2023. Conclusions This study will provide data that will help to determine whether a financial incentive–based mobile health intervention for promoting inhaled corticosteroid use can be effective in patients with high-risk asthma over longer periods. Trial Registration Clinicaltrial.gov NCT03907410; https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT03907410 International Registered Report Identifier (IRRID) DERR1-10.2196/16711


2016 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam A. Markovitz ◽  
Andrew M. Ryan

Research on the effects of pay-for-performance (P4P) in health care indicates largely disappointing results. This central finding, however, may mask important heterogeneity in the effects of P4P. We conducted a literature review to assess whether hospital and physician performance in P4P vary by patient and catchment area factors, organizational and structural capabilities, and P4P program characteristics. Several findings emerged: organizational size, practice type, teaching status, and physician age and gender modify performance in P4P. For physician practices and hospitals, a higher proportion of poor and minority patients is consistently associated with worse performance. Other theoretically influential characteristics—including information technology and staffing levels—yield mixed results. Inconsistent and contradictory effects of bonus likelihood, bonus size, and marginal costs on performance in P4P suggest organizations have not responded strategically to financial incentives. We conclude that extant heterogeneity in the effects of P4P does not fundamentally alter current assessments about its effectiveness.


Author(s):  
Mary Schmeida ◽  
Ramona Sue McNeal

The U.S. population is living longer, placing a demand on long-term care services. In the U.S., Medicaid is the primary player in funding costly long-term care for the aged poor. As a major health reform law, the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Law 111-148, gives financial incentive for states to expand Medicaid, transitioning long-term care services from facilities toward community care. Facing other funding obligations and recent recessions, not all states expanded their Medicaid long-term care program using the financial incentives. Some states continue to spend more dollars on traditional nursing facility care despite legislation. This chapter explores why some states spend more revenue on nursing facility long-term care despite enhanced federal funding to reform, while others are spending more on home and community-based services. Regression analysis and 50 state-level data is used.


2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 886-893 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha M. Meints ◽  
Heidi Y. Yang ◽  
Jamie E. Collins ◽  
Jeffrey N. Katz ◽  
Elena Losina

Purpose: To examine differences in physical activity (PA) uptake between black and white employees during a financial incentive-based workplace intervention. Design: Prospective cohort study from July 2014 to June 2015 (NCT02850094). Setting: Tertiary academic medical center. Participants: Forty-three black and 182 white nonclinical employees. Intervention: Participants self-selected or were assigned to teams. Participants completed a 24-week intervention receiving rewards for meeting weekly PA goals (increasing moderate-to-vigorous PA [MVPA] by 10% from previous week or meeting Guidelines threshold of 150 minutes of MVPA). Measures: Outcomes included weekly MVPA in minutes, average daily step counts, number of weeks meeting personal goals and the Guidelines, and Fitbit adherence in days and weeks. Analysis: We performed an analysis of covariance for each outcome, with race as the primary independent variable of interest, adjusting for demographic and health-related covariates. Results: During the intervention, blacks walked 9128 steps per day while whites walked 7826 steps per day, a difference of approximately 1300 steps ( P < .05). Blacks also demonstrated a greater uptake in both steps and MVPA from baseline than did whites, resulting in similar MVPA throughout the intervention. Conclusions: Findings suggest that workplace PA interventions using financial incentives may result in similar engagement in MVPA among white and black employees, while black employees walk more steps during the intervention. Limitations include a primarily white female sample which may not generalize.


2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 164-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kiran Gupta ◽  
Robert M Wachter ◽  
Allen Kachalia

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