Resistance to Neo-Liberalism: France, Greece, Spain, and the US

2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 182-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Mann

Abstract The mass mobilizations against neo-liberal austerity drives that took place in Greece, France, Spain, and Madison, Wisconsin from 2010 into the summer of 2011 reflect deeply global forces and suggest several trends in contemporary global capitalism. These include an emerging pattern of inequality among member states of the European Union, deep alienation of workers from the Social Democracy and other traditional labor organizations who have championed neo-liberal economic policies and implemented austerity drives, and new forms of collective action.

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 62-66
Author(s):  
Barbara Bradač Hojnik

In this paper, social entrepreneurship as a developing type of entrepreneurship is analyzed. On the level of the European Union (EU), social entrepreneurship is widely supported by different initiatives which aim to develop a suitable legal, administrative, and financial environment for social enterprises, but also allowing member states to regulate them individually. This paper focuses on the social entrepreneurship in Slovenia, where it is strictly shaped by the legislation. Consequently, social enterprises need to meet the legislation’s requirements which hinder their quantity and development. Additionally, the scope of social enterprises is narrowed to those companies that received the formal status of social enterprise. In the paper provided will be the data on social enterprises in Slovenia with some recommendation for further development of the framework for social entrepreneurship in the country.


Author(s):  
Mary Daly

Social policy has a particular character and set of associated politics in the European Union (EU) context. There is a double contestation involved: the extent of the EU’s agency in the field and the type of social policy model pursued. The former is contested because social policy is typically and traditionally a matter of national competence and the latter because the social policy model is crucial to economic and market development. Hence, social policy has both functional and political significance, and EU engagement risks member states’ capacity to control the social fate of their citizens and the associated resources, authority, and power that come with this capacity. The political contestations are at their core territorially and/or social class based; the former crystalizes how wide and extensive the EU authority should be in social policy and the latter a left/right continuum in regard to how redistributive and socially interventionist EU social policy should be. Both are the subject of a complicated politics at EU level. First, there is a diverse set of agents involved, not just member states and the “political” EU institutions (Parliament and Council) but the Commission is also an important “interested” actor. This renders institutional politics and jockeying for power typical features of social policymaking in the EU. Second, one has to break down the monolith of the EU institutions and recognize that within and among them are actors or units that favor a more left or right position on social policy. Third, actors’ positions do not necessarily align on the two types of contestation (apart perhaps from the social nongovernmental organizations and to a lesser extent employers and business interests). Some actors who favor an extensive role for social policy in general are skeptical about the role of the EU in this regard (e.g., trade unions, some social democratic parties) while others (some sectors of the Commission) wish for a more expansive EU remit in social policy but also support a version of social policy pinned tightly to market and economic functions. In this kind of context, the strongest and most consistent political thrust is toward a type of EU social policy that is most clearly oriented to enabling the Union’s economic and market-related objectives. Given this and the institutional set-up, the default position in EU social policy is for a market-making social policy orientation on the one hand and a circumscribed role for the EU in social policy on the other.


Author(s):  
Shannon Dinan

The European Union has no unilateral legislative capacity in the area of social policy. However, the European Commission does play the role of guide by providing a discursive framework and targets for its 28 Member States to meet. Since the late 1990’s, the EU’s ideas on social policy have moved away from the traditional social protection model towards promoting social inclusion, labour activation and investing in children. These new policies represent the social investment perspective, which advocates preparing the population for a knowledge-based economy to increase economic growth and job creation and to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. The EU began the gradual incorporation of the social investment perspective to its social dimension with the adoption of ten-year strategies. Since 2000, it has continued to set goals and benchmarks as well as offer a forum for Member States to coordinate their social initiatives. Drawing on a series of interviews conducted during a research experience in Brussels as well as official documents, this paper is a descriptive analysis of the recent modifications to the EU’s social dimension. It focuses on the changes created by the Europe 2020 Strategy and the Social Investment Package. By tracing the genesis and evolution of these initiatives, the author identifies four obstacles to social investment in the European Union's social dimension.   Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v10i1.263


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-181
Author(s):  
Sławomir Stanisław Górski

The article discusses and analyses the terminology and gives a description of hybrid threats. Particular emphasis is placed on their diversity, variability and the problematic nature of  methods used by  an  aggressor in  order to  destabilise the social, political and economic environments against which the hostile activities are targeted. The areas which may be under the influence of hybrid threats have been indicated and many aspects of these threats’ influence on a contemporary countries’ functioning have also been underlined. The main focus of hybrid threats’ considerations is put in the context of the European Union. The related strategic documents have been analysed and the directions of action defined in them, which may prevent or neutralise the consequences of hybrid threats, have been described, as well. Particular attention has been paid to the analysis of the ”Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats”, the strategic document which acts as a map for joint anti-hybrid activities. The directions of action defined in it may, in the author’s opinion, contribute to building up resistance to hybrid threats. Particularly legitimate are activities which aim at providing an appropriate level of situational knowledge, as well as effective exchange of intelligence information among the European Union’s institutions and its member states. What is more, developing the analytical potential and the transfer of knowledge of hybrid threats, which is carried out by joint centres of excellence, may result in a situation where the influence of these threats on the social, political and economic dimension of the member states’ functioning is smaller. Comparisons between the common strategic solutions to hybrid threats and other instruments of the European Union relating to the internal security (civil protection, solidarity clause) have been made in the article. The summary discusses the directions of antihybrid strategic activities, among which developing the awareness of threats and strengthening the social resilience to hybrid threats have been given special emphasis.


Author(s):  
Russell J. Dalton

This chapter focuses on the variations in cleavage politics across the European Union member states. The analyses compare the structure of issue positions across nations to see if the set of issues defining the economic and cultural cleavages are comparable. While there is some cross-national variation, both cleavages are evident across the European Union. The social group positions on both cleavages are also broadly similar across nations. The chapter then examines the social correlates of cleavage positions to see if factors such as the economic structure or the religious composition of societies affect group alignments. The results emphasize the commonality of the basic patterns for the EU overall to the pattern in specific member states. The analyses are primarily based on the 2009 European Election Study.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shannon Dinan

The European Union has no unilateral legislative capacity in the area of social policy. However, the European Commission does play the role of guide by providing a discursive framework and targets for its 28 Member States to meet. Since the late 1990’s, the EU’s ideas on social policy have moved away from the traditional social protection model towards promoting social inclusion, labour activation and investing in children. These new policies represent the social investment perspective, which advocates preparing the population for a knowledge-based economy to increase economic growth and job creation and to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. The EU began the gradual incorporation of the social investment perspective to its social dimension with the adoption of ten-year strategies. Since 2000, it has continued to set goals and benchmarks as well as offer a forum for Member States to coordinate their social initiatives. Drawing on a series of interviews conducted during a research experience in Brussels as well as official documents, this paper is a descriptive analysis of the recent modifications to the EU’s social dimension. It focuses on the changes created by the Europe 2020 Strategy and the Social Investment Package. By tracing the genesis and evolution of these initiatives, the author identifies four obstacles to social investment in the European Union's social dimension.


Author(s):  
Francesca Pusterla ◽  
Elia Pusterla

The European Union Humanitarian Aid Policy (EUHAP) operates through the European Commission’s Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations Department (DG ECHO) in international humanitarian crises to help victims of man-made atrocities and natural catastrophes worldwide. EUHAP is a subject of vibrant debates given its sensitive scope of intervention and institutional uniqueness. This results, first, in discussions of the reason and legitimacy of humanitarian aid as well as the goals and impact on domestic politics of both donors and recipients. Second, EUHAP is institutionally provided with parallel competences that allow simultaneous and autonomous interventions of the European Union and Member States in humanitarian crises. This means that the EU and Member States can formally carry out independent humanitarian aid without obligation to coordinate. This makes EUHAP particularly relevant regarding the role of the EU as a humanitarian aid provider, the relations between the EU and Member States, the policy governance, and the policy implementation principles. First, coordination and cooperation between the EU and Member States are de facto essential, given the collective nature and global effects of humanitarian crises. Shared competence regulation through EUHAP may enhance the effectiveness of joint operations, overcome inefficient division of labor, and avoid divergence between intervention expected outcome and real performance. Second, parallel competences give to the EU the formal competence to carry out humanitarian actions and conduct a common policy, while Member States’ autonomous actions are not prevented. Indeed, despite the undeniable benefits of multilateral intervention, Member States may opt for bilateralism due to concerns for domestic autonomy and sovereignty breaches. Such collective action problems risk affecting policy coherence and effectiveness. Third, policy governance can make the difference in an effective and coherent EUHAP. This depends on the successful coordination of involved actors to avoid overlapping interventions, dispersion of resources, and particular political, economic, and bureaucratic interests to prevail. In so doing, Member States access the benefits of centralized coordination, monitoring, and division of labor and also avoid autonomy and sovereignty breaches. Fourth, the application of a costs/benefits rationale to common humanitarian interventions is not per se sufficient to ground and overcome the drawbacks of collective action and explain EUHAP. As per its Treaties, or in line with international humanitarian law, the EU adopts and pursues a humanitarian aid policy based on shared principles of solidarity, humanity, impartiality, independence, and neutrality.


2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-34
Author(s):  
Grażyna Kozuń-Cieślak ◽  
Ewa Markowska-Bzducha

Joining the European Union has been treated as a chance for Poland and other post-communist countries to improve their economic growth and development. It was clear from the beginning that it was going to be a long and demanding process in which success is only possible if appropriate economic policies are pursued. That policy should provide stable frameworks to support business development, attract foreign direct investments (FDI), keep the discipline in public finances and assure the right institutional ability and managerial skills to absorb the EU funds. According to forecasts by The McKinsey Quarterly from 2004, 5% Poland's economic growth rate was to require around USD 10 billion of annual FDI inflow! The aim of this study was identifying the leaders in attracting FDI among post-communist European Union member states in the period of 2004-2020. The research showed a huge variation in attracting foreign capital among eleven post-communist EU members. Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia seem to be winners in this race, leaving Poland far behind.


VUZF Review ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 167-176
Author(s):  
Piotr Fraczek

One of the goals of modern states is to strive for continuous economic development and ensure a high standard of living for their citizens. Social problems of too high intensity, existing in individual countries, may constitute a barrier to achieving this goal. One of the acute social problems in every country in the world is the phenomenon of poverty. The European Union and its member states undertake many measures to reduce poverty. One such activity was the creation of the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD), which aims to help the poorest by providing food. The program aimed to complement the policy of public authorities in the Member States and to supplement the existing forms of support in the social welfare system. In Poland, the implementation of FEAD has been planned for the years 2014-2020, and this program was a visible manifestation of European solidarity and significant support for the social assistance system. The article aims to identify the level of support that Poland received in 2014-2019 from the European Union under the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) and to identify trends and problems in the distribution of food products to the poorest people. The analyzes show that in 2014-2019 Poland received support from EU-FEAD of EUR 416.9 million, which allowed for the provision of almost 299 thousand. tons of food for the poorest. In 2019, as much as 76% of the total food provided to the poor was financed from European funds. In the period 2014-2019, there is a noticeable trend in Poland consisting in increasing the share of food aid from the EU for Poland for the purchase of food for the poorest. This is worrying as the end of the EU-funded FEAD program may result in a significant decrease in the number of poor people receiving support in the form of food aid in Poland. One of the main problems in the distribution of food was the insufficiently developed network of food distribution organizations and the presence of municipalities not covered by the food aid program.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-84
Author(s):  
Sanford U. Mba

Recently, the Nigerian Senate passed the Bankruptcy and Insolvency (Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill. This is no doubt a welcome development following the continued demand by insolvency practitioners, academics and other stakeholders for such legislation. The call has not only been for the enactment of just about any legislation, but (consistent with the economic challenges faced by businesses in the country), one that is favourably disposed to the successful restructuring of financially distressed businesses, allowing them to weather the storm of (impending) insolvency, emerge from it and continue to operate within the economy. This article seeks to situate this draft legislative instrument within the present wave of preventive restructuring ably espoused in the European Union Recommendation on New Approaches to Business Rescue and to Give Entrepreneurs a Second Chance (2014), which itself draws largely from Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. The article draws a parallel between the economic crisis that gave rise to the preventive restructuring approach of the Recommendation and the present economic situation in Nigeria; it then examines the chances of such restructuring under the Nigerian draft bankruptcy and insolvency legislation. It argues in the final analysis that the draft legislation does not provide for a prophylactic recourse regime for financially distressed businesses. Consequently, a case is made for such an approach.


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