The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 521-544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Micah Schwartzman
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Cultural Imperialism ◽  
Epistemic Authority ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Basic Features

An important objection to political liberalism is that it provides no means by which to decide conflicts between public and non-public reasons. This article develops John Rawls’ idea of ‘reasoning from conjecture’ as one way to argue for a commitment to public reason. Reasoning from conjecture is a form of non-public justification that allows political liberals to reason from within the comprehensive views of at least some unreasonable citizens. After laying out the basic features of this form of non-public justification, this article responds to three objections based on concerns about insincerity, cultural imperialism, and the epistemic authority of those who reason from conjecture.

Integrity and the Case for Restraint

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Ideal ◽  
Democratic Societies

This chapter discusses the concern that exclusive accounts of public reason threaten or undermine the integrity of some religiously oriented citizens in democratic societies. It discusses various notions of integrity that might be claimed to ground such a concern. It is argued that purely formal accounts of integrity that do not distinguish between the integrity of reasonable and unreasonable persons, as specified within political liberalism, cannot underwrite integrity challenges that should concern political liberals. It is further argued that if the inquiry is limited to conceptions of integrity that distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable persons, the supposed burdens persons of faith face are not burdens different from those that all citizens face equally. It is claimed the concern is best understood as a challenge to the account of public justification and the account of public reason as a moral ideal.

Exclusive Public Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Foundation ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

This chapter develops the idea of public reason based on the shared reasons account of public justification. It is argued that the moral foundation for political liberalism delimits a narrow scope for the idea of public reason, such that public reasons are required only for matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. It is also argued that where public reason applies, persons as citizens have a moral duty to never appeal to their comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public reasoning. Hence, an exclusive account of public reason is vindicated. Finally, we respond to various potential objections to our view, such as the claim that the shared reasons view requires identical reasoning and the claim that public reason is interderminate or inconclusive.

Shared intentions, public reason, and political autonomy

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 776-804 ◽  
Author(s):  
Blain Neufeld
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
State Power ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Political Autonomy ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Corporate Body ◽  
Gerald Gaus

AbstractJohn Rawls claims that public reasoning is the reasoning of ‘equal citizens who as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power’. Drawing upon an amended version of Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intentions, I flesh out this claim by developing the ‘civic people’ account of public reason. Citizens realize ‘full’ political autonomy as members of a civic people. Full political autonomy, though, cannot be realised by citizens in societies governed by a ‘constrained proceduralist’ account of democratic self-government, or the ‘convergence’ account of public justification formulated recently by Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier.

La Idea de “Razón Publica” (y su Revisión) en el Último Rawls

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 5-31
Author(s):  
Fernando Aranda Fraga ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Public Good ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
Political Philosopher

In 1993 John Rawls published his main and longest work since 1971, where he had published his reknowned A Theory of Justice, book that made him famous as the greatest political philosopher of the century. We are referring to Political Liberalism, a summary of his writings of the 80’s and the first half of the 90’s, where he attempts to answer the critics of his intellectual partners, communitarian philosophers. One of the key topics in this book is the issue of “public reason”, whose object is nothing else than public good, and on which the principles and proceedings of justice are to be applied. The book was so important for the political philosophy of the time that in 1997 Rawls had to go through the 1993 edition, becoming this new one the last relevant writing published before the death of the Harvard philosopher in November 2002.

scholarly journals O Construtivismo Político: Uma Teoria Pública da Razão Prática/Political Constructivism: a public theory of practical reason

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Everton Puhl Maciel
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Original Position ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Intuitionism ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Face ◽  
Political Constructivism ◽  
The Universe

RESUMO: Esse trabalho tem por objetivo analisar o construtivismo político da Terceira Conferência da obra Liberalismo Político, de John Rawls. Especificamente, vamos tentar compreender como, limitando o universo de construção aos parâmetros estabelecidos pelo discurso político, podemos estender o alcance dos princípios acordados na posição original para uma comunidade muito mais ampla frente às doutrinas morais abrangentes. Demonstraremos o construtivismo político coerentista não em oposição ao intuicionismo moral utilitarista nem ao construtivismo moral kantiano, mas como capaz de absorver modelos com esse grau de razoabilidade. Isso será disposto através de uma justificação pública tanto do conteúdo quanto da forma do modelo adotado. Assim, o consenso sobreposto apresentado por Rawls é responsável direto pelo resultado democrático que esperamos de uma sociedade onde a publicidade ocupa espaço enquanto fato e possui um valor aceito como legítimo. Nosso método de trabalho envolve uma leitura analítica do texto e de comentadores pertinentes ao assunto proposto.ABSTRACT: This study aims to objective analyze the political constructivism of the Third Conference of the work Political Liberalism, by John Rawls. Specifically, we understand how limiting the universe of construction to the parameters by the political discourse, we can extend the reach of the principles agreed in the original position to a much larger universe in the face of comprehensive moral doctrines. We demonstrate what political constructivism no consistent as opposed to utilitarian moral intuitionism or the Kantian moral constructivism, but as capable of absorbing models with this degree of reasonableness. This will be provided through a public justification of both the content and form of the model adopted. Thus, the overlapping consensus presented by Rawls is directly responsible for the democratic results we expect from a society where democracy takes up space as a fact and has a value accepted as legitimate. KEYWORDS: Constructivism; justification; liberalism.

Free Speech and the Duty of Civility

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Free Speech ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Legal Enforcement

This chapter critically examines which arguments for free speech may be consistent with Rawls’s political liberalism, in order to establish whether there are good reasons, within political liberalism, for rejecting the legal implementation of the duty of civility. Among the various arguments for freedom of speech, the chapter argues, only those from democracy and political legitimacy seem to justify Rawls’s opposition to the legal enforcement of the duty of civility. However, the chapter concludes, since Rawls’s own conception of political legitimacy is not merely procedural but grounded in the ideas of public justification and public reason, political liberalism is in principle consistent with some restrictions on free speech, including those which would result from the legal enforcement of the duty of civility.

Is There a Right to Polygamy? Marriage, Equality and Subsidizing Families in Liberal Public Justification

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 246-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew March
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Civil Union ◽  
Union Status ◽  
Common Objection ◽  
Domestic Partnerships ◽  
The Right ◽  
Female Equality

AbstractThis paper argues that the four most plausible arguments compatible with public reason for an outright legal ban on all forms of polygamy are unvictorious. I consider the types of arguments political liberals would have to insist on, and precisely how strongly, in order for a general prohibition against polygamy to be justified, while also considering what general attitude towards "marriage" and legal recognition of the right to marry are most consistent with political liberalism. I argue that a liberal state should get out of the "marriage business" by leveling down to a universal status of "civil union" neutral as to the gender and affective purpose of domestic partnerships. I then refute what I regard as the four most plausible rational objections to offering this civil union status to multi-member domestic partnerships. The most common objection to polygamy is on grounds of gender equality, more specifically, female equality. But advancing this argument forcefully often involves neglecting the tendency of political liberalism (by whatever name it goes in contemporary, complex, multicultural societies) to tolerate a certain amount of inequality in private, within the bounds of robust and meaningful freedoms of choice and exit. Properly understood, polygamy involves no inherent statement about the essential inferiority of women, and certainly not more than many other existing practices and institutions (including many expressions of the main monotheistic religions) which political liberals regard as tolerable, even reasonable. Arguments from the welfare of children, fairness in the spousal market, and the abuse of family subsidies are also considered and found insufficient for excluding polygamy.

scholarly journals Justificação pública: a função da ideia de estrutura básica da sociedade em Rawls

2011 ◽  
Vol 52 (123) ◽  
pp. 197-211
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Justice As Fairness

O objetivo principal deste artigo é estabelecer uma reflexão sobre a função da ideia da estrutura básica da sociedade (basic structure of society) para a justificação pública (public justification) dos princípios morais na teoria da justiça como equidade de John Rawls, principalmente nas obras Political Liberalism (PL, Lecture VII) e Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (JF, I, § 4, 9; II, § 15, 16), com a intenção de identificar um modelo ético coerentista e pragmatista de justificação, analisando o papel da categoria de justiça de fundo (background justice) neste contexto justificacional.

scholarly journals Justice and the Fetus: Rawls, Children, and Abortion

2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID M. SHAW
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Controversial Issues ◽  
Political Society ◽  
Political Values ◽  
Over Time

In a footnote to the first edition of Political Liberalism, John Rawls introduced an example of how public reason could deal with controversial issues. He intended this example to show that his system of political liberalism could deal with such problems by considering only political values, without the introduction of comprehensive moral doctrines. Unfortunately, Rawls chose “the troubled question of abortion” as the issue that would illustrate this. In the case of abortion, Rawls argued, “the equality of women as equal citizens” overrides both “the ordered reproduction of political society over time” and also “the due respect for human life.” It seems fair to say that this was not the best choice of example and also that Rawls did not argue for his example particularly well: a whole subset of the Rawlsian literature concerns this question alone.

scholarly journals Perspectives for a Social Integration of Human Rights in the Muslim World

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 27-36
Author(s):  
Efrem Garlando
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Social Integration ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Muslim World ◽  
Cultural Imperialism ◽  
Cultural Perspective ◽  
Traditional Concept ◽  
Islamic World ◽  
Neutral Language

Human Rights are defined as sort of humankind “Esperanto”, a neutral language able to promote the difficult task of dialogue across communities. When speaking about “Islam”, it is easy or generates a misunderstanding, because the word Islam does not refers to a monolithic entity: Ummah, the global community of all Muslim believers, is indeed plural and fragmentary from both a geographical and a cultural perspective. In the course of my essay, I will start from the work of John Rawls and Abdullahi Ahmed An- Naim, then focus on a new concept of Human Rights, stressing practical tools rather than hermeneutical ones. As a matter of fact this project should start within the Islamic world in order to be more easily accepted. Furthermore, it is necessary to firstly undertake this task there, so that it cannot be claimed to be the result of western cultural imperialism. The Islamic countries ought to rethink the idea of “public reason”, which must not be confused with the “reason of the sovereign” and should instead outcomes from the dialogue between people. This is possible thanks to a progressive rooting out of the traditional concept of Shari’a and a renovated concept of ijtihad, the concept of personal reasoning, so that the Islamic world can achieve a stronger critical sense towards itself and its religious dogmatism.

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