Death and Environmental Taxes: Why Market Environmentalism Fails in Liberal Market Economies

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert MacNeil

This article aims to explain why market-based climate policies (carbon levies and emissions trading) have had limited success at the national level in “liberal-market economies” like Australia, Canada, and the United States. This situation is paradoxical to the extent that market environmentalism is often thought to be a concept tailored to the political traditions and policy paradigms in these states. I argue this occurs because precisely in such economies, workers have been the least protected from the market and the effects of globalization, leading to a squeeze on incomes and public services, and providing fertile ground for a virulently antitax politics. When coupled with the disproportionately carbon-intensive lifestyles in these states and the strength of fossil fuel interests, it becomes extremely easy and effective for opponents of climate policy to frame carbon prices as an onerous tax on workers and families. The article explores how this strategy has functioned at a discursive level and considers what this situation implies for climate policy advocates in carbon-intensive, neoliberal polities.

2018 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 1840006 ◽  
Author(s):  
JARED WOOLLACOTT

I examine the general equilibrium costs of climate policies that levy taxes on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the United States and return the revenue in the form of lump-sum rebates and tax relief over the years 2020 to 2040 using the US regional version of the Applied Dynamic Analysis of the Global Economy (ADAGE-US) forward-looking dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. I approximate the value of co-benefits to these policies that arise from concomitant reductions in nongreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions using the CO-Benefits Risk Assessment model (COBRA). There is significant heterogeneity in costs and co-benefits from climate policies across space and income. Policy costs are generally less than 0[Formula: see text]5% in equivalent variation terms (between a few tens of dollars and several hundred per household, depending on the income quintile), can be fully neutralized for the lowest- quintile households at a modest increase in overall policy cost, and tend to be lower for upper-quintile households in coastal regions. The policy co-benefit values range widely across regions, approximately $150–1250 per household, exceeding the gross cost of the policy for many households, particularly those in the Midwest. Last, I identify a marginal welfare cost of $58[Formula: see text]tCO2 and a marginal co-benefit of $31[Formula: see text]tCO2 at a national level over all households, which implies a required climate benefit of $27[Formula: see text]tCO2 or less to justify the level of abatement achieved by a $25[Formula: see text]tCO2 tax growing at 5%.


Author(s):  
Christoph Boehringer ◽  
Carolyn Fischer ◽  
Knut Einar Rosendahl

Abstract Individual countries are in the process of legislating responses to the challenges posed by climate change. The prospect of rising carbon prices raises concerns in these nations about the effects on the competitiveness of their own energy-intensive industries and the potential for carbon leakage, particularly leakage to emerging economies that lack comparable regulation. In response, certain developed countries are proposing controversial trade-related measures and allowance allocation designs to complement their climate policies. Missing from much of the debate on trade-related measures is a broader understanding of how climate policies implemented unilaterally (or subglobally) affect all countries in the global trading system. Arguably, the largest impacts are from the targeted carbon pricing itself, which generates macroeconomic effects, terms-of-trade changes, and shifts in global energy demand and prices; it also changes the relative prices of certain energy-intensive goods. This paper studies how climate policies implemented in certain major economies (the European Union and the United States) affect the global distribution of economic and environmental outcomes and how these outcomes may be altered by complementary policies aimed at addressing carbon leakage.


Author(s):  
Jonas Meckling

What policies could mobilize business support for progressive and durable national climate policy in the United States? I examine the climate policy experiences of U.S. states and propose that a national clean energy standard combined with carefully allocated public investment in clean energy infrastructure and innovation could mobilize economic interests in support of decarbonization. Further, I argue that the more entrenched clean energy and infrastructure become, the more likely it becomes that comprehensive climate policies can be passed in the future. This includes performance and deployment mandates beyond the electricity industry, including in the transport and building sectors. These initial steps may also help to build a winning coalition for progressive federal carbon pricing, as opposed to an accommodative coalition in support of weak carbon pricing.


2021 ◽  
pp. 107049652110277
Author(s):  
Antto Vihma ◽  
Gunilla Reischl ◽  
Astrid Nonbo Andersen

The rise of authoritarian populism has disrupted the patterns of party competition in many Western societies. Related to this development, the current debates in the United States and European Union illustrate how empirical science on climate change may become intensely politicized, and all ambitious climate policies challenged in the contemporary political landscape. We set out an analytical framework with three ideal types of political strategies for opposing climate policies: climate science denialism, climate policy nationalism, and climate policy conservativism. Empirically, the article investigates populist resistance to ambitious climate change policy in the Nordic context, where countries have sought to assume global leadership in climate politics and have considerable public support for climate action. In an analysis of the evolving positions of populist parties in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in recent elections, the article sheds light on the interconnection between populism and climate change policy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 166 (3-4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice Lépissier ◽  
Matto Mildenberger

AbstractFollowing the failure of climate governance regimes that sought to impose legally binding treaty-based obligations, the Paris Agreement relies on voluntary actions by individual countries. Yet, there is no guarantee that unilateral policies will lead to a decrease in carbon emissions. Critics worry that voluntary climate measures will be weak and ineffective, and insights from political economy imply that regulatory loopholes are likely to benefit carbon-intensive sectors. Here, we empirically evaluate whether unilateral action can still reduce carbon pollution by estimating the causal effect of the UK’s 2001 Climate Change Programme (CCP) on the country’s carbon emissions. Existing efforts to evaluate the overall impact of climate policies on national carbon emissions rely on Business-As-Usual (BAU) scenarios to project what carbon emissions would have been without a climate policy. We instead use synthetic control methods to undertake an ex post national-level assessment of the UK’s CCP without relying on parametric BAU assumptions and demonstrate the potential of synthetic control methods for climate policy impact evaluation. Despite setting lax carbon targets and making substantial concessions to producers, we show that, in 2005, the UK’s CO2 emissions per capita were 9.8% lower relative to what they would have been if the CCP had not been passed. Our findings offer empirical confirmation that unilateral climate policies can still reduce carbon emissions, even in the absence of a binding global climate agreement and in the presence of regulatory capture by industry.


Author(s):  
Samuel Trachtman

Large-scale carbon emissions reductions in the United States likely require national-level policy, but political and institutional constraints restrict the scope of policy that can be enacted in Washington. State governments, on the other hand, have demonstrated a remarkable willingness to enact climate policies, despite the global nature of the problem. Although it is limited in directly reducing carbon emissions, state policy has the potential to make the terrain of U.S. climate politics more fertile for future policy. I discuss mechanisms by which climate policies enacted at the state level can influence climate politics across the states and at the national level. Finally, I make policy and political strategy recommendations that take these multilevel policy feedback dynamics into account.


Author(s):  
Anatolii Petrovich Mykolaiets

It is noted that from the standpoint of sociology, “management — a function of organized systems of various nature — (technical, biological, social), which ensures the preservation of their structure, maintaining a certain state or transfer to another state, in accordance with the objective laws of the existence of this system, which implemented by a program or deliberately set aside”. Management is carried out through the influence of one subsystem-controlling, on the other-controlled, on the processes taking place in it with the help of information signals or administrative actions. It is proved that self-government allows all members of society or a separate association to fully express their will and interests, overcome alienation, effectively combat bureaucracy, and promote public self-realization of the individual. At the same time, wide direct participation in the management of insufficiently competent participants who are not responsible for their decisions, contradicts the social division of labor, reduces the effectiveness of management, complicates the rationalization of production. This can lead to the dominance of short-term interests over promising interests. Therefore, it is always important for society to find the optimal measure of a combination of self-management and professional management. It is determined that social representation acts, on the one hand, as the most important intermediary between the state and the population, the protection of social interests in a politically heterogeneous environment. On the other hand, it ensures the operation of a mechanism for correcting the political system, which makes it possible to correct previously adopted decisions in a legitimate way, without resorting to violence. It is proved that the system of social representation influences the most important political relations, promotes social integration, that is, the inclusion of various social groups and public associations in the political system. It is proposed to use the term “self-government” in relation to several levels of people’s association: the whole community — public self-government or self-government of the people, to individual regions or communities — local, to production management — production self-government. Traditionally, self-government is seen as an alternative to public administration. Ideology and practice of selfgovernment originate from the primitive, communal-tribal democracy. It is established that, in practice, centralization has become a “natural form of government”. In its pure form, centralization does not recognize the autonomy of places and even local life. It is characteristic of authoritarian regimes, but it is also widely used by democratic regimes, where they believe that political freedoms should be fixed only at the national level. It is determined that since the state has achieved certain sizes, it is impossible to abandon the admission of the existence of local authorities. Thus, deconcentration appears as one of the forms of centralization and as a cure for the excesses of the latter. Deconcentration assumes the presence of local bodies, which depend on the government functionally and in the order of subordination of their officials. The dependency of officials means that the leadership of local authorities is appointed by the central government and may be displaced.


Shore & Beach ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 53-64
Author(s):  
Edward Atkin ◽  
Dan Reineman ◽  
Jesse Reiblich ◽  
David Revell

Surf breaks are finite, valuable, and vulnerable natural resources, that not only influence community and cultural identities, but are a source of revenue and provide a range of health benefits. Despite these values, surf breaks largely lack recognition as coastal resources and therefore the associated management measures required to maintain them. Some countries, especially those endowed with high-quality surf breaks and where the sport of surfing is accepted as mainstream, have recognized the value of surfing resources and have specific policies for their conservation. In Aotearoa New Zealand surf breaks are included within national environmental policy. Aotearoa New Zealand has recently produced Management Guidelines for Surfing Resources (MGSR), which were developed in conjunction with universities, regional authorities, not-for-profit entities, and government agencies. The MGSR provide recommendations for both consenting authorities and those wishing to undertake activities in the coastal marine area, as well as tools and techniques to aid in the management of surfing resources. While the MGSR are firmly aligned with Aotearoa New Zealand’s cultural and legal frameworks, much of their content is applicable to surf breaks worldwide. In the United States, there are several national-level and state-level statutes that are generally relevant to various aspects of surfing resources, but there is no law or policy that directly addresses them. This paper describes the MGSR, considers California’s existing governance frameworks, and examines the potential benefits of adapting and expanding the MGSR in this state.


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