Myanmar

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 428-466
Author(s):  
Noel M. Morada
Keyword(s):  
Vulnerable Populations ◽  
International Community ◽  
Limited Effect ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Military Forces ◽  
Domestic Affairs

Abstract This article examines how atrocity prevention efforts have had a limited effect on the violence and atrocities being committed in Myanmar. Myanmar’s military forces, the Tatmadaw, remain free to commit atrocities against vulnerable populations in the country, particularly against the Rohingya minority in Rakhine state. These efforts have been stymied at both the international and regional levels, especially now that the Tatmadaw rule the country following a coup d’etat in February 2021. UN efforts have fallen short as the Tatmadaw refuse to cooperate with the international community due to a lack of trust in UN processes and a subsequent siege mentality over heightened international outrage over the treatment of both the Rohingyas and protesters against the coup. Prevention efforts through asean, of which Myanmar is a member, have also fallen short. This is due primarily to a lack of accountability for erring members, and a long-standing principle of non-interference in members’ domestic affairs. Currently, there are no incentives for the Tatmadaw to negotiate and stop the violence committed against their own people. Indeed, the failure of these prevention efforts and the increased notions of nationalism they foster may be used by the Tatmadaw to continue their current policies of isolation and maintain power.

The Issue of Implementation Enforcement: SADC's Power Mediation in Madagascar

Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Kotzé
Keyword(s):  
Transition Process ◽  
International Community ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Normative Values ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Implementation Phase ◽  
Sufficient Power ◽  
Role Players ◽  
International Responsibility ◽  
Domestic Affairs

This article argues that the international community is increasingly becoming involved in the domestic affairs of states and that this involvement can be described as part of international responsibility to promote peace and security. The role that an external party plays as a mediator in a transition or peace process is by definition a form of intervention. This article argues that this understanding of mediation should be broadened to include the responsibility to oversee the implementation (or enforcement) of the mediated agreement. The case of Madagascar (2009–2013) is used to investigate whether such enforcement is already accepted in practice and what some of the complications are. The article’s conclusions acknowledge that such a view of the mediator’s enforcement responsibility will be controversial, especially when mediation is used as a strategic instrument of power politics. In mediation, more attention is normally paid to its preparations and the negotiation process than to the implementation phase. Elections, as part of a transition process, create a critical tipping point for external enforcement, because after elections an external presence will be an unpopular idea for the national role players. Enforcement by actors who have sufficient power leverage is more viable than enforcement by mediators who have little power but a great deal of political or diplomatic authority (such as former presidents or senior diplomats). Implementation enforcement is more likely when it is motivated by interest-based considerations than by normative values. In conclusion, enforcement of agreement implementation is generally supported by the international community as a rhetorical exercise, but it is not yet embraced as a norm for international behaviour.

Epilogue

2021 ◽  
pp. 203-214
Author(s):  
António Tomás
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Cape Verde ◽  
Cape Verdean ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Military Forces ◽  
Colonial Empire

Having lost the war politically, with the independence of Guinea and the recognition of Guinean state by dozens of countries, Estado Novo was entering into a crisis of legitimacy. Members of the Portuguese military forces formed the Movement of Armed Forces, who lead the popular uprising against Marcelo Caetano on April 1974. The end of Estado Novo was not an automatic confirmation of the end of colonialism. But independence was inevitable. By the end of 1975, Portugal was no longer a colonial empire in Africa. Against Cabral’s desire, independence did bring the unity between Cope Verdeans and Guineans. Whereas Cape Verde was governed by an all- Cape Verdean government, Guinea had a few Cape Verdean in its government. The coup d’etat led by Nino Vieira against Cabral’s bother Luís Cabral has been considered the second death of Cabral.

Coup D'état in Burundi: Renewal of Ethnic Violence In Africa's Great Lakes Region

1996 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 45-48 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Great Lakes ◽  
International Community ◽  
Ethnic Violence ◽  
Great Lakes Region ◽  
Special Rapporteur ◽  
Coup D'etat

The Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Burundi has called on the international community to exert the greatest possible pressure on belligerents there to put an end to spiralling violence.

The Dangers of the Dissemination of Misinformation in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cherine Foty
Keyword(s):  
Regime Change ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Humanitarian Intervention ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
International Community ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Military Interventions ◽  
Initial Report ◽  
Initial Decision ◽  
Domestic Affairs

The creation of the responsibility to protect doctrine reformulated the historical notion of humanitarian intervention. The new doctrine was centered around the principle of nonintervention, a basic precept of the u.n. Charter system, with its initial report explicitly excluding regime change disguised as humanitarian intervention as external to the scope of the doctrine. Military intervention was only to be the means of last resort after the exhaustion of several preliminary mechanisms. In its implementation, the broad mandate of the responsibility to protect has been harshly criticized because it opens the possibility for powerful States, often seeking regime change, to interfere in the domestic affairs of weaker States. This article will first discuss (i) the chronology and evolution of the doctrine, (ii) situating it in the context of the u.n. Charter prohibition on the use of force and articulating its nonbinding nature. It will then examine (iii) the cases of Libya and Syria, focusing on the initial decision to intervene and how the dissemination of misinformation has served to promote military interventions where they would otherwise be considered illegitimate. The article will conclude with a brief discussion of (iv) how the international community can move beyond misapplication and seek to limit its abuse.

Rethinking Approaches to Prevention under the Responsibility to Protect

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Mayersen
Keyword(s):  
Vulnerable Populations ◽  
International Community ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Vulnerable Groups ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Ethnic Cleansing ◽  
Historical Case ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
External Actors ◽  
Yemenite Jews

Within the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle, there is an assumption that is rarely questioned. Beneath the statement that states and the international community are charged with the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, lies the implication that vulnerable populations cannot protect themselves. In periods of crisis, when the international community might consider mobilising a response under pillar three, this is often the case. Yet outside of such crises, when pillar one – the enduring responsibility of the state to protect its own populations – and pillar two – assistance from the international community to meet this responsibility – might be invoked in a preventive capacity, vulnerable populations may not be wholly reliant upon protection from external actors. In these circumstances, persecuted groups may actively seek to protect themselves, and may be successfully able to do so. In this paper, I challenge the current understanding of prevention within R2P as an externally imposed process, by considering how persecuted groups have themselves acted in ways that mitigate their vulnerability to mass atrocities. The paper considers a number of historical case studies in which targeted groups were able to leverage their own agency, often with assistance from others, to reduce this vulnerability. These include cases that culminated in genocide, namely the experiences of German and Austrian Jews under Nazi rule, and negative cases studies in which a demonstrable risk of mass atrocities was not realised, such as the experiences of Yemenite Jews in the first half of the twentieth century and those of the Bahá’í community in Iran since the 1979 Iranian revolution. These cases suggest that assisting persecuted populations to empower themselves can be an effective way to promote resilience to mass atrocities. In the final section of the paper, I explore why this approach is often overlooked, despite its capacity for some success. I consider the potential benefits and costs of a greater focus on utilising the agency of vulnerable groups in endeavours to prevent mass atrocities.

GENESIS AND COURSE OF TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT AND ATTEMPTS OF ITS RESOLUTION

2012 ◽  
Vol 165 (3) ◽  
pp. 121-138
Author(s):  
Michał LUBICZ-MISZEWSKI
Keyword(s):  
Russian Federation ◽  
International Community ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Military Forces ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Russian Military ◽  
The Military

The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic is a quasi-country not recognized by the international community. It constitutes de-jure a part of the Moldavian Republic. In 1992, as a result of a five month, victorious war with Moldavia, separatist Transnistria defended itself and in the following years strengthened its independence. After the end of the military part of the conflict, both countries maintained unfriendly relationships, and any political attempts to settle that conflict have so far been ineffective. It is mainly due to the Russian Federation supporting the separatist republic (the evidence of which is the presence of Russian military forces in Transnistria), the weakness of the Moldavian country and the interest of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic to maintain the status quo.

Coalitions of the Willing and the Shared Responsibility to Protect

2019 ◽  
pp. 61-87
Author(s):  
Toni Erskine
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Vulnerable Populations ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
International Community ◽  
Shared Responsibility ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Do So

There has been widespread support for the idea that the so-called ‘international community’ has a remedial moral responsibility to protect vulnerable populations from mass atrocities when their own governments fail to do so. Moreover, military intervention may, when necessary, be one means of discharging this proposed ‘responsibility to protect’ or, more colloquially, ‘R2P’. But, where exactly is this responsibility located? In other words, which body or bodies can be expected to discharge a duty to safeguard those who lack the protection of—or, indeed, come under threat from—their own government? In this chapter, I propose ‘coalitions of the willing’ as one (likely provocative) answer to this question, and explore how the informal nature of such associations should inform the judgements of moral responsibility that we make in relation to them. Perhaps most controversially, I suggest that, under certain circumstances, states and other entities each have a duty to contribute to establishing such an ad hoc association.

The 1964 Military Coup in Brazil

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Roberto Martins Filho
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Military Forces ◽  
The Government ◽  
Getulio Vargas ◽  
The Military

The coup that took place in Brazil on March 31, 1964 can be understood as a typical Cold War event. Supported by civilians, the action was carried out by the armed forces. Its origins hark back to the failed military revolt, headed by the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), in November of 1935, stirring up strong anticommunist sentiments. The Estado Novo coup, which occurred two years later, was supported by the army (war) and navy ministers. It marked the beginnings of the dictatorial phase of Getúlio Vargas, who had been in power since 1930. At the end of the Second World War, officers who had taken part in the struggle against Nazism in Italy returned to Brazil and overthrew the dictatorial Vargas regime, who nonetheless returned to power through the 1950 presidential elections. In 1954, under pressure from right-wing military forces, he committed suicide, thereby frustrating existing plans for another coup d’état. The Superior War School (ESG), created in 1949, had become both the birthplace of the ideology of National Security and stage where the French doctrine of guerre révolutionnaire was welcomed. During the 1950s, the military came to be divided into pro-American and nationalist factions. The alliance between the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and the centrist Social Democratic Party (PSD), which had elected Vargas earlier, now enabled Juscelino Kubitschek’s victory in the 1955 elections, disappointing the conservatives of the National Democratic Union (UDN) and its military allies. The latter were briefly encouraged when the 1960 presidential election put Jânio Quadros at the head of the executive. In August 1961, when Quadros resigned, his military ministers tried to use force to keep Vice-President João Goulart, Vargas’s political heir at the head of the PTB, from taking office. The coup was frustrated by the resistance of the governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Yet the Goulart administration was marked by instability, in the midst of intense social struggles and by a sharp economic crisis. The outcome of this drama began to take shape in March 1963, when the government took a leftwards turn. A massive demonstration in downtown Rio de Janeiro on March 13 served as an alert, and the March 25 sailors’ revolt as the match in the powder keg. On March 31, military forces carried out the infamous coup. The Goulart administration collapsed. Social movements were left waiting for orders to resist that never came.

War and Peace in the Strategy of the Communist Party of Greece, 1945–1949

2001 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thanasis D. Sfikas
Keyword(s):  
Great Britain ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Active Role ◽  
International Community ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Liberal Party ◽  
Armed Struggle ◽  
Domestic Affairs ◽  
Of Greece

Using archival sources that only recently have become available, this article fo-cuses on the interplay between the concepts of war and peace in the strategy of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) during the Greek Civil War of the late 1940s. The article demonstrates that the choices facing the KKE and its opponents changed quite dramatically in the period from 1945 to 1949. The active role of Great Britain in Greek domestic affairs and the relatively limited role of the Soviet nion meant that the KKE was increasingly ostracized in the international community. The unwillingness of the Greek Liberal Party to forge a political alliance with the KKE prompted the Communists to resume their armed struggle for power. This article presents the alternatives facing the KKE in light of the postwar domestic and international contexts.

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