Research on Contract Coordination in the Manufacturing Supply Chain Given China’s Work Safety Constraints

With supply chain management’s increasing importance in work safety, this paper establishes the leading enterprise with core enterprises as work safety units. These guide the small and medium-sized enterprises within the supply chain to focus on improving work safety according to the leading position of the supply chain’s core enterprises. Therefore, the Stackelberg game model is applied to build and explain supply chain node-enterprises’ optimal centralized and decentralized operational decisions. This research was conducted in the context of enterprise work safety constraints’ influence on the manufacturing supply chain’s equilibrium results. It also reveals the necessity in supply chain node enterprises’ contract coordination design by comparing the two decision models’ equilibrium results. Ultimately, the manufacturing supply chain’s overall profit and work safety can reach a level that includes centralized decisions through revenue- and cost-sharing contracts. Furthermore, profits to the supply chain’s node enterprises also improve, and a Pareto optimality is achieved. An enlightened management demonstrates the importance of core enterprises’ leading position in the supply chain, and the supply chain node enterprises’ levels of work safety, product demand, and total profit can be promoted through revenue- and cost-sharing contracts.

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A Building-Material Supply Chain Sustainable Operations under Fairness Concerns and Reference Price Benefits

Complexity ◽

10.1155/2021/5555307 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 2021 ◽

pp. 1-14

Author(s):

Huimin Xiao ◽

Youlei Xu ◽

Shiwei Li

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Building Material ◽

Cost Sharing ◽

Reference Price ◽

Dynamic Models ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Noncooperative Game ◽

Sustainable Operations ◽

Effort Level ◽

Fairness Concerns

This paper incorporates fairness concerns and consumer reference price effects into a two-echelon building-material closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. By establishing four differential game models, we investigate the sustainable operations and cooperation of this supply chain. The four game models are a Nash noncooperative game, Stackelberg game with cost sharing, Stackelberg game with fairness concerns and cost sharing, and centralized decision model. By using dynamic models and optimal control theory, we obtain the two members’ optimal equilibrium strategies in the supply chain. Analytical results show that the consumer reference price effect has a positive impact on the manufacturer’s effort level, retailer’s publicity level, and product brand goodwill, which can improve the supply chain performance. The retailer’s partial commitment to cost sharing can enhance the production enthusiasm of the manufacturer, improve the brand reputation of the product, and enhance the two members’ individual profitability. The distributional fairness concerns of the manufacturer not only prevent the manufacturer and retailer from achieving Pareto improvement but also lead to the decline of the manufacturer’s effort level and profitability. The research conclusions of this paper can provide some insights into the cooperation and sustainable development of the supply chain.

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Decision Models of Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information with Demand Disruption

Advanced Materials Research ◽

10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.143-144.773 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 143-144 ◽

pp. 773-781

Author(s):

Xin Rong Jiang ◽

Yong Chao Li

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Asymmetric Information ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Wholesale Price ◽

Retail Price ◽

Expected Profit ◽

Decision Models ◽

Market Demand ◽

Optimal Production ◽

Production Quantity

This paper studied the influence of asymmetric information and demand disruption on the decision of the supply chain. We analyzed the supply chain decision models based on a Stackelberg game under normal circumstances and demand disruption situation. The conclusion indicates when the market demand is disrupted, the optimal wholesale price, the retail price, the supplier’s expected profit and the supply chain system’s expected profit change in the same direction as the demand disruption, while the optimal production quantity and the retailer’s profit both have certain robustness under disruption. Finally we gave a numerical example to illustrate our analysis.

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Coordination contract for a competitive pharmaceutical supply chain considering corporate social responsibility and pricing decisions

RAIRO - Operations Research ◽

10.1051/ro/2019073 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 54 (5) ◽

pp. 1515-1535 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Maryam Johari ◽

Seyyed-Mahdi Hosseini-Motlagh

Keyword(s):

Corporate Social Responsibility ◽

Supply Chain ◽

Social Responsibility ◽

Cost Sharing ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Market Demand ◽

Pharmaceutical Supply Chain ◽

Pricing Decisions ◽

Substitutable Products ◽

Corporate Social

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and pricing decisions are proposed for a competitive two-level pharmaceutical supply chain (PSC) comprising two pharma-manufacturers and one pharma-retailer. In the investigated PSC, the pharma-manufacturers competitively invest in the CSR effort to produce a new medicine and sell two substitutable products to the market through the pharma-retailer, deciding on selling prices of manufacturers’ products. The PSC under consideration is modeled in three decision-making structures, i.e., decentralized, centralized, and coordinated models. In the decentralized model, the pricing and CSR decisions are individually obtained using a pharma-manufacturers–Stackelberg game structure. In the centralized model as a benchmark, the best performance of the entire PSC system is achieved. Finally, to encourage all PSC members to agree on the coordination plan, a CSR cost-sharing contract is proposed. Our results reveal that under competitive environment, the proposed CSR cost-sharing contract is able to increase market demand by significantly decreasing selling prices and increasing level of the CSR efforts.

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Alliance Decision of Supply Chain Considering Product Greenness and Recycling Competition

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su11246900 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 11 (24) ◽

pp. 6900 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Liu ◽

Shi ◽

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Closed Loop ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Third Party ◽

Equilibrium Analysis ◽

Distribution Method ◽

Profit Distribution ◽

Alliance Partner ◽

Total Profit ◽

The Right

In a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), the right alliance can help manufacturers better manufacture green products and make more profits. Choosing the most suitable alliance partner is also critical for manufacturers. In regard to product greenness and recycling competition, this paper considers the CLSC comprised of a dominant manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party recycler. Based on the Stackelberg game and equilibrium analysis, we discuss the optimal supply chain decision-making under four different models. Then, in order to ensure supply chain (SC) members’ enthusiasm to participate in the alliance, we design a profit distribution method to distribute the total profit to SC members. The results show that manufacturer’s optimal alliance decision is related to the degree of recycling competition. When less than the threshold, C alliance(the manufacturer make an alliance with the retailer and the third-party recycler at the same time) is optimal, otherwise, MR alliance(the manufacturer and the retailer make an alliance ) is more beneficial for the manufacturer.

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Cost-sharing contract in a closed-loop supply chain considering carbon abatement, quality improvement effort, and pricing strategy

RAIRO - Operations Research ◽

10.1051/ro/2020072 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Ata Allah Taleizadeh ◽

Seyed Taghi Akhavan Niaki ◽

Nima Alizadeh-Basban

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Cost Sharing ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Optimal Decision ◽

Motivating Factors ◽

Green Technologies ◽

Quality Improvement Effort ◽

Carbon Abatement ◽

Theoretical Approaches ◽

Market Shares

The high competition in today's market persuaded companies to provide some attractive options for products to obtain more market shares. Therefore, in this research, three motivating elements are devised in the framework of a two-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a distributor under stochastic demand, where green production via carbon abatement, quality enhancement efforts, and returning and remanufacturing policies are used. In line with reducing carbon emission two possibilities are applied in this paper involving the green technologies investment and the trade and cap policy. As simultaneous consideration of all motivating factors raises conflicts between the members in terms of undertaking the costs, a cooperative supply chain, as well as a cost-sharing (CS) contract in non-cooperative form, is devised to alleviate the conflicts and boost the performance of the supply chain. In order to find the optimal decision variables and profits in the CS contract, two game-theoretical approaches, namely Nash and Stackelberg, are applied. The results present the sufficiently of both the cooperative chain and the CS contact. In addition, the analysis of parameters in the CS contract in Stackelberg game indicates that when the distributor undertakes a part of the costs, positive impacts on the other motivating factors are observed. However, there is no interaction among the motivating factors in the Nash game.

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Dynamic cooperative advertising strategy in OAO supply chain with customer return

RAIRO - Operations Research ◽

10.1051/ro/2019067 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 54 (5) ◽

pp. 1537-1553

Author(s):

Duanyang Cao ◽

Xumei Zhang ◽

Lingli Yang ◽

Jian Xiao

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Cost Sharing ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Influence Factors ◽

Third Party ◽

Direct Channel ◽

Decentralized System ◽

Optimal Advertising ◽

Retail Channel ◽

Customer Returns

Nowadays many manufacturers are increasingly adopting their own online direct channel and the offline retail channel to sell their products as the quick development of e-commerce and third party logistics. To gain more and more market share, the manufacturer and the retailer implement unconditional return strategy, which does not affect secondary sales. We build a differential game model for the optimal advertising and the optimal advertising cost sharing proportion for centralized and decentralized OAO (Online and Offline) supply chain considering customer returns rates. We further analyze how the returns rates affect the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer. The results show that the returns rates, the brand reputation and the influence factors of retail channel goodwill on demand of online direct channel strongly influence the optimal advertising decisions. Furthermore, the retailer does not support for the manufacturer advertising efforts in Stackelberg game. Compared with the centralized OAO supply chain, the decentralized system results in channel inefficiency. To coordinate the channels, we design a two-way advertising cost-sharing contract. By this contract, each member of the supply chain reaches a win-win situation and is willing to cooperate. Numerical studies verify the conclusions of this paper.

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A Stackelberg game on production planning of make-to-order manufacturing supply chain with fuzzy parameters

Manufacturing Letters ◽

10.1016/j.mfglet.2017.12.017 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 15 ◽

pp. 22-27 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Neelesh Vasnani ◽

Felixter Leone Chua ◽

Lance Brandon Pacio ◽

Lanndon Ocampo

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Production Planning ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Make To Order ◽

Manufacturing Supply Chain ◽

Fuzzy Parameters

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Effect of government subsidies on supply chain decision-making and coordination in the context of COVID-19

RAIRO - Operations Research ◽

10.1051/ro/2021089 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Wuyong Qian ◽

Sen Yang

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Social Welfare ◽

Cost Sharing ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Government Subsidy ◽

Effort Level ◽

Welfare Level ◽

Coordination Strategies ◽

The Government ◽

The Cost

Considering the two-stage supply chain composed of a leading retailer and a manufacturer under the background of the COVID-19 epidemic, the retailer determines the anti-epidemic effort level and bears the corresponding costs, and the manufacturer determines the cost-sharing rate under the coordination strategy. This paper analyses the pricing decision, anti-epidemic effort level and cost-sharing rate of supply chain under different government subsidy measures and coordination strategies. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the applicability of the conclusion and the model. From the perspective of Stackelberg game, we find that under the background of the epidemic, government subsidy measures, coordination strategies and increasing marginal income of anti-epidemic efforts are conducive to higher anti-epidemic efforts and social welfare level. And the government can obtain the maximum anti-epidemic efforts and social welfare level by subsidising manufacturers with cost sharing.

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Ananlysis of Carbon Emission Reduction and Power Dominance between Single Manufacturer and Single Retailer in Regulatory Cap and Trade System

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society ◽

10.1155/2014/523451 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 2014 ◽

pp. 1-12 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Liang-jie Xia ◽

Hua-wei Zhi

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Numerical Analysis ◽

Emission Reduction ◽

Carbon Emission ◽

Stackelberg Game ◽

Supply Chain Coordination ◽

Individual Rationality ◽

Side Payment ◽

Cap And Trade ◽

Product Demand

In the cap and trade system, the paper analyses the Stackelberg game between the power asymmetrical retailer and manufacturer and designs a side-payment self-enforcing contract to resolve some arguments that the existing research overemphasizes spontaneity of participation in side-payment contracts design based on supply chain coordination and does not consider rationality and fairness of allocation of profit increment. Also, the numerical analysis was given. The research shows some important conclusions: in the supply chain, the dominant manufacturer is not able to encourage the retailer to improve its promotion level by increasing its carbon cutting level, but the optimal emission reduction level increases with the dominant retailer’s promotion level; the optimal promotion level, emission reduction, and product demand in a retailer leading supply chain are higher than those in a supply chain dominated by manufacturer; with the new side-payment self-enforcing contract, decentralized decision according to individual rationality incurs a collective reason effect in the centralized setting.

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Coordination of Store Brand Product’s Green Supply Chain Based on Negotiation

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su12093637 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 12 (9) ◽

pp. 3637 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Shaobo Wu ◽

Shiping Wen ◽

Quan Zhou ◽

Xinghong Qin

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Integrated Control ◽

Green Supply Chain ◽

Store Brand ◽

Product Demand ◽

Full Participation ◽

Coordination Effect ◽

Total Profit ◽

Strong Position ◽

The Difference

The environmental input of a store brand product’s green supply chain plays an important role in improving the product brand image and expanding the product demand. According to the difference of the initial one-off environmental investment of the store brand product, it can be divided into three modes: direct OEM, retailer’s full participation and retailer’s partial participation. The research methods employed in this study include model establishment, numerical analysis and comparison under three entrustment modes based on retailers’ negotiation strength. In addition, sensitivity analysis was used to test the influence of parameter variations on the results. The research results show that: (i) the direct OEM mode is the best choice for retailers when the retailer is in a weak position, but it is not the best choice for the manufacturer. With the increase of the retailers’ negotiation strength, the profits of both sides will decline, causing the problem of double marginal profit decreasing; (ii) the retailer’s full participation mode is the best choice for the manufacturer when the retailer is in a strong position, but not the best choice for the retailer. It is not the best choice for both sides when the retailer is in a weak position; (iii) the greenness and total profit of the supply chain are no relative with the negotiation strength of the retailer under the partial participation mode, and the greenness and total profit of the supply chain are the same as the condition under the integrated control to achieve the best coordination effect.

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