Brexit and Britain’s Changing Constitution

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 400-417
Author(s):  
Rainer Grote

The Brexit saga which culminated in the sweeping victory of the Conservative Party in the parliamentary elections of December 2019 and the British withdrawal from the European Union the following months caused a major upheaval in the relationship between Britain’s main constitutional actors, especially between the government and the judiciary. In the course of the long-winded and acrimonious Brexit debate, the courts were repeatedly asked to intervene at critical junctures of the withdrawal process, first to secure a central role for Parliament in discussing and approving the terms of withdrawal and then to protect Parliament against attempts by the government to curtail and render ineffective this role through the questionable use of its prerogative powers. This development reached its climax with the UK Supreme Court’s judgment of 24 September 2019 on the unlawfulness of the prorogation of Parliament decided by the Queen on the advice of the Prime Minister in the run-up to Brexit, an unprecedented interference by the courts with the exercise of prerogative powers in the name of a functioning parliamentary democracy. While the reasoning of the Court does not appear entirely convincing, there can be no doubt that the ruling was crucial in upholding the central role of Parliament in the Brexit negotiations and, by implication, of the authority of the courts which had defined that role at the beginning of the negotiations. That the Supreme Court felt it necessary to take the unprecedented step of confronting the executive over the use of its prerogative powers in a highly polarized political debate also demonstrates the extent to which the political consensus which in former times had underpinned the functioning of Britain’s flexible constitutional democracy has broken down as a result of the Brexit debate, and the divisions it has engendered within Britain’s political class and in the public at large. This gives rise to the concern that the reforms announced by the Conservative government following its sweeping victory in the parliamentary elections of December 2019 will destroy any progress which had been made in the UK prior to the Brexit referendum towards a modern practice of parliamentary majority government based on incomplete but genuine checks and balances.

Author(s):  
E.V. Ananieva

The UK EU membership referendum (2016) brought a confused result not giving the Brexiteers or the Bremainers decisive preponderance. This led to sharp divisions in the society at large, and a prolonged political crisis in Britain. Bremainers as early as at the stage of the pre-referendum campaign accused Brexiteers of being under the influence of Russia, meddling on the part of Brexit. The Bremainers initiated a series of inquiries into Russian interference to discredit the Brexiteers, putting under question the results of the referendum and the mandate of the UK government to conduct negotiations with Brussels. This confrontation went through lines of interparty divisions, and its methods went beyond the traditions and unwritten rules of the United Kingdom's political culture. The vicissitudes of inter- and intra-party infighting around the Parliamentary Intelligence and Defence Committee's report “Russia” showed that the government feared the report would influence voters in the run-up to the 2019 early general election. The investigation found no evidence of Russian interference in the referendum, nor in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum or the 2017 and 2019 parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, the “Russia” report became the basis for mutual accusations of the parties in the 2019 election campaign. London's focus on the concept of "Global Britain" indicates that the United Kingdom, regardless of the outcome of negotiations with the EU, views Russia as a strategic adversary.


2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 586-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Birrell ◽  
Deirdre Heenan

Abstract This article assesses the implications of the 2017 Confidence and Supply Agreement between the Conservative Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in the context of the Barnett Formula and intergovernmental relations post the devolution settlement and the Good Friday Agreement. In light of the parties’ shared objectives to strengthen and enhance the UK, the Confidence and Supply Agreement, sets out how the DUP would support the minority Conservative government in specific areas, including finance Bills and matters pertaining to the exit from the European Union. This article examines the nature and operation of this Agreement and assesses the extent to which it may be seen to have breached established conventions, rules and principles around devolved funding and the principle of political impartiality enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement. It is argued that the Confidence and Supply Agreement has contributed to the perceived shortcomings of the Barnett Formula as a robust, fair, financial methodology. The distribution of money to the devolved administrations should be modernised and based on need, accountability and transparency. It is also concluded that being locked into a parliamentary deal undermines the UK Government’s ability to be impartial between the competing interests in Northern Ireland.


2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Kenny ◽  
J. Barnfield ◽  
L. Daly ◽  
A. Dunn ◽  
D. Passey ◽  
...  

AbstractWith the UK population ageing, deciding upon a satisfactory and sustainable system for the funding of people’s long-term care (LTC) needs has long been a topic of political debate. Phase 1 of the Care Act 2014 (“the Act”) brought in some of the reforms recommended by the Dilnot Commission in 2011. However, the Government announced during 2015 that Phase 2 of “the Act” such as the introduction of a £72,000 cap on Local Authority care costs and a change in the means testing thresholds1 would be deferred until 2020. In addition to this delay, the “freedom and choice” agenda for pensions has come into force. It is therefore timely that the potential market responses to help people pay for their care within the new pensions environment should be considered. In this paper, we analyse whether the proposed reforms meet the policy intention of protecting people from catastrophic care costs, whilst facilitating individual understanding of their potential care funding requirements. In particular, we review a number of financial products and ascertain the extent to which such products might help individuals to fund the LTC costs for which they would be responsible for meeting. We also produce case studies to demonstrate the complexities of the care funding system. Finally, we review the potential impact on incentives for individuals to save for care costs under the proposed new means testing thresholds and compare these with the current thresholds. We conclude that:∙Although it is still too early to understand exactly how individuals will respond to the pensions freedom and choice agenda, there are a number of financial products that might complement the new flexibilities and help people make provision for care costs.∙The new care funding system is complex making it difficult for people to understand their potential care costs.∙The current means testing system causes a disincentive to save. The new means testing thresholds provide a greater level of reward for savers than the existing thresholds and therefore may increase the level of saving for care; however, the new thresholds could still act as a barrier since disincentives still exist.


2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Ring ◽  
Roddy McKinnon

Across the European Union, national governments are re-assessing the institutional mechanisms through which pension provision is delivered. This articles sets the debate within the wider context of the ‘pillared’ structural analysis often adopted by international institutions when discussing pensions reform. It then sets out a detailed discussion of developments in the UK, arguing that the UK is moving towards a model of reform akin to that promoted by the World Bank – referred to here as ‘pillared-privatisation’. The themes of this model indicate more means-testing, greater private provision, and a shift of the burden of risk from the government to individuals. An assessment is then made of the implications of UK developments for other EU countries. It is suggested that while there are strong reasons to think that other countries will not travel as far down the road of ‘pillared-privatisation’ as the UK, this should not be taken as a ‘given’.


Animals ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (11) ◽  
pp. 213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven McCulloch

The British people voted to leave the European Union (EU) in a 2016 referendum. The United Kingdom (UK) has been a member of the EU since the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1993 and before that a member of the European Communities (EC) since 1973. EU animal health and welfare regulations and directives have had a major impact on UK animal protection policy. Similarly, the UK has had a substantial impact on EU animal protection. Brexit represents a substantial political upheaval for animal protection policy, with the potential to impact animal welfare in the UK, EU and internationally. Brexit’s impact on farmed animals will determine the overall impact of Brexit on animals. A major threat to animal welfare is from importing lower welfare products. A major opportunity is reform of UK agricultural policy to reward high welfare outside the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). A soft Brexit, in which the UK remains in the single market and/or customs union, mitigates the threat of importing lower welfare products. A harder Brexit means threats to animal welfare are more likely to materialise. Whether threats and opportunities do materialise will depend on political considerations including decisions of key political actors. The Conservative Government delivering Brexit has a problematic relationship with animal protection. Furthermore, Brexit represents a shift to the political right, which is not associated with progressive animal protection. There is significant political support in the Conservative Party for a hard Brexit. Further research is required to investigate whether the various threats and opportunities are likely to materialise.


Author(s):  
Anthony Salamone

As Scottish Conservative leader, Ruth Davidson was a prominent campaigner for a ‘Remain’ vote in the European Union referendum of June 2016. Following the 2017 general election, meanwhile, Davidson repositioned herself as someone who could – aided by 13 Scottish Tory MPs in the House of Commons – influence the Brexit negotiations and nudge the UK Conservative Party towards a ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ deal with the EU. This chapter considers the impact of Brexit on the Scottish Conservatives during the leadership of Ruth Davidson in four dimensions: Brexit’s distinct Scottish political context, its electoral consequences, the conduct of Brexit within the UK, and the Brexit negotiations themselves. It concludes with reflections on the future prospects for the Scottish party in light of all four dimensions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 332-346
Author(s):  
David Mangan*

2020 had been marked as a significant year for the UK with its departure from the European Union. The coronavirus pandemic quickly became the most important issue facing the Government under a third Prime Minister since the 2016 referendum. From the start, problems have dogged this Government in meeting the monumental challenges posed by Covid-19. The UK approached the work implications of this pandemic in some distinct ways, as compared to European Union Member States. This piece is longer than other country reports in this volume as a result of critically engaging with these differences.


1990 ◽  
Vol 131 ◽  
pp. 6-23

The probability has increased that the UK will become a full member of the EMS before the next general election. The issue is by no means settled, but full membership now seems the right assumption to make for the forecast. The precise timing is difficult to foresee: on the one hand the present economic situation in this country makes an immediate move difficult, on the other hand the Government might be loath to make the move in the run-up to the election. Fortunately the choice of the exact date is not very material to the forecast. We have assumed the fourth quarter of the year is the date of entry. A more important question concerns the terms on which the UK joins: whether sterling joins at the market exchange rate of the day and the width of the band within which it can fluctuate.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kees Groenendijk

AbstractSeveral States require immigrants from outside the EU to participate in language or integration courses after arrival. In recent years, some EU Member States made passing a language test (Netherlands and Germany) or participating in a language course (France) a condition for a visa for family reunification for immigrants from certain third countries. Denmark and the UK introduced a similar requirement in 2010. The focus of his article is on three aspects: the political debate, the legal constraints and the effects. Firstly, the development of the pre-departure integration strategies is analyzed. What was the rationale behind the introduction and does is vary between Member States? Secondly, the legal constraints of EU and international law are discussed. Finally, the results of the first studies evaluating this policy instrument are presented. Is pre-departure a good predictor for immigrant’s ability to integrate? Does it actually assist integration, and what are the unexpected or counterproductive effects?


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewan Sutherland

Purpose This paper aims to analyse the implication of the exit of the UK from the European Union (a.k.a. Brexit). Design/methodology/approach This paper analyses the options for the UK and the freedom this creates for the government to design its system of governance for the telecommunications and related economic sectors. Findings Brexit, other than the Norway Option or membership of the European Economic Area, allows the UK Government considerable freedom to reshape its system of governance for telecommunications. The strongest influence in such a redesign would be vested commercial interests, with the risk of subsequent underperformance and insufficient rigour. Research limitations/implications Events have moved relatively quickly, yet the outcome of the negotiations remains difficult to predict, beyond broad scenarios. Social implications There will be a need for greater involvement of consumers and business users in the process of recasting the regulatory governance system if it is not to be for the benefit of vested interests. Originality/value This is the first substantive analysis of Brexit for the telecommunications sector.


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