‘No Ideas but in Things’: The Responsibility to Protect as Assemblage

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Jack Adam MacLennan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Current Literature ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Research Agenda ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Extant Literature ◽  
Productive Research ◽  
Tools And Techniques ◽  
Organization Intervention

Abstract This article establishes the need to engage with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as an assemblage in order to reckon with how material influences shape its politics. Through an analysis of the 2011 United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervention in Libya, the paper illustrates how particular tools and techniques influence R2P. The example shows how the original impetus of the intervention was mediated and translated by the particular collection of elements brought together to realise the intervention in Libya. Rather than argue this illustrates how R2P is defined by specific techniques, the article situates and then builds upon the extant literature by labelling R2P as an assemblage. In this way the article highlights how material influences and the importance of mediation are missed in the extant literature. Further, it concludes by arguing for a more productive research agenda that foregrounds empirical engagements with specific practices in order to develop the current literature.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-329 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
Ballistic Missile ◽  
The North ◽  
The Press ◽  
Ballistic Missiles ◽  
Medium Range

The Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its eleventh annual ministerial review at NATO headquarters in Paris from December 16 to 18, 1960. The main topic of discussion at the meeting was the announcement by United States Secretary of State Christian Herter of what he reportedly termed a new concept for the operation of medium-range ballistic missiles. The United States plan included: 1) a proposal that NATO discuss a multilateral system for the political control of the weapons; 2) an offer to place five ballistic missile submarines armed with 80 Polaris missiles under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), by the end of 1963; and 3) a suggestion that the other members of the alliance contribute approximately 100 more medium-range ballistic missiles by purchasing them in the United States. The press reported that Lord Home, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, welcomed the United States proposal and said that NATO should examine the possibility of a medium-range ballistic missile force under multilateral control, a suggestion in which M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, concurred. The West German Defense Minister, Franz Joseph Strauss, told the Ministers, the press announced, that concrete decisions on the United States proposal should be taken in the near future, and that plans for NATO control of the Polaris missile force should be pushed through by military and political authorities early in the spring of 1961. The Council of Ministers decided to pass on to its Permanent Comand other related materials, according to the press.

Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Bowie
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
The North ◽  
Nuclear Control ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Military

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-816
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
Peace Treaty ◽  
The North ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Foreign Ministers ◽  
Of Greece

On September 15, 1951 the seventh session of the North Atlantic Council met at Ottawa. At this meeting, members were represented by their foreign ministers, defense ministers, and economic or finance ministers. Press reports indicated that the “Big Three” (United Kingdom, France, United States) intended to press for: 1) creation of a unified European army to include German units of “division” strength; 2) addition of Greece and Turkey; 3) revision of the Italian peace treaty in order to release Italy from limitations on its armed forces; 4) negotiation of a settlement of the Italian-Yugoslav dispute over Trieste.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 656-657
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
The West ◽  
German Government ◽  
The North ◽  
The Press

Council It was reported in the press on July 20, 1956 that the west German government was preparing to bring its anxieties about United Kingdom and United States suggestions for a reduction in armed forces before the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council, but contrary to expectation, at the July 25 meeting of the Council no reference was made to the reduction of forces. The press did note on July 25 that the United States Secretary of State Dulles gave reassurances to the German ambassador that the United States contemplated no change from the existing number of troops at that time and was still in favor of a German contribution of twelve divisions to NATO. Press reports also noted that the west German government transmitted notes to the members of the Western European Union calling for a review of allied strategy and military planning in view of moves by the United States and United Kingdom to cut their armed forces.

scholarly journals Turkey’s dealing with the Syrian Kurds (Part I)

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-38
Author(s):  
Michael Gunter
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Mediterranean

This wide-ranging survey of the Kurds in Syria will evaluate the mid-term fall-out of the suddenly announced US withdrawal on October 7, 2019. It concludes that  1. The US dishonorably deserted its Syrian Kurdish ally, 2. Alienated future allies who would no longer trust it, 3. Allowed some of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) prisoners incarcerated by YPG guards to escape and potentially revive the genocidal jihadist organization, 4. Rewarded Turkish aggression, 5. Handed the murderous, but badly taxed Assad regime new life, 6. Facilitated Iran’s drive to the Mediterranean and potential threat to Israel, and, maybe most of all, 7. Empowered Russia as the ultimate arbitrator of the Syrian imbroglio to the detriment of the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1953 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-168
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The North ◽  
The North Atlantic

The Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Paris, December 15–18, 1952, the first meeting of the Council on a ministerial level since the Lisbon meeting of February 1952. Ministers of foreign affairs, finance and defense of the fourteen NATO members took part in the meeting. Observers agreed that the principal fact conditioning the discussions and decisions of the ministers was the impending change of government in the United States.

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