Climate Change, Individual Emissions, and Foreseeing Harm

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 562-584 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chad Vance
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Greenhouse Gas ◽  
Human Activity ◽  
Side Effect ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Group Activities ◽  
Reduce Emissions ◽  
Moral Difference

There are a number of cases where, collectively, groups cause harm, and yet no single individual’s contribution to the collective makes any difference to the amount of harm that is caused. For instance, though human activity is collectively causing climate change, my individual greenhouse gas emissions are neither necessary nor sufficient for any harm that results from climate change. Some (e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong) take this to indicate that there is no individual moral obligation to reduce emissions. There is a collective action problem here, to which I offer a solution. My solution rests on an argument for a (sometimes) bare moral difference between intending harm and foreseeing with near certainty that harm will result as an unintended side-effect of one’s action. I conclude that we have a moral obligation to reduce our individual emissions, and, more broadly, an obligation to not participate in many other harmful group activities (e.g., factory-farming).

scholarly journals Combating climate change with matching-commitment agreements

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chai Molina ◽  
Erol Akcay ◽  
Ulf Dieckmann ◽  
Simon Levin ◽  
Elena A. Rovenskaya
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Greenhouse Gas Emissions ◽  
Greenhouse Gas ◽  
Paris Agreement ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Emissions Reductions ◽  
Gas Emissions ◽  
Reduce Emissions

Countries generally agree that global greenhouse gas emissions are too high, but prefer other countries reduce emissions rather than reducing their own. The Paris Agreement is intended to solve this collective action problem, but is likely insufficient. One proposed solution is a matching-commitment agreement, through which countries can change each other’s incentives by committing to conditional emissions reductions, before countries decide on their unconditional reductions. Here, we study matching-commitment agreements between two heterogeneous countries. We find that such agreements (1) incentivize both countries to make matching commitments that in turn incentivize efficient emissions reductions, (2) reduce emissions from those expected without an agreement, and (3) increase both countries’ welfare. Matching-commitment agreements are attractive because they do not require a central enforcing authority and only require countries to fulfil their promises; countries are left to choose their conditional and unconditional emissions reductions according to their own interests.

scholarly journals Climate Change Inaction and Optimism

Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Philip J. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Economic Growth ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Discourse ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
The Public ◽  
Policy Context ◽  
Positive Action ◽  
Ideological Fantasy

The problem of climate change inaction is sometimes said to be ‘wicked’, or essentially insoluble, and it has also been seen as a collective action problem, which is correct but inconsequential. In the absence of progress, much is made of various frailties of the public, hence the need for an optimistic tone in public discourse to overcome fatalism and encourage positive action. This argument is immaterial without meaningful action in the first place, and to favour what amounts to the suppression of truth over intellectual openness is in any case disreputable. ‘Optimism’ is also vexed in this context, often having been opposed to the sombre mood of environmentalists by advocates of economic growth. The greater mental impediments are ideological fantasy, which is blind to the contradictions in public discourse, and the misapprehension that if optimism is appropriate in one social or policy context it must be appropriate in others. Optimism, far from spurring climate change action, fosters inaction.

scholarly journals Antimicrobial Footprints, Fairness, and Collective Harm

2020 ◽  
pp. 377-387
Author(s):  
Anne Schwenkenbecher
Keyword(s):  
Antimicrobial Resistance ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Carbon Footprint ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Real Difference ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Individual Behaviour ◽  
Individual Contributions ◽  
Collective Harm ◽  
Discernible Difference

Abstract This chapter explores the question of whether or not individual agents are under a moral obligation to reduce their ‘antimicrobial footprint’. An agent’s antimicrobial footprint measures the extent to which her actions are causally linked to the use of antibiotics. As such, it is not necessarily a measure of her contribution to antimicrobial resistance. Talking about people’s antimicrobial footprint in a way we talk about our carbon footprint may be helpful for drawing attention to the global effects of individual behaviour and for highlighting that our choices can collectively make a real difference. But can we be morally obligated to make a contribution to resolving a collective action problem when our individual contributions by themselves make no discernible difference? I will focus on two lines of argument in favour of such obligations: whether a failure to reduce one’s antimicrobial footprint is unfair and whether it constitutes wrongdoing because it is harmful. I conclude by suggesting that the argument from collective harm is ultimately more successful.

The Effect of Incentives: Diffusion of Responsibility

2021 ◽  
pp. 166-182
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan ◽  
William English ◽  
John Hasnas ◽  
Peter Jaworski
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
P Diffusion ◽  
Perverse Incentives ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Diffusion Of Responsibility

Diffusion of responsibility refers to the problem that when something is everyone’s job, it in effect ends up being nobody’s job. This explains why many collective problems arise. People face perverse incentives to free ride on others’ actions and not to do their part. As a result, agents often think in short-term rather than long-term ways. Problems such as climate change can be modeled as instances of the tragedy of the commons, one form of a collective action problem that arises due to perverse incentives created by the diffusion of responsibility.

scholarly journals Return to the Isle of Ted: Simulating the Collective Action Problem of Climate Change

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-555
Author(s):  
Jocelyn Sage Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Active Learning ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Global Inequality ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Unequal Distribution ◽  
Road Map ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
The Commons

ABSTRACTThis article modifies the classic “Isle of Ted” simulation to teach students about the collective action problems associated with climate change. Modifications include the introduction of a common-pool resource (i.e., fish) and increased pirate attacks to model rising climate threats and unequal distribution of risk. A return to the Isle of Ted enables a deeper engagement with specific collective action problems of climate change, including the tragedy of the commons and issues of global inequality. This article provides a road map for the incorporation of this modified simulation into active-learning classrooms.

scholarly journals Climate Change and "historical responsibilities"

2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Goldemberg ◽  
Patricia Maria Guardabassi
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Greenhouse Gases ◽  
Greenhouse Gas Emissions ◽  
Greenhouse Gas ◽  
Co2 Emissions ◽  
Relative Contribution ◽  
Historical Responsibility ◽  
Copenhagen Accord ◽  
Reduce Emissions ◽  
Climate Convention

The historical responsibility of countries listed in the Annex I of the Convention on Climate Change has been used extensively as a justification for the lack of action of countries not included in Annex I to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. We analyzed the contribution of non-Annex I countries to the CO2 emissions in the period 1850 - 2006 to assess their relative contribution to total CO2 emissions. In the period 1980 - 2006 non-Annex I countries represented 44% of the total but this contribution increased in the period 1990 - 2006 to 48%. If we extrapolate present trends to 2020 they will represent 56% in the period 1990 - 2020. The "historical responsibility" of Annex I countries is therefore decreasing. If we take 1990 as the starting year in which the Climate Convention recognized clearly that greenhouse gases are interfering dangerously with the climate system, it becomes very difficult to attribute "blame" and "guilt" to Annex I for their historical contributions. It becomes also quite clear the need of non-Annex I countries to engage with Annex I countries in the effort to reduce emissions. The Copenhagen Accord has no mention of "historical responsibilities".

Climate Change, Individual Obligations and the Virtue of Justice

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 326-340
Author(s):  
Ryan Darr
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Greenhouse Gas ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Institutional Failure ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Current Context ◽  
The Common ◽  
Reduce Emissions

Over the last decade, a number of climate ethicists have turned their attention to the question of individual moral obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Important problems face their efforts, especially what is called the problem of inconsequentialism. The problems, I argue, arise largely from the failure to treat individual obligations as a matter of justice, a failure that stems from the common modern assumption that justice primarily concerns social institutions. I develop an alternative approach by appealing to the account of justice as a virtue in Thomas Aquinas. This approach allows us to talk about individual obligations to reduce emissions as obligations of justice, even in the current context of institutional failure. At the same time, I argue that approaching climate change in Thomistic terms requires an important modification of Aquinas’s understanding of justice.

scholarly journals Is there a convincing case for climate veganism?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teea Kortetmäki ◽  
Markku Oksanen
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Greenhouse Gas Emissions ◽  
Greenhouse Gas ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Food Ethics ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Interesting Issue ◽  
Convincing Case ◽  
Dietary Choices ◽  
Nonhuman Animals

AbstractClimate change compels us to rethink the ethics of our dietary choices and has become an interesting issue for ethicists concerned about diets, including animal ethicists. The defenders of veganism have found that climate change provides a new reason to support their cause because many animal-based foods have high greenhouse gas emissions. The new style of argumentation, the ‘climatic argument(s) for veganism’, may benefit animals by persuading even those who are not concerned about animals themselves but worry about climate change. The arguments about the high emissions of animal-based food, and a resulting moral obligation to abstain from eating such products, are an addition to the prior forms of argument for principled veganism grounded on the moral standing of, and concern for, nonhuman animals. In this paper, we examine whether the climatic argument for veganism is convincing. We propose a formulation for the amended version of the argument and discuss its implications and differences compared to the moral obligations of principled veganism. We also reflect upon the implications of our findings on agricultural and food ethics more generally.

scholarly journals Research of a Biomass Boiler with Stirling Engine Microgeneration Unit

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 587-599
Author(s):  
Jānis Kramens ◽  
Edgars Vīgants ◽  
Ivars Liepiņš ◽  
Linards Vērnieks ◽  
Viktorija Terjanika
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Greenhouse Gas ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Renewable Energy Sources ◽  
Ghg Emissions ◽  
Electrical Energy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Reduce Emissions ◽  
Electrical Energy Production

Abstract A number of intergovernmental agreements, the most important of which are the Paris Agreement (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) and the European Green Deal, provide for resource efficiency and the reduction of greenhouse gas and particulate matter (PM2.5, PM10) emissions to 2030 (short-term program to reduce emissions by at least 55 %) and to achieve emissions-neutral production, transport and household activities by 2050. The European Union (EU) has taken the lead in developing and implementing climate change mitigation policies for both industrial and private residential homes in the world through a green course. As an EU country, Latvia has joined both the EU-level climate policy and developed its policy, regulatory documents and action plans for 2021–2030 (Latvia’s National Energy and Climate Plan for 2021–2030), climate policy, including a policy aimed at significantly reducing GHG emissions and increasing efficiency in the household sector. Achieving these climate policy goals requires both a change in human habits and more efficient technologies. This article discusses one of the technological solutions that can reduce both greenhouse gas emissions and the release of PM2.5 and PM10 from individual heating systems in private homes and small commercial facilities. Calculations of electrical energy production in mCHP mode of the system for household self-consumption based on experiments will be done. The technology involves the production of heat from biomass or other types of renewable energy sources while generating electricity for self-consumption. Conclusions of CHP mode on overall efficiency will be done.

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