Promoting Empirical Knowledge in Habsburg Europe

Nuncius ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-118
Author(s):  
Luca Ciancio

Abstract Recent studies on the functions performed by natural and mathematical sciences in Renaissance courts have shown how closely and extensively the domains of medicine, astrology and politics interacted with each other. The dedicatory letters to Cardinal and Prince-Bishop Bernardo Cles printed in works of medicine, astronomy and natural philosophy by scholars like Marco Antonio Rozoni (1524), Sebastian Münster (1527), Luca Gaurico (1531) Pietro Antonio Mattioli (1533) and Ludovico Nogarola (1536) reveal how much attention Ferdinand I’s Supreme Chancellor, a prelate and politician of unquestioned authority and power, devoted to such influential domains of natural science. In particular, they suggest that Bernardo was not unfavorable to a view of natural knowledge inspired by the anti-astrological skepticism of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. What is more, his intellectual proximity to learned physicians working in the wake of Nicolò Leoniceno’s medical humanism lends credit to the image of a patron, and a ruler, who was oriented to rely preferably on natural knowledge grounded in repeatable sensorial experience.

Author(s):  
Peter Dear

Marin Mersenne represents a new seventeenth-century perspective on natural knowledge. This perspective elevated the classical mathematical sciences over natural philosophy as the appropriate models of what can be known, of how it can be known and of the cognitive status of that knowledge. His early publications had the apologetic aim not only of combating various forms of heresy, but also of opposing philosophical scepticism, which was widely regarded in Catholic France of the early seventeenth century as undermining the certainty of religious dogma. To that end, Mersenne stressed the certainty of demonstrations in sciences such as optics, astronomy and mechanics, all of which stood as ‘mathematical’ sciences in the classifications of the sciences stemming from Aristotle. Mersenne’s stress on the mathematical sciences contrasted them with natural philosophy in so far as the former concerned only the measurable external properties of things whereas the latter purported to discuss their inner natures, or essences. In accepting the considerable degree of uncertainty attending knowledge of essences, and juxtaposing it to the relative certainty of knowledge of appearances, Mersenne adopted a position (since called ‘mitigated scepticism’) that combated scepticism by lowering the stakes: in accepting that the essences of things cannot be known, he agreed with the sceptics; but in asserting that knowledge of appearances can, by contrast, be had with certainty, he rejected the apparent intellectual paralysis advocated by the sceptics. In furthering this programme, Mersenne embarked on a publication effort relating to the mathematical sciences, combined with a massive lifelong correspondence on largely philosophical as well as religious topics with a wide network of people throughout Europe.


1999 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 1125-1145 ◽  
Author(s):  
ADRIAN JOHNS

Historians of early modern science face a serious problem, in that there was no science in early modern society. There were, however, other enterprises in the early modern period devoted to the understanding and manipulation of the physical world. This review identifies important trends in historians' attempts to comprehend those enterprises. In particular, it identifies four leading currents. The first is the move to characterize these different enterprises themselves, and in particular to understand natural philosophy and the mathematical sciences as distinct practical endeavours. The second is the attention now being paid to the social identity of the investigator of nature. The third is the attempt to understand the history of science as a history of practical enterprises rather than propositions or theories. The fourth, finally, is the understanding of natural knowledge in terms of systems of trust, and in particular in terms of the credit vested in rival claimants. In a combination of these, the review suggests, lies a future for a discipline that has otherwise lost its subject.


Apeiron ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Woodcox

AbstractThis paper offers a novel interpretation of the nature and role of logical (logikôs) argumentation in Aristotle’s natural philosophy. In contrast to the standard domain interpretation, which makes logikôs argumentation the contrary of phusikôs, relying on principles drawn from outside the domain of natural science, I propose that the essential or defining feature of logikôs argumentation is the use of principles that are general relative to the question under investigation. My interpretation is developed and illustrated with a close textual analysis of Aristotle’s explanation of mule sterility in Generation of Animals II 8.


2020 ◽  
pp. 250-266
Author(s):  
Jonathan Scott

This chapter studies cultural invention in light of the North-Western European cultural movement called Enlightenment. Enlightenment refers, in the first place, to a description by European intellectuals of what they took to be an advanced present state of moral and natural knowledge by comparison to that of the ancients. With related self-confidence, in the heyday of their empires, some described their culture as possessed of a dynamic modernity to be distinguished from the ‘oriental' lethargy and backwardness existing elsewhere. Yet Enlightenment also originated as European self-criticism. One context for that was the comparative perspective acquired by discovery of non-European cultures. In this and in other ways the origin of Enlightenment, including its ‘conviction that progress had become unstoppable', lies in the period when Renaissance and Reformation combined with printing and natural philosophy to establish the culture of the European North-West.


1948 ◽  
Vol 5 (16) ◽  
pp. 778-789

Henry Crozier Plummer was born at Oxford on 24 October 1875. He was the eldest son of William Edward Plummer, who was then Senior Assistant at the Oxford University Observatory under the directorship of Pritchard and who was subsequently (1892) appointed Director of the Observatory of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board and Reader in Astronomy at the University of Liverpool. Plummer was educated at St Edmund’s School, Oxford, from whence he proceeded to Hertford College where he held a scholarship. He took first classes in Mathematical Moderations and Finals, and a second class in the Final Honours School of Natural Science (Physics). After a year as Assistant Lecturer in Mathematics at Owens College, Manchester, and another year as Assistant Demonstrator in the Clarendon Laboratory, he accepted, in 1901, the position of Second Assistant in the University Observatory under the directorship of H. H. Turner. The salary of this post was not attractive, but Plummer wished to devote his energies to astronomy, a subject to which he had already made contributions in the form of papers published in the Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society ; he had been elected a Fellow of that Society in 1899. His career as a professional astronomer lasted until 1921. During that period his published papers (most of which appeared in the Monthly Notices ) covered a wide field of topics and included several well-defined series which represented substantial contributions to natural knowledge. He always approached a problem critically and with careful attention to detail; thoroughness and solidity were the characteristics of his work.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Maxwell

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to spell out the urgent need to correct structural rationality defects in academia as it exists at present, so that it may become actively and effectively engaged in helping us solve the grave global problems that confront us. Design/methodology/approach The paper spells out an argument for the urgent need to bring about a revolution in academic inquiry so that the basic aim becomes social wisdom and not just specialized knowledge, problems of living being put at the heart of the academic enterprise. Findings Natural science needs to become more like natural philosophy; social science needs to become social methodology or social philosophy; and a basic task of academia needs to become public education about what our problems are and what we need to do about them. Almost every part and aspect of academia needs to change. Research limitations/implications The implication is the urgent need to bring about an intellectual/institutional revolution in academic inquiry, so that the aim becomes wisdom, and not just knowledge. Practical implications There are substantial practical implications for natural science, social inquiry and the humanities, education, social, economic and political life. Social implications There is a need for a new kind of academic inquiry rationally designed and devoted to helping us make social progress towards as good a world as possible. The social implications are profound. Originality/value In the author’s view, bringing about the academic revolution, from knowledge-inquiry to wisdom-inquiry, is the single most important thing needed for the long-term interests of humanity.


1800 ◽  
Vol 90 ◽  
pp. 255-283 ◽  

It is sometimes of great use in natural philosophy, to doubt of things that are commonly taken for granted; especially as the means of resolving any doubt, when once it is entertained, are often within our reach. We may therefore say, that any experiment which leads us to investigate the truth of what was before admitted upon trust, may become of great utility to natural knowledge. Thus, for instance, when we see the effect of the condensation of the sun's rays in the focus of a burning lens, it seems to be natural to suppose, that every one of the united rays contributes its proportional share to the intensity of the heat which is produced; and we should probably think it highly absurd, if it were asserted that many of them had but little concern in the combustion, or vitrification, which follows, when an object is put into that focus. It will therefore not be amiss to mention what gave rise to a surmise, that the power of heating and illuminating objects, might not be equally distributed among the variously coloured rays. In a variety of experiments I have occasionally made, relating to the method of viewing the sun, with large telescopes, to the best advantage, I used various combinations of differently-coloured darkening glasses. What appeared remarkable was, that when I used some of them, I felt a sensation of heat, though I had but little light; while others gave me much light, with scarce any sensation of heat. Now, as in these different combinations the sun's image was also differently coloured, it occurred to me, that the prismatic rays might have the power of heating bodies very unequally distributed among them; and, as I judged it right in this respect to entertain a doubt, it appeared equally proper to admit the same with regard to light. If certain colours should be more apt to occasion heat, others might, on the contrary, be more fit for vision, by possessing a superior illuminating power. At all events, it would be proper to recur to experiments for a decision.


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