Love and (Polygamous) Marriage?

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily M. Crookston

Opponents of same-sex marriage suggest that legalizing same-sex marriage will start a slide down a “slippery-slope” leading to the legalization of all kinds of salacious family arrangements including polygamy. In this paper, I argue that because previous attempts by liberal political theorists to combat such slippery-slope arguments have been unsuccessful, there are two options left open to political liberals. Either one could embrace polygamy as a logically consistent implication of extending civil liberties to same-sex couples or one could find a new strategy for blocking the slide down the slope. I take the second option arguing that we ought to devise a harm principle for domestic partnerships. Once this principle has been established, it becomes clear that the risk of exploitation for those potentially occupying the multiple side of the marriage is sufficient reason to reject polygamous marriage arrangements. I conclude that, contrary to appearances, holding both (a) same-sex marriage is permissible and (b) polygamous marriage is impermissible is at the same time consistent and consistently liberal.

Author(s):  
Nancy J. Knauer

This chapter examines the implications of the landmark US Supreme Court decision Obergefell v. Hodges for same-sex marriage, divorce, and parental rights. Heralded as one of the most significant civil rights victories in recent memory, Obergefell had an immediate impact on the lives of same-sex couples by providing uniform and nationwide access to both marriage and divorce. It ended a confusing patchwork of state laws, some of which recognized same-sex marriage and some of which prohibited not only same-sex marriage but also domestic partnerships and civil unions. Obergefell also ensured that all same-sex married couples would be eligible for federal benefits regardless of where they lived. The longer-term effects and applications of Obergefell remain unclear, especially with respect to parental rights. In addition, Obergefell has ignited a backlash of religious exemptions law and concern remains that marriage equality may further marginalize nontraditional families and those who choose not to marry.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgina Turner ◽  
Sara Mills ◽  
Isabelle van der Bom ◽  
Laura Coffey-Glover ◽  
Laura L Paterson ◽  
...  

In this article, we take a queer linguistics approach to the analysis of data from British newspaper articles that discuss the introduction of same-sex marriage. Drawing on methods from critical discourse analysis (CDA) and corpus linguistics, we focus on the construction of agency in relation to the government extending marriage to same-sex couples, and those resisting this. We show that opponents to same-sex marriage are represented and represent themselves as victims whose moral values, traditions and civil liberties are being threatened by the state. Specifically, we argue that victimhood is invoked in a way that both enables and permits discourses of implicit homophobia.


2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
Roderick T. Chen ◽  
Alexandra K. Glazier

As more same-sex couples enter into civil unions and domestic partnerships, the courts and other institutions are beginning to consider the implications of these partnerships in several areas of the law. A Georgia appeals court, for example, recently published the first opinion addressing this issue, ruling that a civil union of two women, obtained in Vermont, was not equivalent to a marriage for the purposes of interpreting a child custody agreement entered into in Georgia. As many observers predicted, the enactment of legislation recognizing same-sex partnerships has profound implications on the practice of family law, trust and estate law and healthcare law.This Article focuses on an area of healthcare law in which the legal status of a civil union or domestic partnership could have significant consequences—organ donations. In particular, it explores whether a civil union or domestic partner is an appropriate party to consent to an organ donation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 75-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle L. Dion ◽  
Jordi Díez

AbstractLatin America has been at the forefront of the expansion of rights for same-sex couples. Proponents of same-sex marriage frame the issue as related to human rights and democratic deepening; opponents emphasize morality tied to religious values. Elite framing shapes public opinion when frames resonate with individuals’ values and the frame source is deemed credible. Using surveys in 18 Latin American countries in 2010 and 2012, this article demonstrates that democratic values are associated with support for same-sex marriage while religiosity reduces support, particularly among strong democrats. The tension between democratic and religious values is particularly salient for women, people who live outside the capital city, and people who came of age during or before democratization.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 779-800
Author(s):  
Shawna M. Young

Currently, same-sex couples that are legally married in a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex marriage may not be able to divorce if they move to Texas. Of the few cases tried in Texas, most courts refused to grant the samesex divorce because the courts refused to recognize the underlying marriage. Because these couples cannot simply return to the granting state due to most states’ divorce residency requirements, they cannot divorce and face untold issues due to this inability. While Texas does offer the opportunity for the couple to declare the marriage void, declaring the marriage void is not an adequate legal remedy and may not prevent property and other legal issues. Instead, Texas should analyze divorce as implicating rights separate from those implicated by marriage. Based on such analysis, Texas should grant same-sex divorces. While several authors have addressed this issue from a national standpoint, this Comment addresses the issue as it stands in Texas, where a jurisdictional split between the courts of appeals makes it ripe for discussion.


2009 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Puja Kapai

AbstractHong Kong recently amended its Domestic Violence Ordinance (“DVO”). During the deliberations, the issue of whether protection under the DVO ought to be extended to same-sex couples arose for discussion and has since been the subject of extensive debate. Religious and conservative groups have argued that including these groups within the DVO risks overhauling the traditional meaning of “family” and could implicitly legitimize same-sex marriage whilst others have insisted that failing to provide equivalent civil remedies under the DVO to such groups amounts to sexual orientation discrimination and is contrary to Hong Kong's international human rights commitments. This paper reviews the various arguments that have been raised against the inclusion of same-sex couples within the DVO and argues that Hong Kong's international and constitutional commitments to the principles of equality and non-discrimination require that samesex couples be brought within the purview of this legislation.


Author(s):  
Stephen Macedo

This chapter examines the many “legal incidents” of marriage: the specific benefits, responsibilities, obligations, and protections that are associated with marriage by law. While critics focus on the special privileges or benefits that spouses acquire in marriage, those are balanced by special obligations. The chapter suggests that the whole package seems reasonably appropriate for both opposite-sex and same-sex couples. It also considers the ways in which marriage seems to promote the good of spouses, children, and society, along with the class divide that now characterizes marriage and parenting. It argues that this class divide, not same-sex marriage, is the great challenge for the future.


Author(s):  
Susan Gluck Mezey

Opposition to same-sex marriage in the United States is frequently based on the religious belief that marriage should be reserved for a man and a woman. With most of the attention focused on wedding vendors, the clash between religious liberty and marriage equality has largely manifested itself in efforts by business owners, such as photographers, florists, caterers, and bakers, to deny their services to same-sex couples celebrating their marriages. Citing state antidiscrimination laws, the couples demand the owners treat them as they do their other customers. Owners of public accommodations (privately owned business open to the public) who object to facilitating the weddings of same-sex couples do so typically by asserting their personal religious beliefs as defenses when charged with violating such laws; they argue that they would view their participation (albeit indirect) in wedding ceremonies as endorsing same-sex marriage. As the lawsuits against them began to proliferate, the business owners asked the courts to shield them from liability for violating the laws prohibiting discrimination because of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. They cited their First Amendment right to the free exercise of their religion and their right not to be compelled to speak, that is, to express a positive message about same-sex marriage. With conflicts between same-sex couples and owners of business establishments arising in a number of states, the focus of the nation’s attention was on a New Mexico photographer, a Washington State florist, and a Colorado baker, each of whom sought an exemption from their state’s antidiscrimination law to enable them to exercise their religious tenets against marriage equality. In these cases, the state human rights commissions and the state appellate courts ruled that the antidiscrimination laws outweighed the rights of the business owners to exercise their religious beliefs against marriage equality by refusing to play a role, no matter how limited, in a same-sex marriage ceremony. In June 2018, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, LTD. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the state’s antidiscrimination law that guaranteed equal treatment for same-sex couples in places of public accommodations but reversed the Commission’s ruling against the Colorado baker. In a narrow decision, the Court held that the Commission infringed on the baker’s First Amendment right to free exercise by uttering comments that, in the Court’s view, demonstrated hostility to his sincerely held religious beliefs. The ruling affirmed that society has a strong interest in protecting gay men and lesbians from harm as they engage in the marketplace as well as in respecting sincerely held religious beliefs.


2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2005
Author(s):  
Ronalda Murphy

The Reference re Same-Sex Marriage1 is not a major opinion on the rights of same-sex couples in Canada, but it is nonetheless an important and fascinating case. There are only a few lines that are about the “rights” of same-sex couples. Did the Supreme Court of Canada “duck” the issue? Was the Court carefully gauging how much or little political capital it had and making a political decision to say as little as possible on this topic? The Court certainly displayed strategic brilliance, but it did not do so in the name of avoiding the “political” hot topic of same-sex marriage. It is factually difficult to maintain the view that the Supreme Court of Canada is loath to enter into this political debate. It has been the lead social institution in Canada in terms of responding to the claims of gays and lesbians to equality in law,2 and it has never been shy of dealing with topics simply because they involve controversial political issues.3 Rather, the Court’s brilliance lies in its minimalist and almost weary tone. This approach had the effect of taking the wind out of the sails of those opposed to same-sex marriage: the same-sex advocates definitely win the constitutional race, but they do so because according to the Supreme Court, there is no provincial constitutional headwind that can stop them. In short, provinces can complain all they want about the federal position in favour of same-sex marriage, but the wedding will go on despite and over their objections to the ceremony.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Smith

Some scholars, faced with the apparent conflict between the Church of England's teaching on marriage and the idea of equal marriage embraced by the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, have focused on the implications of that Act for the constitutional relationship between Church, State and nation. More frequently, noting the position of the Church of England under that Act, academics have critiqued the legislation as an exercise in balancing competing human rights. This article by contrast, leaving behind a tendency to treat religion as a monolithic ‘other’, and leaving behind the neat binaries of rights-based analyses, interrogates the internal agonies of the Church of England as it has striven to negotiate an institutional response to the secular legalisation of same-sex marriage. It explores the struggles of the Church to do so in a manner which holds in balance a wide array of doctrinal positions and the demands of mission, pastoral care and the continued apostolic identity of the Church of England.


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