Aristotle’s Empiricist Theory of Doxastic Knowledge

Phronesis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hendrik Lorenz ◽  
Benjamin Morison

AbstractAristotle takes practical wisdom and arts or crafts to be forms of knowledge which, we argue, can usefully be thought of as ‘empiricist’. This empiricism has two key features: knowledge does not rest on grasping unobservable natures or essences; and knowledge does not rest on grasping logical relations that hold among propositions. Instead, knowledge rests on observation, memory, experience and everyday uses of reason. While Aristotle’s conception of theoretical knowledge does require grasping unobservable essences and logical relations that hold among suitable propositions, his conception of practical and productive knowledge avoids such requirements and is consistent with empiricism.

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcia M. D'Alessio

ABSTRACTThere is a tension between Theory and History: “[...] poetry is more philosophical and of a higher character than history, because poetry remains in the universal sphere whilst history studies only the particular” (Aristotle, 2007: 43). This statement of Aristotle was perhaps the first indication of that tension seen between these two forms of knowledge: historical and theoretical. In the quote above, philosophy is the reference of a thought hierarchically higher, and its legitimacy as such involves the universality of its truths. Additionally, it is of paramount importance to state that poetry in this aristotelian reflection is considered a form of knowledge, although differing from history regarding the matter of the ‘known’: in the first one, the fact could have happened, while in the second it certainly happened. And as it happened, the fact is singular, and what could have happened falls into the universal sphere. In this sense, a key to understand the tension mentioned above is the uniqueness and the universality of the knowledge acquired: “[...] It is clear that it is not up to the poet to narrate exactly what happened, but what could have happened, ‘the possible’, in accordance with the likelihood or necessity. The historian and the poet are not distinguished from each other by the fact of the first write in prose and the second in verse [...]. They differ from each other because one wrote what happened and what else could have happened” (Aristotle, 2007: 43). By situating the history in a lower level in comparison with poetry. Aristotle seems to have aroused in contemporary thinkers the idea of the distinction between historical knowledge and theoretical knowledge. This study deals with the nature of historical knowledge and their methodological difficulties in the use of theoretical frameworks, which are necessary to address their fundamental questions.RESUMOExiste uma tensão entre Teoria e História: “[...] a poesia é mais filosófica e de caráter mais elevado que a história, porque a poesia permanece no universal e a história estuda apenas o particular” (Aristóteles, 2007, 43). Esta afirmação de Aristóteles talvez tenha sido a primeira indicação da referida tensão entre as duas formas de conhecimento: a histórica e a teórica. Na citação acima, a filosofia é a referência de um pensamento hierarquicamente superior, sendo que sua legitimação enquanto tal passa pela universalidade de suas verdades. É importante salientar que a poesia nesta reflexão aristotélica é uma forma de conhecimento, embora difira da história no que concerne à matéria do conhecido: na primeira, o fato poderia ter acontecido; na segunda, aconteceu. Porque aconteceu, o fato é singular, e que poderia ter acontecido cai no âmbito do universal. Neste sentido, a chave para a compreensão da tensão entre história e teoria é a universalidade ou singularidade do conhecimento adquirido: “[...] é evidente que não compete ao poeta narrar exatamente o que aconteceu; mas sim o que poderia ter acontecido, o possível, segundo a verossimilhança ou a necessidade. O historiador e o poeta não se distinguem um do outro, pelo fato de o primeiro escrever em prosa e o segundo em verso [...]. Diferem entre si porque um escreveu o que aconteceu e o outro o que poderia ter acontecido” (Aristóteles, 2007, 43). Ao situar a história em nível menos elevado que a poesia, Aristóteles parece ter suscitado em pensadores contemporâneos a ideia da distinção entre conhecimento histórico e conhecimento teórico. O presente estudo versa sobre a natureza do conhecimento histórico e seus impasses metodológicos no uso dos referenciais teóricos necessários às suas indagações fundamentais.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth Campbell ◽  
Kate Pahl ◽  
Elizabeth Pente ◽  
Zanib Rasool

This chapter offers a sense of the legacy of this book and identify its key features, in order to provide a summary of what the authors have learned from doing the book. The central goal in writing this book has been to demonstrate that communities produce their own forms of knowledge, and that those forms are valid — and valuable — ways of knowing. The chapter articulates the value of this kind of research for community knowledge production that is emergent, situated, and future oriented. As such, this chapter identifies four key themes: thinking across difference, the arts as a mode of inquiry and as an agent of change, rethinking knowledge production practices, and hope and the importance of transformational change. The chapter then reflects on these themes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-88
Author(s):  
Ilona Zenker

Knowledge is an understanding of someone or something, such as facts, information, descriptions or skills, which is acquired by individuals through education, learning, experience or by discovering. We have to distinguish two forms of knowledge, which is on the one hand “explicit knowledge” and on the other hand “tacit knowledge”. Explicit knowledge is not a homogenous resource, but it can be qualified as factual knowledge, which is verbalized, codified, systematic and formal. Persons have easy access to explicit knowledge and it can be easily transmitted to others. It is transferred through written or verbal media.Tacit knowledge can be defined as skills, procedure and ideas and is learned mostly through experience over time. Tacit knowledge is a personal type of knowledge that cannot be shared simply through written or verbal communication, because it is not codified. Tacit knowledge can be seen as the knowledge practitioners have in their minds. To put theoretical knowledge into practice means to create tacit knowledge. Knowledge in general is an accumulation of education and experience – a mixture of explicit and tacit knowledge. Both forms of knowledge together make the difference between a novice and an expert. An efficient tool transferring collective knowledge into practice is called “Knowledge Management” (KM). Strategies and processes to gather, identify, structure, value, and share intellectual assets of companies. As a kind of “map of knowledge” it is considered as a useful tool to distribute knowledge and is seen as a help to settle in the world of “Practice” more quickly. A “community of practice” (CoP) is a group of people who share a common interest or create a platform with the goal of gaining knowledge related to a specific topic. The members of the group learn from each other by sharing information and experience within the group. The path becoming a lawyer can be a long process in Germany. The university education is marked by the idea, that a lawyer has to understand all branches of law und its system. The German system of studying law followed two predominant ideas, which is Comprehensive Knowledge and a dual education system. A jurist has to understand and to know every branch of law and was prepared with comprehensive knowledge for the next step – walking in the field of daily business matters. Specialization for a certain field of law is a personal and individual matter and doesn`t influence the university education. Comprehensive knowledge should enable the candidate to handle various challenges and to apply their knowledge in practice without being limited on a special kind of theoretical knowledge. Transferring explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge starts with using common sense, empathy and active listing skills. Transferring knowledge into practice needs first at all common sense. Common sense is practical judgement or a basic ability to perceive, understand and judge daily situations without special knowledge and without specialized training or deliberative thoughts. What distinguishes the humanities from the natural sciences is the mode of approach to any question. Knowledge in relation to Humanity means a structured way of thinking, which is a process of putting a framework to an unstructured problem. Knowledge means also critical thinking, which is the objective analysis of facts to form a judgement. Solving legal problems needs a rational, skeptical and unbiased analysis and the evaluation of factual evidence. Efficient transferring knowledge into practice needs structured thinking in both matters and is the only successful way to connect knowledge and practice.


Author(s):  
Jeanne Gaakeer

The chapters of Part II of this book turn to continental-European philosophical hermeneutics, especially as developed by Paul Ricoeur, because his work is rich on the topics of narrative and metaphor, as well as the equitable and the just. They do so to show what the humanities can contribute to the realm of praxis by bringing to the fore the resources that can contribute to the judge’s development of her professional quality of phronèsis, i.e. prudence or practical wisdom, with judicial ethos and habitus included. Chapter 6 deals with the interrelation of facts and (legal) norms in the “application” of law in a specific case, and on the bond of theory and practice. The chapter offers an extended analysis of (Aristotelian) phronèsis (practical wisdom) and épistème (theoretical knowledge) in relation to Ricoeur’s proposal for hermeneutics in law. It argues that iuris prudentia always necessarily combines theoretical knowledge with practical activity.


This section explains what kind of philosophy we are referring to when we talk about the role of philosophy in the cross-disciplinary type of debates that interest us here. Namely, it is a practical – rather than theoretical – philosophy; indeed, a practice in itself, rather than an analytical pursuit, which is aimed at achieving practical wisdom, rather than theoretical insights. This entails different kinds of practices – from what we would nowadays call moral and political philosophy, in Plato and Aristotle, through a certain kind of interpretive practice, in Heidegger and Gadamer, to a series of neo-pragmatist ways of living, in Rorty and Shusterman. What these have in common is a philosophical focus on what we can do, in our personal, social, and professional lives, rather than what type of theoretical knowledge we can achieve – and how. The former is a kind of philosophy that is more likely to have an impact on the way we live, than on a particular theory or line of arguments.


Author(s):  
Aoran Peng ◽  
John Ostrander ◽  
Noriana Radwan ◽  
Elizabeth Starkey ◽  
Scarlett Miller ◽  
...  

Although needle insertion remains a crucial part of medicine practice, there still exists a gap between theoretical knowledge and real-world practice with live patients. To help bridge this gap, the Low-Cost Needle Insertion Simulator, or the LCNIS, is developed to assist students in gaining more confidence through simulated practice. It does so first through its physical design, which include a physical needle insertion device that can give the feeling of puncturing through multiple layers of human flesh. Its user-interface then provides a variety of simulation options as well as performance feedback that can aid in the improvement of student skills. With these key features, the LCNIS hopes to give students a cheap and yet realistic way of practicing needle insertion without the stress and pressure associated with performing on patients. This study hopes to (1) learn about the current needle insertion education as well as gather feedback on the LCNIS prototype, and (2) use this information to construct a more effective user interface for the LCNIS.


Author(s):  
Marc Gasser-Wingate

Aristotle is famous for thinking that all our knowledge comes from perception. But it’s not immediately clear what this view is meant to entail. For it’s not clear what perception is supposed to contribute to the more advanced forms of knowledge that derive from it, or indeed how we should understand the nature of its contribution—what it might mean to say that these more advanced forms of knowledge are “derived from” or “based on” what we perceive. Aristotle is often thought to have disappointingly little to say on these matters. I argue here that this thought is mistaken: a coherent and philosophically attractive view of perceptual knowledge can be found in the various texts in which Aristotle discusses perception’s role in animal life, the cognitive resources on which it does and does not depend, and the relation it bears to practical and theoretical modes of understanding. What emerges from these discussions is a moderate form of empiricism—an empiricism on which we can develop sophisticated forms of knowledge by broadly perceptual means, but nonetheless rely on our intellectual powers for more advanced forms of understanding. I consider the role this empiricism plays in Aristotle’s account of our learning, and its implications for his views about practical wisdom and the cognitive lives of nonrational animals.


2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 134-146
Author(s):  
Verity Campbell-Barr

This article proposes reconceptualizing professional knowledge in early childhood education and care (ECEC) as knowledges, incorporating phronesis (practical wisdom), techne (skill), and episteme (pure knowledge). Conceptualizing professional knowledge in the plural broadens perspectives on the professional knowledge base and opens up a discussion of how different forms of knowledge are acquired. Drawing on Bernstein, the author identifies ECEC as requiring horizontal and vertical constructs of knowledge that have different structures and legitimization processes. While phronesis is presented as being a part of ECEC professional knowledges, the discussion explores the difficulties in defining phronesis, because of the variable ways it is articulated.


Author(s):  
Evelyn M. Barker

Ancient Greek education featured the pedagogical exercise of dialectic, in which a student defended a thesis against rigorous questioning by an instructor. Aristophanes’ Clouds, as well as Plato and Aristotle, criticize the practice for promoting intellectual skepticism, moral cynicism, and an eristic spirit - the desire to win in argument rather than seek the truth. I suggest Aristotle’s logic is meant to reform the practice of dialectic. In the first part of my paper, I defend the thesis that Aristotle’s syllogistic is an art of substantive reasoning against the contemporary view that it is a science of abstract argument forms. First, I show that Aristotle’s exclusive distinction between art and science makes syllogistic a techne for the higher forms of knowledge, science and practical wisdom. Then I argue that Aristotle’s treatment of demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms provides rigorous standards for reasoning in science and public debate. In particular I discuss a) the requirement that a demonstration use verifiable premises whose middle term points out a cause for the predicate applying to the conclusion; b) how his analysis of valid syllogisms with a "wholly or partly false" universal premise applies to dialectical syllogisms.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Erik Bratland ◽  
Mohamed El Ghami

Integration of theory and practice is the key element in the research on teachers’ professional knowledge. Traditionally, this topic has created a polarization between practical and theoretical knowledge. The reform in the new Norwegian teacher education has introduced a new and watered-down concept of knowledge and research-based knowledge in education. With the reform, conflicting perceptions have arisen of what we can understand with professional knowledge in teacher education. Based on Maton’s Legitimation Code Theory, and with examples from a study of students’ R&D papers, this paper sheds light on the conflicting concept of professional knowledge in new Norwegian teacher education. The paper refutes a generic concept of knowledge and argues that teachers’ professional knowledge is based on practices that are informed by specialized forms of knowledge in the subject area.


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