Distinct Neural Systems Involved in Agency and Animacy Detection

2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (8) ◽  
pp. 1911-1920 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Ida Gobbini ◽  
Claudio Gentili ◽  
Emiliano Ricciardi ◽  
Claudia Bellucci ◽  
Pericle Salvini ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mirror Neuron System ◽  
Temporal Cortex ◽  
Mirror Neuron ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Systems ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
The Social ◽  
Medial Pfc ◽  
Evoked Activity ◽  
Human Faces

We designed an fMRI experiment comparing perception of human faces and robotic faces producing emotional expressions. The purpose of our experiment was to investigate engagement of different parts of the social brain by viewing these animate and inanimate agents. Both human and robotic face expressions evoked activity in face-responsive regions in the fusiform gyrus and STS and in the putative human mirror neuron system. These results suggest that these areas mediate perception of agency, independently of whether the agents are living or not. By contrast, the human faces evoked stronger activity than did robotic faces in the medial pFC and the anterior temporal cortex—areas associated with the representation of others' mental states (theory of mind), whereas robotic faces evoked stronger activity in areas associated with perception of objects and mechanical movements. Our data demonstrate that the representation of the distinction between animate and inanimate agents involves areas that participate in attribution of mental stance.

scholarly journals Two Takes on the Social Brain: A Comparison of Theory of Mind Tasks

2007 ◽  
Vol 19 (11) ◽  
pp. 1803-1814 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Ida Gobbini ◽  
Aaron C. Koralek ◽  
Ronald E. Bryan ◽  
Kimberly J. Montgomery ◽  
James V. Haxby
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mirror Neuron System ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Superior Temporal Sulcus ◽  
Neural System ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Fusiform Gyrus ◽  
Neural Systems ◽  
General Role ◽  
The Social

We compared two tasks that are widely used in research on mentalizing—false belief stories and animations of rigid geometric shapes that depict social interactions—to investigate whether the neural systems that mediate the representation of others' mental states are consistent across these tasks. Whereas false belief stories activated primarily the anterior paracingulate cortex (APC), the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/PC), and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)—components of the distributed neural system for theory of mind (ToM)—the social animations activated an extensive region along nearly the full extent of the superior temporal sulcus, including a locus in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), as well as the frontal operculum and inferior parietal lobule (IPL)—components of the distributed neural system for action understanding—and the fusiform gyrus. These results suggest that the representation of covert mental states that may predict behavior and the representation of intentions that are implied by perceived actions involve distinct neural systems. These results show that the TPJ and the pSTS play dissociable roles in mentalizing and are parts of different distributed neural systems. Because the social animations do not depict articulated body movements, these results also highlight that the perception of the kinematics of actions is not necessary to activate the mirror neuron system, suggesting that this system plays a general role in the representation of intentions and goals of actions. Furthermore, these results suggest that the fusiform gyrus plays a general role in the representation of visual stimuli that signify agency, independent of visual form.

scholarly journals Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and the Social Brain: Affect-Related Disruption of the Default and Mirror Networks

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin M. Tan ◽  
Lisa J. Burklund ◽  
Michelle G. Craske ◽  
Matthew D. Lieberman
Keyword(s):  
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder ◽  
Posttraumatic Stress ◽  
Stress Disorder ◽  
Mirror Neuron System ◽  
Mirror Neuron ◽  
Emotional Stimuli ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Attentional Processing ◽  
Social Inference ◽  
The Social

AbstractBackgroundSocial impairments, specifically in mentalizing and emotion recognition, are common and debilitating symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Despite this, little is known about the neural underpinnings of these impairments, as there have been no published neuroimaging investigations of social inference in PTSD.MethodsTrauma-exposed veterans with and without PTSD (N = 20 each) performed the Why/How social inference task during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The PTSD group had two fMRI sessions, between which they underwent affect labeling training. We probed the primary networks of the “social brain”—the default mode network (DMN) and mirror neuron system (MNS)—by examining neural activity evoked by mentalizing and action identification prompts, which were paired with emotional and non-emotional targets.ResultsHyperactivation to emotional stimuli differentiated PTSD patients from controls, correlated with symptom severity, and predicted training outcomes. Critically, these effects were generally non-significant for non-emotional stimuli. PTSD-related effects were widely distributed throughout DMN and MNS. Effects were strongest in regions associated with the dorsal attention, ventral attention, and frontoparietal control networks. Unexpectedly, effects were non-significant in core affect regions.ConclusionsThe array of social cognitive processes subserved by DMN and MNS may be inordinately selective for emotional stimuli in PTSD. This selectivity may be tightly linked with attentional processes, as effects were strongest in attention-related regions. Putatively, we propose an attentional account of social inference dysfunction in PTSD, in which affective attentional biases drive widespread affect-selectivity throughout the social brain. This account aligns with numerous findings of affect-biased attentional processing in PTSD.

scholarly journals Identifying the What, Why, and How of an Observed Action: An fMRI Study of Mentalizing and Mechanizing during Action Observation

2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert P. Spunt ◽  
Ajay B. Satpute ◽  
Matthew D. Lieberman
Keyword(s):  
Mirror Neuron System ◽  
Action Observation ◽  
Temporal Cortex ◽  
Mirror Neuron ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Action Identification ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Neuron System ◽  
Embodied Simulation ◽  
Mentalizing System

Humans commonly understand the unobservable mental states of others by observing their actions. Embodied simulation theories suggest that this ability may be based in areas of the fronto-parietal mirror neuron system, yet neuroimaging studies that explicitly investigate the human ability to draw mental state inferences point to the involvement of a “mentalizing” system consisting of regions that do not overlap with the mirror neuron system. For the present study, we developed a novel action identification paradigm that allowed us to explicitly investigate the neural bases of mentalizing observed actions. Across repeated viewings of a set of ecologically valid video clips of ordinary human actions, we manipulated the extent to which participants identified the unobservable mental states of the actor (mentalizing) or the observable mechanics of their behavior (mechanizing). Although areas of the mirror neuron system did show an enhanced response during action identification, its activity was not significantly modulated by the extent to which the observers identified mental states. Instead, several regions of the mentalizing system, including dorsal and ventral aspects of medial pFC, posterior cingulate cortex, and temporal poles, were associated with mentalizing actions, whereas a single region in left lateral occipito-temporal cortex was associated with mechanizing actions. These data suggest that embodied simulation is insufficient to account for the sophisticated mentalizing that human beings are capable of while observing another and that a different system along the cortical midline and in anterior temporal cortex is involved in mentalizing an observed action.

Social Cognition in Gilles de la Tourette Syndrome

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 243-249
Author(s):  
Ronja Weiblen ◽  
Melanie Jonas ◽  
Sören Krach ◽  
Ulrike M. Krämer
Keyword(s):  
Tourette Syndrome ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mirror Neuron System ◽  
Mirror Neuron ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
The Social ◽  
Decision Making System ◽  
Social Decision Making ◽  
Work Done

Abstract. Research on the neural mechanisms underlying Gilles de la Tourette syndrome (GTS) has mostly concentrated on abnormalities in basal ganglia circuits. Recent alternative accounts, however, focused more on social and affective aspects. Individuals with GTS show peculiarities in their social and affective domain, including echophenomena, coprolalia, and nonobscene socially inappropriate behavior. This article reviews the experimental and theoretical work done on the social symptoms of GTS. We discuss the role of different social cognitive and affective functions and associated brain networks, namely, the social-decision-making system, theory-of-mind functions, and the so-called “mirror-neuron” system. Although GTS affects social interactions in many ways, and although the syndrome includes aberrant social behavior, the underlying cognitive, affective, and neural processes remain to be investigated.

People represent their own mental states more distinctly than others’

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Judith Mildner ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Social Distance ◽  
Activity Patterns ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Behavioral Studies ◽  
The Social ◽  
External Cues

One can never know the internal workings of another person – one can only infer others’ mental states based on external cues. In contrast, each person has direct access to the contents of their own mind. Here we test the hypothesis that this privileged access shapes the way people represent internal mental experiences, such that they represent their own mental states more distinctly than the states of others. Across four studies, participants considered their own and others’ mental states; analyses measured the distinctiveness of mental state representations. Two neuroimaging studies used representational similarity analyses to demonstrate that the social brain manifests more distinct activity patterns when thinking about one’s own states versus others’. Two behavioral studies support these findings. Further, they demonstrate that people differentiate between states less as social distance increases. Together these results suggest that we represent our own mind with greater granularity than the minds of others.

Intentionality of movement: Mirror neuron system and theory of mind

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 2113-2113 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.M. Borghi ◽  
F. Binkofski
Keyword(s):  
Mirror Neurons ◽  
Mirror Neuron System ◽  
Mirror Neuron ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Action Understanding ◽  
Imaging Studies ◽  
Motor Representation ◽  
Neuron System ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Additional Explanation

The ability to understand intentions of actions performed by others is one of the prerequisites for social interaction. This ability has been attributed to our capacity to mentalize others’ behaviour, by simulating or predicting their mental states that would cause that behaviour and make it comprehensible. Brain imaging studies revealed the so called “mentalizng network” including the pSTS/TPJ, the temporal poles and the medial prefrontal cortex. This network gets constantly activated anytime we try to take the perspective of others or try to simulate their state of mind. On the other hand the discovery of mirror neurons has provided an additional explanation for understanding of the content of actions. The functional properties of these neurons point out that action understanding is primarily based on a mechanism that directly matches the sensory representation of perceived actions with one's own motor representation of the same actions. We provide evidence that both systems interact closely during the processing of intentionality of actions. Thus mentalizing is not the only form of intentional understanding and motor and intentional components of action are closely interwoven. Both systems play an important role in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia.

Neural reuse in the social and emotional brain

2010 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 275-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Helen Immordino-Yang ◽  
Joan Y. Chiao ◽  
Alan P. Fiske
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Transmission ◽  
Neural Systems ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Social And Emotional ◽  
Cultural Effects ◽  
The Social ◽  
Neural Reuse ◽  
Mental Techniques ◽  
Modes Of Thought

AbstractPresenting evidence from the social brain, we argue that neural reuse is a dynamic, socially organized process that is influenced ontogenetically and evolutionarily by the cultural transmission of mental techniques, values, and modes of thought. Anderson's theory should be broadened to accommodate cultural effects on the functioning of architecturally similar neural systems, and the implications of these differences for reuse.

The mirror neuron system in social interactions and schizophrenia

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 2111-2111
Author(s):  
T. Kicher
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Interaction ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Mirror Neuron System ◽  
Mirror Neuron ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Body Language ◽  
Neuron System ◽  
The Social

The term social cognition comprises of the perception and cognitive processing of stimuli of the social environment that is necessary to understand one's own behaviour and that of others. Social cognition is important for conscious and unconscious behaviour in social interactions and is composed of the recognition and interpretation of emotions in faces, body language and speech, reflection of one's own mental state and intentions as well as the realization of others’ intentions, thoughts and feelings. The mirror neuron system is involved in empathetic processes. Several aspects of the neural correlates of social interaction, embodiment and the mirror neuron system in schizophrenia and autism will be reported.

scholarly journals The role of mirror neurons in cognitive and social functioning*

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 30-40
Author(s):  
Marta Fabiańska ◽  
Mateusz Bosiacki ◽  
Donata Simińska
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Mirror Neurons ◽  
Mirror Neuron System ◽  
Mirror Neuron ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Nerve Cells ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Neuron System ◽  
Evolutionary Point

AbstractMirror neurons were accidentally discovered during research on the activity of nerve cells which was conducted by a team of Italian scientists in Parma. They observed that certain brain cells were activated when an animal performed a given activity but also when it observed a similar activity performed by someone else. The following discovery of mirror neurons in the human brain initiated a wave of experimental research which confirmed that mirror nerve cells are responsible for understanding the mental state of other humans. This process is much more complicated and important from an evolutionary point of view than it might initially seem. The activity of mirror neurons is noticeable in everyday life, during all interactions with other living beings. This is exhibited through mirroring – the reflection of emotional and epistemic mental states of others based on their behavior. We present the activities of mirror neurons and the theoretical framework of research. Finally, we discuss the results of neurological studies which have made it possible to locate and define in detail the role of the mirror neuron system in the human brain.

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