scholarly journals Obligations of Conscience

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Shane N. Glackin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Positive Case ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral View

Abstract In this paper, I outline and defend a commonly-held moral view which has received surprisingly little sustained philosophical attention. This view, which I call the ‘authority of conscience,’ states that believing ourselves to have moral obligations to act in a certain way does in fact create an obligation to act in that way. Although I do not provide a positive case for the principle of authoritative conscience, beyond its popularity and intuitive force, I defend it against several prima facie objections. I then go on to demonstrate that the principle does not entail any anti-realist metaethical commitments, and is therefore compatible in particular, and contrary to appearances, with plausible formulations of moral realism.

Intrafamilial Organ Donation Is Often an Altruistic Act

2003 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Spital
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Organ Donation ◽  
Genetic Relationship ◽  
Recent Article ◽  
Family Members ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Logical Conclusion ◽  
Prima Facie Duty

In their recent article, Glannon and Ross remind us that family members have obligations to help each other that strangers do not have. They argue, I believe correctly, that what creates moral obligations within families is not genetic relationship but rather a sharing of intimacy. For no one are these obligations stronger than they are for parents of young children. This observation leads the authors to the logical conclusion that organ donation by a parent to her child is not optional but rather a prima facie duty. However, Glannon and Ross go a step further by suggesting that because parent-to-child organ donation is a duty, it cannot be altruistic. They assert that “altruistic acts are optional, nonobligatory…supererogatory…. Given that altruism consists in purely optional actions presupposing no duty to aid others, any parental act that counts as meeting a child's needs cannot be altruistic.” Here I think the authors go too far.

scholarly journals Beyond Divine Command Theory: Moral realism in the Hebrew Bible

2009 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaco W. Gericke
Keyword(s):  
Hebrew Bible ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Command Theory ◽  
Israelite Religion ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
Euthyphro Dilemma

Philosophical approaches to ancient Israelite religion are rare, as is metaethical reflection on the Hebrew Bible. Nevertheless, many biblical scholars and philosophers of religion tend to take it for granted that the biblical metaethical assumptions about the relation between divinity and morality involve a pre-philosophical version of Divine Command Theory by default. In this paper the author challenges the popular consensus with several arguments demonstrating the presence of moral realism in the text. It is furthermore suggested that the popular consensus came about as a result of prima facie assessments informed by anachronistic metatheistic assumptions about what the Hebrew Bible assumed to be essential in the deity–morality relation. The study concludes with the observation that in the texts where Divine Command Theory is absent from the underlying moral epistemology the Euthyphro Dilemma disappears as a false dichotomy.

The Obligation Dilemma

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Relationships ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Skeptical Conclusion

This book argues for the prima facie plausibility of the surprising and paradoxical conclusion that there are no moral obligations regardless of whether determinism is true. In the form of a dilemma, the primary argument for this skeptical conclusion presupposes that obligation requires freedom. A minimal number of credible principles entail that this is the freedom both to do, and to refrain from doing, what is obligatory. On the deterministic horn of the dilemma, since determinism eliminates freedom to do otherwise, it imperils moral obligation. On the indeterministic horn, pertinent actions are too luck-infected to qualify as obligations. Hence, there are no moral obligations. The book’s principal goal is to develop the obligation dilemma as powerfully and clearly as possible to inspire sustained philosophical work to solve it (assuming that it can be solved). In many respects, the obligation dilemma mirrors the venerable responsibility dilemma: regardless of whether determinism is true, no one is morally responsible for anything. The book shows that various prevalent moves in favor of, or in response to, the responsibility dilemma are, when suitably amended, not promising as supportive of, or retorts to, the obligation dilemma. Exposing the obligation dilemma’s implications for responsibility, and its ramifications for forgiveness (something central to salutary interpersonal relationships), underscores its urgency.

Moral Dilemmas, Compromise and Compensation

Philosophy ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 66 (257) ◽  
pp. 369-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. Day
Keyword(s):  
Relevant Literature ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Conflicts

Moral dilemmas, or moral conflicts, present a leading problem in Ethics. Ross calls them the problem of conflicting prima facie moral obligations. Lemmon calls them ‘moral dilemmas’, and Sinnott-Armstrong in his recent book discusses them thoroughly and provides extensive references to relevant literature.

A Frankfurter in Königsberg: Prolegomenon to any Future non-metaphysical Kant

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-604
Author(s):  
James Gordon Finlayson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constructivist Theory ◽  
Kantian Constructivism ◽  
Sharon Street ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

AbstractIn this article I press four different objections on Forst’s theory of the ‘Right to Justification’. These are (i) that the principle of justification is not well-formulated; (ii) that ‘reasonableness and reciprocity’, as these notions are used by Rawls, are not apt to support a Kantian conception of morality; (iii) that the principle of justification, as Forst understands it, gives an inadequate account of what makes actions wrong; and (iv) that, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, Forst’s account veers towards a version of moral realism that is prima facie incompatible with Kantian constructivism. I then evaluate Forst’s theory in the light of a distinction made by Sharon Street between restricted and unrestricted constructivism. I show that Forst has reason to deny that it is either the one or the other, but he is not able to show that it is both or neither. I conclude that the arguments Forst advances in support of his constructivist theory of the right to justification entail that it is a metaphysical and comprehensive conception in the relevant, Rawlsian sense. Forst’s theory of the right to justification therefore fails to fulfil one of the main stated aims.

scholarly journals THE OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN FINNIS AND RAZ

2021 ◽  
Vol 48 (152) ◽  
pp. 725
Author(s):  
Andrea Luisa Bucchile Faggion
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Social Facts ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
The Law ◽  
John Finnis

The recent debate between John Finnis and Joseph Raz on the existence of a general prima facie moral obligation to obey positive laws is a major contribution to a classical topic in legal and political philosophy. In this paper, I argue that Raz’s normal justification thesis and Finnis’s doctrine of “determinatio,” inherited from Aquinas, complement each other, shedding light on how norms grounded in social facts can give rise to particular moral obligations independently of their content. However, I argue that this on its own does not explain the possibility of a general moral obligation to obey the law, that is, the notion that everyone has a prima facie moral obligation to obey every law that applies to them.

Conflicts and Challenges of Truth-Telling in Dentistry: A Case-Based Ethical Analysis

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Azam Khorshidian ◽  
Alireza Parsapoor ◽  
Ehsan Shamsi Gooshki
Keyword(s):  
Medical Errors ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Case Analysis ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Ethical Analysis ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Best Interest ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Truth Telling ◽  
Respect For Autonomy

Objectives: The basis of truth-telling is respecting the autonomy of patients and developing an ability to make informed decisions with valid consent. The purpose of this study was to ethically analyze the conflicts about truth-telling in dentistry. Materials and Methods: This case analysis focused on the issues of truth-telling in medicine and dentistry. The challenges encountered by dentists with respect to ethical issues related to truth-telling were discussed and analyzed by the research team. Results:  The literature review showed that the issue of truth-telling in dentistry has been addressed from three aspects: Truth-telling about other dentists’ medical errors, truth-telling about dangerous, refractory, or incurable diseases, and truth-telling to children or incompetent individuals for decision-making. Conclusion: When the duty of the dentist in truth-telling is conflicted with some other moral obligations, the conflict between the prima facie duties arises. The principle-based ethical theories provide a suitable conceptual framework for moral judgement in such conflicts. In cases of conflicts related to truth-telling, a balance should be maintained between principles and rules such as fidelity, respect for autonomy, maintaining trust in dentist-patient relation, and best interest of patients. The decision in truth-telling should be made individually for each patient based on the specific contextual conditions.

scholarly journals Does Darwall’s Morality of Accountability Require Moral Realism? (And Would It Be Strengthened by Adding God to the Story?)

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
C. Stephen Evans
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Stephen Darwall

Stephen Darwall has developed an account of moral obligations as grounded in “second-personal reasons,” which was developed in conversation with early modern “theological voluntarists” who were divine command theorists. For Darwall, morality does not require accountability to God; humans as autonomous moral agents are the source of moral obligations. In this paper, I try to show that Darwall is vulnerable to some objections made against divine command theories. There are responses Darwall could make that have parallels to those given by divine command theorists. However, those responses require moral realism, while Darwall’s project is often seen as being inspired by metaethical constructivism. Finally, I suggest that Darwall’s view could be further strengthened by the addition of God to the story.

Infinite Lifespans, Terraforming Planets, And Intergenerational Justice

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-86
Author(s):  
Adelin-Costin Dumitru ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Intergenerational Justice ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Feasibility Constraint ◽  
The One

When it comes to specifying the moral duties we bear towards future generations, most political philosophers position themselves on what could be regarded as a safe ground. A variant of the Lockean proviso is commonplace in the literature on intergenerational justice, taking the form of an obligation to bestow upon future people a minimum of goods necessary for reaching a certain threshold of well-being (Meyer, 2017). Furthermore, even this minimum is often frowned upon, given the non-identity problem and the challenges this presents to the topic of justice between generations. Additional issues are raised at the level of non-ideal theory, the most significant being the problem of non-compliance (Gosseries and Meyer, 2009).In this paper I intend to probe the limits of “practical political possibility” (Rawls 1999), by inquiring whether embracing the sufficiency view (Frankfurt, 1987; Crisp, 2003; Benbaji, 2005) as a distributive pattern and capabilities as a metric can lead to more burdensome obligations for present generations. More specifically, I try to show that we have a duty to invest in research that aims at prolonging the lifespan of humans (the idea can already be found in the sufficientarian literature, for instance in Farrelly, 2007). Moreover, given the Earth’s limited resources, we ought to encourage the terraforming of other planets in order to make them inhabitable for (future) people.I argue that these two seemingly far-fetched projects are in fact worthwhile goals to pursue on the one hand, and moral obligations on the other hand. Nonetheless, they are not the only ones we ought to take on; for instance, we must simultaneously pursue them and try to improve the prospects of those who fall under a sufficiency threshold here and now. That is, specifying these (prima facie) duties towards future generations is connected with stronger obligations towards the current generation.Towards the end of the paper I engage in a discussion regarding the role of the feasibility constraint in a theory of justice, as rationales pertaining to feasibility are perhaps going to be the most recurrent criticisms raised against my proposal. To that end, I defend limitarian policies, which aim at setting an upper limit to how much money individuals are allowed to possess (Robeyns, 2017; Volacu and Dumitru, 2019).

scholarly journals Allied Identities

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt M Blankschaen
Keyword(s):  
Family Member ◽  
Sense Of Community ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Lgbt Rights ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
Lgbt Community ◽  
The Status ◽  
Conflicting Interests

Allies are extremely important to LGBT rights. Though we don’t often enumerate what tasks we expect allies to do, a fairly common conception is that allies “support the LGBT community.” In the first section I introduce three difficulties for this position that collectively suggest it is conceptually insufficient. I then develop a positive account by starting with whom allies are allied to instead of what allies are supposed to do. We might obviously say here that allies are allied to the LGBT community, but I will argue that this community is better thought of as a loose coalition because there are often intersectional issues and conflicting interests that challenge any unified sense of community. I argue that people typically become allies because a friend or family member is experiencing some kind of specific harm; if that harm or discrimination is what causally explains why people become allies, then allies are required to do more than we commonly think. Although allies have a prima facie obligation to honor what members of a subcommunity identify as a harm, this obligation is defeasible if an ally believes fulfilling the obligation would be harmful. I conclude by looking at how we can understand what an ally is in terms of a larger discussion about moral obligations. If people already have these obligations, whatever they are, because morality requires it, then the status “ally” is redundant. I conclude by showing that certain social statuses can not only transform or reprioritize prior moral commitments, but can also introduce new kinds of responsibility that an agent did not have before.

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