scholarly journals Effect of government subsidies on supply chain decision-making and coordination in the context of COVID-19

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wuyong Qian ◽  
Sen Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Welfare Level ◽  
Coordination Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Considering the two-stage supply chain composed of a leading retailer and a manufacturer under the background of the COVID-19 epidemic, the retailer determines the anti-epidemic effort level and bears the corresponding costs, and the manufacturer determines the cost-sharing rate under the coordination strategy. This paper analyses the pricing decision, anti-epidemic effort level and cost-sharing rate of supply chain under different government subsidy measures and coordination strategies. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the applicability of the conclusion and the model. From the perspective of Stackelberg game, we find that under the background of the epidemic, government subsidy measures, coordination strategies and increasing marginal income of anti-epidemic efforts are conducive to higher anti-epidemic efforts and social welfare level. And the government can obtain the maximum anti-epidemic efforts and social welfare level by subsidising manufacturers with cost sharing.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing and Green Product Design Strategies in a Sustainable Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidy and Different Channel Power Structures

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (22) ◽  
pp. 12446
Author(s):  
Kelei Xue ◽  
Guohua Sun ◽  
Yuyan Wang ◽  
Shuiye Niu
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Product Design ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Design Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Green Product Design

Green product design is a vital measure to support sustainable development in a circular economy era. This paper studies the multi-product pricing and green product design strategies under different supply chain structures and government subsidy strategies. Considering different channel leadership, we establish the centralized (C), manufacturer-led (MS), and retailer-led (RS) supply chain models, respectively. By applying a game-theoretical approach, corresponding equilibrium pricing, green product design, and government subsidy decisions under different supply chain structures are obtained. Through comparison and numerical analysis, we find that: (1) the different subsidy strategies of the government have an important impact on green product development. When the government provides a uniform subsidy strategy, a RS supply chain can bring greener product, more market demands, more profit, and more social welfare; (2) when the government provides a differentiated subsidy strategy, MS and RS supply chain structures can bring greener product and more market demand than the centralized supply chain. They can also bring the same social welfare and the same product to the green design level. However, the MS supply chain structure can bring more profit for the firm; (3) the consumers’ green awareness positively impacts the design and development of green product. Therefore, it is beneficial for the firm to adopt reasonable measures to boost the environmental awareness of consumers in order to realize the sustainable development of our society.

scholarly journals Knowledge Sharing Strategy and Emission Reduction Benefits of Low Carbon Technology Collaborative Innovation in the Green Supply Chain

2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Huimin Li ◽  
Yongchao Cao ◽  
Chengyi Zhang ◽  
Yunlong Ran
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Knowledge Stock ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Cost

Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.

scholarly journals A Building-Material Supply Chain Sustainable Operations under Fairness Concerns and Reference Price Benefits

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Huimin Xiao ◽  
Youlei Xu ◽  
Shiwei Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Building Material ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Reference Price ◽  
Dynamic Models ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Sustainable Operations ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Fairness Concerns

This paper incorporates fairness concerns and consumer reference price effects into a two-echelon building-material closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. By establishing four differential game models, we investigate the sustainable operations and cooperation of this supply chain. The four game models are a Nash noncooperative game, Stackelberg game with cost sharing, Stackelberg game with fairness concerns and cost sharing, and centralized decision model. By using dynamic models and optimal control theory, we obtain the two members’ optimal equilibrium strategies in the supply chain. Analytical results show that the consumer reference price effect has a positive impact on the manufacturer’s effort level, retailer’s publicity level, and product brand goodwill, which can improve the supply chain performance. The retailer’s partial commitment to cost sharing can enhance the production enthusiasm of the manufacturer, improve the brand reputation of the product, and enhance the two members’ individual profitability. The distributional fairness concerns of the manufacturer not only prevent the manufacturer and retailer from achieving Pareto improvement but also lead to the decline of the manufacturer’s effort level and profitability. The research conclusions of this paper can provide some insights into the cooperation and sustainable development of the supply chain.

scholarly journals External Intervention or Internal Coordination? Incentives to Promote Sustainable Development through Green Supply Chains

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 2857 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Tong ◽  
Yina Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Internal Funds ◽  
Theoretical And Numerical Analysis ◽  
The Government ◽  
Decision Making Behavior

To encourage firms to engage in green production, two different types of investment funding, namely external funds from agencies outside the supply chain (e.g., government subsidy), and internal funds from supply chain partners (e.g., greening cost-sharing with the retailer), are investigated in this paper. Based on game theory, the decision-making behavior and profits of a competitive supply chain consisting of a green manufacturer, a regular manufacturer, and a retailer are analyzed under both funding schemes. The results show that while both government subsidy and greening cost-sharing contract can achieve the goals of increasing a product’s degree of greenness and increasing the sales of green products, there are differences between these two methods in reaching these goals. Further, both via theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that although both the green manufacturer and the retailer can greatly benefit from government subsidy and greening cost-sharing contract, they may have different preferences regarding these two methods, which are mainly related to the size of the government subsidy, the fraction of greening cost-sharing with the retailer, the Research and Development (R&D) cost coefficient, the greenness sensitivity coefficient, and price sensitivity coefficient. Finally, the supply chain members’ behaviors (including the production and pricing decisions and, the choice of funds investment) are largely affected by the government subsidy mechanism.

scholarly journals Research on Government Subsidy Strategies for the Development of Agricultural Products E-Commerce

Agriculture ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 1152
Author(s):  
Yaoguang Zhong ◽  
Ivan Ka Wai Lai ◽  
Fangfang Guo ◽  
Huajun Tang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Agricultural Research ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Agricultural Cooperatives ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Profit Model ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
The Government

In many countries, the governments support the development of local agriculture through subsidization. Subsidizing the sales of agricultural products through E-commerce channels is a way to support the development of agriculture in China. This study aims to develop a profit model and apply Stackelberg game theory to determine which type of subsidies and decision-making can provide the maximum benefits for agricultural products E-commerce supply chains. The results indicate that for both centralized decisions and decentralized decisions, the subsidizing to the agricultural cooperative is better than the subsidizing to consumers and no subsidization. The sales volume, preservation level, sales efforts, and overall profit of the agricultural products E-commerce supply chain are significantly higher. It suggests that the government should play a leading role to support the development of agricultural products E-commerce. This study contributes to agricultural research by developing a profit model to examine the effects of different government subsidy strategies on each member of the agricultural online shopping supply chain. Recommendations are provided for agricultural cooperatives, E-commerce platforms, and the government to improve the quality and sales of agricultural products through online shopping channels.

A coordination mechanism through cost sharing of corporate social responsibility and government subsidy in a two-echelon supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Liu ◽  
Wenwen Ren ◽  
Qian Xu ◽  
Zhiyang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Corporate Social

Purpose This paper aims to deal with the coordination problem of the supply chain through cost sharing of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and government subsidy. Design/methodology/approach With respect to the coordination problem of the supply chain with CSR, this paper constructs a three-stage game model consisting of a dominant retailer, n suppliers and government. From the perspective of cost sharing and government subsidies, this paper discussed the decentralized and centralized decision-making, respectively. On this basis, this paper designed a coordination mechanism considering both cost sharing and government subsidies and explore the impact of cost sharing rate and government subsidy rate on CSR efforts, members’ profits and social welfare. Findings CSR can improve the profits of supply chain members and the overall performance of the supply chain. Then the profits of supply chain nodal enterprises will be affected by the fulfillment level of CSR of their partners. Furthermore, excessive CSR will erode the supply chain profits and cause resource waste. High CSR costs often make retailers low CSR effort level, while a high CSR cost sharing rate can reduce the profits of suppliers and the supply chain. In addition, excessive government subsidies will lead to the decline of social welfare. Excessive government subsidies will cause the dependence of enterprises and affect their operating efficiency. Practical implications The proposed coordination mechanism can effectively do with the coordination problem of the supply chain. Originality/value The proposed coordination mechanism considering cost sharing and government subsidies simultaneously can effectively deal with conflict problems and guarantee the supply chain members and the supply chain to maximize their profits and social welfare.

scholarly journals Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zi-yuan Zhang ◽  
Duan-xiang Fu ◽  
Qing Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Market Expansion ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Preference Behavior ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Government subsidy promotes the development of green supply chain, and the influence of decision-makers’ behavioral preferences becomes increasingly prominent in green supply chain management. In order to further enrich the research content of green supply chain, we first use Stackelberg game theory to construct game models by taking the product green degree, wholesale price and retail price as the decision variables, then we work out the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer under four decision scenarios, and reveal the impact differences between the two parties’ fairness preference behaviors. Our research mainly has the following findings: Firstly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer can benefit these two parties and can have certain impact on the optimal decisions only by working with the green product market expansion efficiency. Secondly, these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors can cause serious damage to the other party’s profit and the overall profit of green supply chain, and increase the rate of their own profit in the overall profit of green supply chain, but the difference is that the retailer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater decline in product green degree and wholesale price, and when certain conditions are met, its own profit may rise compared to its fairness neutral, while the manufacturer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater damage to the overall profit of green supply chainand make its own profit always be lower than its fairness neutral. Thirdly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer and the fairness preference behaviors of both parties can cause a stack effect on the optimal solutions, which means that the subsidy government provides for the manufacturer can aggravate the negative influence caused by these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Influence Mechanism on Supplier Emission Reduction Based on a Two-Level Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (23) ◽  
pp. 12439
Author(s):  
Lina Ma ◽  
Xinran Zhang ◽  
Yushen Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Impact ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Ghg Emissions ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Governmental Intervention ◽  
The Government ◽  
Reduction Effort ◽  
Better Than

The purpose of this paper is to investigate environmental performance of a supply chain which consists of an upstream supplier and a downstream firm. A mathematical model considering both downstream firm’s monitoring and governmental intervention is developed. Afterwards, a numerical example is presented to show the equilibriums of these models and the optimal choices of firms and government. The results show that when customers’ environmental awareness increases, both total environmental impact and social welfare decrease. The downstream firm’s monitoring will certainly reduce the total environmental impact. In most cases, it does not matter whether the downstream firm chooses to monitor the supplier or not, the total environmental impact and social welfare would not be affected when the government chooses subsidy. If a subsidy is present, firms and environment will be better than those without subsidy. Hence, the government is more likely to choose to provide subsidy and the downstream firm will not monitor the supplier’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction effort. In a few cases when environmental impact is too large, taxation may be the optimal choice for the government and the downstream firm will choose to monitor the supplier’s GHG emissions reduction investment.

scholarly journals Tax or Subsidy? Optimal Carbon Emission Policy: A Supply Chain Perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1548 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xing Yin ◽  
Xiaolin Chen ◽  
Xiaolin Xu ◽  
Lianmin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Manufacturing Firm ◽  
Numerical Studies ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Government ◽  
Increasing Demand ◽  
The Cost

With a rigid requirement for environment protection, governments need to make appropriate policies to induce firms to adopt green technology in consideration of the rapidly increasing demand for environmentally friendly products. We investigated the government policy from the perspective of a supply chain, which consisted of the upstream government (she) and the downstream manufacturing firm (he). The government decided on the policy (tax or subsidy) to maximize the social welfare, while the firm decided on the greenness level of the product, which affects the consumers’ choice behavior and hence his own demand. Assuming else being equal, the government should adopt the tax policy if consumers are very sensitive to the greenness, the cost of greening is high, or the negative impact due to carbon emission is large, and subsidize the firm otherwise. We also conduct some numerical studies when price is endogenous. The main insights can be carried over.

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