Moral Dilemmas, Compromise and Compensation

Moral dilemmas, or moral conflicts, present a leading problem in Ethics. Ross calls them the problem of conflicting prima facie moral obligations. Lemmon calls them ‘moral dilemmas’, and Sinnott-Armstrong in his recent book discusses them thoroughly and provides extensive references to relevant literature.

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Intrafamilial Organ Donation Is Often an Altruistic Act

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics ◽

10.1017/s0963180103121147 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 12 (1) ◽

pp. 116-118 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Aaron Spital

Keyword(s):

Young Children ◽

Organ Donation ◽

Genetic Relationship ◽

Plants Seem Prima Facie Indian But Alien In Origin: A Nomenclatural Chaos

Plantae Scientia ◽

10.32439/ps.v4i2.117-120 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 4 (2) ◽

pp. 117-120

Author(s):

D A Patil ◽

S B. Khairnar

Keyword(s):

Alien Species ◽

Relevant Literature ◽

Single Species ◽

Prima Facie ◽

Indian Species ◽

International Code ◽

American Continent ◽

Code Of Nomenclature ◽

Rules And Principles ◽

International Code Of Nomenclature

The alien species, as the native ones, are assigned two names. These are based on choice of nomenclaturist. The nominclaturists are preforce been forced to adapt the scientific names in accordance with the rules and principles of ICN (International Code of Nomenclature) for uniformity and convenience internationally. The present authors could notice some plant taxa which by their names and on etymological analysis, prima facie, appear to be Indian species. The fact is, however, contrary. When select 26 such species were studied critically for their nativity consulting relevant literature, they turned out to be aliens. Maximum alien species belong to various parts of American continent, while other regions or countries are represented by a few or a single species each. The taxa which appear to be Indian but basically they are aliens, a new term ‘pseudo-native’ for them is proposed. The authors also pointed out necessity to have evaluation regarding exotic status of species of flora of a region for better management of plant-wealth in future.

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Service with a conscience: moral dilemmas in customer service roles

Journal of Service Theory and Practice ◽

10.1108/jstp-04-2016-0089 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 27 (3) ◽

pp. 689-711 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Dana Yagil ◽

Tamar Shultz

Keyword(s):

Customer Service ◽

Service Providers ◽

Personal Values ◽

Moral Dilemmas ◽

Moral Emotions ◽

Moral Decision Making ◽

Moral Conflicts ◽

Content Type ◽

Service Employees ◽

Moral Decisions

Purpose Service employees are frequently exposed to moral dilemmas as a result of their boundary role, attending to the interests of both the organization and customers. The purpose of this paper is to explore organizational and personal values that generate moral dilemmas in the service context, as well as emotions related to employees’ moral decisions. Design/methodology/approach Using the critical incidents technique, data were collected from service providers about moral dilemmas in the workplace. The data were analyzed independently by each author, with an agreement rate of 84-88 percent. Findings The results show that service employees confront dilemmas as a result of conflicts between the following organizational and personal values: standardization vs personalization; profit vs integrity; and emotional display rules vs dignity. Moral decision making involves emotions generated by customer distress, negative emotions toward customers, and emotions of guilt, shame, or fear. Originality/value Little research has studied moral conflicts in service encounters from employees’ perspective. Using a qualitative approach, this study explores the role of personal values and moral emotions in such processes.

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The Obligation Dilemma

10.1093/oso/9780190050856.001.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Ishtiyaque Haji

Keyword(s):

Interpersonal Relationships ◽

Moral Obligation ◽

Prima Facie ◽

Moral Obligations ◽

Philosophical Work ◽

Skeptical Conclusion

This book argues for the prima facie plausibility of the surprising and paradoxical conclusion that there are no moral obligations regardless of whether determinism is true. In the form of a dilemma, the primary argument for this skeptical conclusion presupposes that obligation requires freedom. A minimal number of credible principles entail that this is the freedom both to do, and to refrain from doing, what is obligatory. On the deterministic horn of the dilemma, since determinism eliminates freedom to do otherwise, it imperils moral obligation. On the indeterministic horn, pertinent actions are too luck-infected to qualify as obligations. Hence, there are no moral obligations. The book’s principal goal is to develop the obligation dilemma as powerfully and clearly as possible to inspire sustained philosophical work to solve it (assuming that it can be solved). In many respects, the obligation dilemma mirrors the venerable responsibility dilemma: regardless of whether determinism is true, no one is morally responsible for anything. The book shows that various prevalent moves in favor of, or in response to, the responsibility dilemma are, when suitably amended, not promising as supportive of, or retorts to, the obligation dilemma. Exposing the obligation dilemma’s implications for responsibility, and its ramifications for forgiveness (something central to salutary interpersonal relationships), underscores its urgency.

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Hegel's Idealism: Prospects

Hegel Bulletin ◽

10.1017/s0263523200004638 ◽

1989 ◽

Vol 10 (01) ◽

pp. 28-41 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Robert B. Pippin

Keyword(s):

Category Theory ◽

Western Europe ◽

Prima Facie ◽

The Self ◽

Recent Book ◽

Full Theory ◽

Self Actualization ◽

Post War ◽

The Right ◽

Conceptual Possibility

First of all, I am very grateful to both commentators for the attention they have devoted to Hegel's Idealism; I am heartened by the kind words and humbled by the magnitude of the problems introduced by their criticisms. These criticisms both rightly refer to what is the heart of my interpretation, the Kant-Hegel relation, and, interestingly enough, raise objections from roughly opposite directions. Professor Pinkard, in effect, charges that I have made too much of that relation and thereby confused transcendental and speculative concerns. He argues here, as he does at greater length in his recent book (Hegel's Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility), that the philosophically valuable core of Hegel is a ‘category theory’ limited to an ‘explanation’ of the conceptual ‘possibility’ of various judgments, practices, institutions, etc. Professor Harris charges, on the other hand (and with some irony), that I have made too little of the Kant-Hegel relation, or have construed it too narrowly, that the interpretation of Hegel's idealism which I provide thus either unfairly neglects, or does not have the resources to deal with, Hegel's full theory of the ‘whole’, or of Absolute Spirit, his account of the modern community's reconciliation with itself in time. I am thus alleged to have provided an interpretation that is at once too ambitious, and not ambitious enough, and I hope that such responses, at least for the Aristotelians in the audience, count as prima facie evidence that I must have said just the right thing. My claim in Hegel's Idealism is that the well-known Hegel Renaissance, in post-war Western Europe especially, has still failed to produce a contemporary reconstruction of Hegel's fundamental position, his ‘identity theory’, his identifying the ‘self-actualization’ of the Notion with ‘actuality’, or his theory of the reality of the Absolute Idea.

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Moral Conflicts and Moral Awareness

Philosophy ◽

10.1017/s0031819111000362 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 86 (4) ◽

pp. 563-587 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Chris Bessemans

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Moral Philosophy ◽

Moral Theory ◽

Moral Dilemmas ◽

Moral Awareness ◽

Phenomenological Method ◽

Moral Choice ◽

Moral Conflicts ◽

Adequate Understanding ◽

Action Guidance

AbstractBy making use of Aurel Kolnai's ethical writings I want to offer a more adequate understanding of moral conflicts and moral dilemmas. Insisting on Kolnai's phenomenological method, in particular, focussing on the agent's moral awareness (or conscience) and his deliberation, results in an understanding of moral conflicts as moments of moral choice rather than anomalies of moral theory. In this way, I argue that one can account for Bernard Williams's phenomenological description of moral conflicts without having to accept his anti-realist conclusions. Moreover, this approach indicates the adequacy of ordinary moral reasoning for decision-making and action guidance. Lastly and importantly, the essay illustrates the relevance of Kolnai's writings to contemporary moral philosophy.

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Lying and Perjury in Medieval Practical Thought

10.1093/oso/9780198828884.001.0001 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Emily Corran

Keyword(s):

Middle Ages ◽

Thirteenth Century ◽

Western Europe ◽

Moral Dilemmas ◽

Moral Theology ◽

Moral Obligations ◽

Moral Ambiguity ◽

Late Middle Ages ◽

Counter Reformation ◽

Moral Rules

Thought about lying and perjury became increasingly practical from the end of the twelfth century in Western Europe. At this time, a distinctive way of thinking about deception and false oaths appeared, which dealt with moral dilemmas and the application of moral rules in exceptional cases. It first emerged in the schools of Paris and Bologna, most notably in the Summa de Sacramentis et Animae Consiliis of Peter the Chanter. The tradition continued in pastoral writings of the thirteenth century, the practical moral questions addressed by theologians in universities in the second half of the thirteenth century, and in the Summae de Casibus Conscientiae of the late Middle Ages. This book argues that medieval practical ethics of this sort can usefully be described as casuistry—a term for the discipline of moral theology that became famous during the Counter-Reformation. This can be seen in the medieval origins of the concept of equivocation, an idea that was explored in medieval literature with varying degrees of moral ambiguity. From the turn of the thirteenth century, the concept was adopted by canon lawyers and theologians, as a means of exploring questions about exceptional situations in ethics. It has been assumed in the past that equivocation and the casuistry of lying was an academic discourse invented in the sixteenth century in order to evade moral obligations. This study reveals that casuistry in the Middle Ages was developed in ecclesiastical thought as part of an effort to explain how to follow moral rules in ambiguous and perplexing cases.

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Examples in ethics

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy ◽

10.4324/9780415249126-l023-1 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Robert B. Louden

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Case Studies ◽

Moral Education ◽

Real Life ◽

Moral Dilemmas ◽

Moral Experience ◽

Moral Obligations ◽

Actual Case ◽

Philosophical Questions

Philosophers often employ examples to illustrate how their favoured principles are to be applied to concrete cases, and sometimes even to show that principles are of no help in decision-making. Examples are also used to convince readers of the existence of moral dilemmas – unresolvable conflicts between moral obligations. But a variety of different philosophical questions concerning the role, status, and nature of examples used in ethics have also been raised. One such question concerns the role that examples should play in our moral experience: should this be a rhetorical, pedagogic role of persuading us to do what is right, as determined by pre-existing principle; or a stronger, logical role of helping to determine what is morally right? Another query relates to moral teaching: is exposure to and reflection on stories, tales, narratives and exemplars sufficient for moral education, or is there a further need for exposure to principles and theories of ethics? Third, in terms of the kinds of examples employed in moral philosophy and reflection, should such examples be culled from great literature or sacred texts? Alternatively, should they be actual case studies drawn from real life, or hypothetical but realistic examples constructed by theorists? Or should they be imaginary, highly improbable cases designed to test our intuitions? A fourth question asks how examples are best identified and described, and to what extent the examples used in ethics are themselves theory-laden or even theory-constituted.

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Nielsen, Ethics and God

Religious Studies ◽

10.1017/s0034412500010684 ◽

1978 ◽

Vol 14 (2) ◽

pp. 205-216 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Osmond G. Ramberan

Keyword(s):

Moral Judgment ◽

Good Reason ◽

Recent Book ◽

Christian Tradition ◽

Moral Obligations ◽

Moral Beliefs ◽

Belief In God ◽

Moral Insight ◽

Moral Claims ◽

The Will

One of the central claims of most religious people (especially those in the Judeo-Christian tradition) is that morality is based upon religion or, more specifically, on a belief in God. A morality which is not God-centred not only cannot provide a genuine basis for moral beliefs but is really and truly groundless. For without a belief in the sovereignty of God, there can be no genuine adequate foundation for moral beliefs. In his recent book, Ethics Without God, Kai Nielsen claims that this view is grossly mistaken. According to Nielsen, morality cannot be based on religion because moral claims cannot be derived from religious (non-moral) cosmological claims such as ‘God is Creator’, or ‘God exists’. ‘God wills X’, ‘God commands X’, do not entail ‘X ought to be done’, or ‘I ought to do X’. It is perfectly in order for someone to say that God wills (commands) X, but is X good? It is also perfectly in order for someone to say that God commands me to do X, but why should I obey God? Surely it cannot be because God is powerful and, if I do not obey his commands, he will punish me. It may be prudent and expedient to obey God because I am afraid of punishment, but this is surely not a morally good reason for obeying him. Moral obligations follow God's commands only if it is assumed that God is morally perfect or that he is good or that his commands are right (p. 5). But I cannot know that God is good without an understanding of what it is for something to be good. To be sure, ‘God is good’, is a truth of language, but in order to understand it we must have a prior understanding of goodness- an understanding which is ‘logically prior to, and independent of, any understanding or acknowledgement of God’ (p. 11). Moreover, Nielsen argues, the religious quest is a quest to find a being that is ‘worthy of worship’, but it is by our own moral insight that we decide that any being, any Z, is ‘worthy of worship’. The decision that there is a Z such that Z is worthy of worship is a moral judgment which is in no way dependent upon the will of God. But more than this, ‘God’, in ‘God is worthy of worship’, is, in most cases, used analytically so that anyone who is brought to say ‘My God’, or ‘My Lord and my God’, is using ‘God’ evaluatively and by implication making a moral judgment - a moral judgment which is logically prior to the will or command of God. This leads Nielsen to conclude:

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Sobre a lógica deôntica não-clássica

Crítica Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía ◽

10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1987.639 ◽

1987 ◽

Vol 19 (55) ◽

pp. 19-37

Author(s):

Leila Z. Puga ◽

Newton C.A. Da Costa

Keyword(s):

Propositional Logic ◽

Ethical Theory ◽

Classical System ◽

Propositional Calculus ◽

Moral Dilemmas ◽

Prima Facie ◽

First Order ◽

Starting Point ◽

Expository Paper ◽

Classical Propositional Calculus

Our starting point, in this basically expository paper, is the study of a classical system of deontic propositional logic, classical in the sense that it constitutes an extension of the classical propositional calculus. It is noted, then, that the system excludes ab initio the possibility of the existence of real moral dilemmas (contradictory obligations and prohibitions), and also can not cope smoothly with the so-called prima facie moral dilemmas. So, we develop a non-classical, paraconsistent system of propositional deontic logic which is compatible with such dilemmas, real or prima facie. In our paraconsistent system one can handle them neatly, in particular one can directly investigate their force, operational meaning, and the most important consequences of their acceptance as not uncommon moral facts. Of course, we are conscious that other procedures for dealing with them are at hand, for example by the weakening of the specific deontic axioms. It is not argued that our procedure is the best, at least as regards the present state of the issue. We think only that owing, among other reasons, to the circumstance that the basic ethical concepts are intrinsically vague, it seems quite difficult to get rid of moral dilemmas and of moral deadlocks in general. Apparently this speaks in favour of a paraconsistent approach to ethics. At any rate, a final appraisal of the possible solutions to the problem of dilemmas and deadlocks, if there is one, constitutes a matter of ethical theory and not only of logic. On the other hand, the paraconsistency stance looks likely to be relevant also in the field of legal logic. It is shown, in outline, that the systems considered are sound and complete, relative to a natural semantics. All results of this paper can be extended to first-order and to higher-order logics. Such extensions give rise to the question of the transparency (or oppacity) of the deontic contexts. As we shall argue in forthcoming articles, they normally are transparent. [L.Z.P., N.C.A. da C.] (PDF en portugués)

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