scholarly journals Turkey’s dealing with the Syrian Kurds (Part I)

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-38
Author(s):  
Michael Gunter

This wide-ranging survey of the Kurds in Syria will evaluate the mid-term fall-out of the suddenly announced US withdrawal on October 7, 2019. It concludes that  1. The US dishonorably deserted its Syrian Kurdish ally, 2. Alienated future allies who would no longer trust it, 3. Allowed some of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) prisoners incarcerated by YPG guards to escape and potentially revive the genocidal jihadist organization, 4. Rewarded Turkish aggression, 5. Handed the murderous, but badly taxed Assad regime new life, 6. Facilitated Iran’s drive to the Mediterranean and potential threat to Israel, and, maybe most of all, 7. Empowered Russia as the ultimate arbitrator of the Syrian imbroglio to the detriment of the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-329 ◽  

The Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its eleventh annual ministerial review at NATO headquarters in Paris from December 16 to 18, 1960. The main topic of discussion at the meeting was the announcement by United States Secretary of State Christian Herter of what he reportedly termed a new concept for the operation of medium-range ballistic missiles. The United States plan included: 1) a proposal that NATO discuss a multilateral system for the political control of the weapons; 2) an offer to place five ballistic missile submarines armed with 80 Polaris missiles under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), by the end of 1963; and 3) a suggestion that the other members of the alliance contribute approximately 100 more medium-range ballistic missiles by purchasing them in the United States. The press reported that Lord Home, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, welcomed the United States proposal and said that NATO should examine the possibility of a medium-range ballistic missile force under multilateral control, a suggestion in which M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, concurred. The West German Defense Minister, Franz Joseph Strauss, told the Ministers, the press announced, that concrete decisions on the United States proposal should be taken in the near future, and that plans for NATO control of the Polaris missile force should be pushed through by military and political authorities early in the spring of 1961. The Council of Ministers decided to pass on to its Permanent Comand other related materials, according to the press.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Bowie

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe


Author(s):  
Kevin Zhou

Canada is known for its close relations with the United States in the domains of economic affairs, defence and international diplomacy. This arrangement, however, was a product of the great changes brought about by the Second World War. The combination of British decline, Ottawa’s desire to achieve full independence from London, and the looming Soviet threat during the Cold War created a political environment in which Canada had to become closely integrated with the United States both militarily and economically. Canada did so to ensure its survival in the international system. With the exception of a few controversial issues like US involvement in Vietnam (1955) and Iraq (2003) as well as Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), Ottawa has been Washington’s closest ally since 1945. On numerous occasions like the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and as recently as the War in Afghanistan and the War Against IS (Islamic State), Canada had provided staunch military and diplomatic support to Washington in its engagements around the globe. In an era of relative peace, stability, and certainty, particularly during the Post-Cold War period and the height of American power from 1991 to 2008, this geopolitical arrangement of continental integration had greatly benefited Canada. This era of benefits, however, is arguably drawing to a close. The Great Recession of 2007-09, the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the insistence on pursuing a foreign policy of global primacy despite its significant economic cost, are sending the US down an uncertain path. Due to its close relations and geographical proximity with the US, Canada now faces a hostile international environment that is filled with uncertainty as a result of superpower decline, great power rivalries, environmental degradation, and failed US interventions.


1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 656-657

Council It was reported in the press on July 20, 1956 that the west German government was preparing to bring its anxieties about United Kingdom and United States suggestions for a reduction in armed forces before the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council, but contrary to expectation, at the July 25 meeting of the Council no reference was made to the reduction of forces. The press did note on July 25 that the United States Secretary of State Dulles gave reassurances to the German ambassador that the United States contemplated no change from the existing number of troops at that time and was still in favor of a German contribution of twelve divisions to NATO. Press reports also noted that the west German government transmitted notes to the members of the Western European Union calling for a review of allied strategy and military planning in view of moves by the United States and United Kingdom to cut their armed forces.


Subject Assessment of the 'Khorasan Group' Significance The US-led coalition's airstrikes in Syria since 2014 have focused on the Islamic State group (ISG). However, they have also struck the 'Khorasan Group' -- a collection of veteran al-Qaida operatives that allegedly plots terrorist attacks abroad, and that operates on the edges of Syria's al-Qaida affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN). Beginning in late 2014, Washington warned repeatedly that the Khorasan Group was plotting attacks in Europe and the United States, and that it was recruiting holders of Western passports who would be able to enter and transit Western countries more easily. Impacts Al-Qaida outside Syria will likely pursue terrorist attacks that punish the West for its policies in the Muslim world. ISG will also carry out terrorist attacks in an effort to assert its leadership over the global jihadist movement. Without an imminent threat from the Khorasan Group, the West will have difficulty making a case for targeting JaN. JaN will retain a base of Syrian opposition support so long as it does not invite international retaliation by supporting an attack abroad.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanislav Mikhailovich Ivanov

The article analyzes the military operation of the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan, which lasted for 20 years, and the prospects for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from this country. The author states that the new US President D. Biden does not abandon the foreign policy course pursued by his predecessors earlier to reduce the US military presence in Afghanistan. Moreover, the new president reaffirmed his commitment to the peace agreement between the United States and the opposition Taliban, reached in the Qatari capital of Doha in February 2020, which provides for the withdrawal of US troops and their NATO allies from the country. However, the author comes to the conclusion that due to a number of objective and subjective factors, the timing of the final withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan may be postponed indefinitely, and even the deadline recently declared by the White House on September 11, 2021, may be far from final and may be repeatedly subjected to revisions. The main obstacle to the implementation of this important clause of the bilateral agreement is the lack of progress in negotiations between the Taliban representatives and the central government, as well as the lack of security guarantees for the withdrawn contingent of the US Armed Forces, NATO and the remaining staff of Western foreign missions in Afghanistan. Not only the radical Taliban wing, but also a number of current ministers in Kabul are trying to sabotage the conclusion of a second peace agreement and the subsequent integration of the Taliban into power. Without a lasting agreement between the Taliban and the central authorities in Kabul and the formation of a new coalition government, the likelihood of a resumption of civil war in the country will remain. New terrorist attacks and outbursts of violence on the part of the radical wing of the Taliban movement against the central government and foreign troops are not excluded. The penetration of Islamic State gangs into Afghanistan, which can undermine the stability of the military-political situation from within and provoke new armed conflicts, also carries certain risks. Much will also depend on the position of one of the main external players in Afghan affairs — Islamabad. Time will show whether Pakistan will be ready to take on part of the functions of a peaceful settlement within the Afghan conflict. The US administration would like more participation in stabilizing the further situation in Afghanistan from other regional forces (China, Russia, India, Iran, Turkey, Uzbekistan).


Author(s):  
Ahmad Shah Mohibi

On September 12, 2020, the Afghan peace talks begin between the Taliban and the Afghan government in Doha-Qatar to end the 19 years of war. This significant diplomatic effort was only possible when in February 29, 2020, the United States and the Taliban reached an “historic agreement” in the presence of the international community in Doha-Qatar committing all U.S. troops to lave Afghanistan in 14 months in return the Taliban will cut ties with al-Qaida and make peace. [1, p. 1.]It was set to pave the way for intra-Afghan dialogues—a much needed move toward peace. Afghanistan has been entrenched in a 40-year civil war that has consequently created the conditions for the country to be considered a base for terrorist operations, ravaged by war and conflict for centuries by empires and militia groups in the name of power, religion and ideologies. It has seen foreign invasions, civil wars and has been turned into a theatre of conflict where the power struggle between hostile foreign countries transpired. It became the heart of the Mujahideen, the Taliban and the al-Qaeda’s operational bases and subsequently the United States intervention after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and has remained engaged in its longest war as part of the ongoing “War on Terror” [2, p. 1]. While the US is pulling troops out and the Afghans are making peace, there is a potential threat, the rise of the Islamic State of Khorasan IS-K in Afghanistan. It is at this point that overall lessons gained from ground and first-hand experience can be applied to addressing the security issues that plague Afghanistan. Overall, there is a strong drive for peace amongst contemporary Afghans. They believe that negotiations and political settlement are in the nation’s best interests.


1953 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-168

The Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Paris, December 15–18, 1952, the first meeting of the Council on a ministerial level since the Lisbon meeting of February 1952. Ministers of foreign affairs, finance and defense of the fourteen NATO members took part in the meeting. Observers agreed that the principal fact conditioning the discussions and decisions of the ministers was the impending change of government in the United States.


Author(s):  
Timothy Andrews Sayle

In March 2003 US and coalition forces invaded Iraq. US forces withdrew in December 2008. Approximately 4,400 US troops were killed and 31,900 wounded during the initial invasion and the subsequent war. Estimates of Iraqi casualties vary widely, ranging from roughly 100,000 to more than half a million. The invasion was launched as part of the US strategic response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, and ended the rule of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. After the collapse of the regime, Iraq experienced significant violence as former regime loyalists launched insurgent attacks against US forces, and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a group linked to al-Qaeda, also attacked US forces and sought to precipitate sectarian civil war. Simultaneously with the increasing violence, Iraq held a series of elections that resulted in a new Constitution and an elected parliament and government. In 2007, the United States deployed more troops to Iraq to quell the insurgency and sectarian strife. The temporary increase in troops was known as “the Surge.” In November 2008, the US and Iraqi governments agreed that all US troops would withdraw from Iraq by December 2011. In 2014, AQI, now calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), attacked and captured large swaths of Iraq, including several large cities. That year, the United States and allied states launched new military operations in Iraq called Operation Inherent Resolve. The government of Iraq declared victory over ISIL in 2017.


Significance Turkey carried out its first airstrikes inside Syria on July 24, almost a year after the start of the US-led campaign against ISG. However, critics claim that Turkey is simply joining the anti-ISG operations as a pretext to prevent Kurdish militants in Syria from seizing new territory along the border. Ankara has said it plans to establish a security belt controlled by Syrian Arab rebel units in territory on the Syrian side of the Turkish border currently held by ISG. Impacts Expansion of the anti-ISG campaign to al-Bab and Manbij would see new refugee influxes into Turkey. Setbacks in Aleppo would reinforce ISG's drive to expand into Homs province. ISG will be tempted to carry out retaliatory attacks against the Turkish authorities and economy. Damascus will avoid direct military confrontation with Turkey and the United States in northern Syria. Syrian rebels, particularly the more moderate factions, will benefit from the weakening of ISG.


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