The un Secretary-General and the Forgotten Third r2p Responsibility

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 343-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Srinjoy Bose ◽  
Ramesh Thakur
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Political Leadership ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
First Century ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Leadership Roles ◽  
Critical Importance ◽  
International Policy ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
Integral Component

The responsibility to rebuild needs to be re-elevated to prominence as an integral component of r2p: conceptually, normatively and operationally; and its institutional homes in the un system and the Secretary-General’s role clarified. The 2009 three pillar formulation of r2p works well in most contexts, but is problematic in that it buries and loses sight of the critical importance of the original iciss third ‘responsibility to rebuild’ and reconstruct war-raved societies to the point of being viable and self-sustaining once again. We derive some key lessons from the major international interventions of the twenty-first century and recall the context in which r2p was originally formulated in order to highlight the distinctive features of its contribution to international policy. We then describe three dimensions of the responsibility to rebuild – recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation – and the strategies and steps needed for the rebuilding agenda. Recalling that Security Council authorisation of r2p coercive operations is a nonnegotiable prerequisite, we suggest that the responsibility to rebuild can be reintroduced and implemented through the administrative and political leadership roles of the Secretary-General.

scholarly journals Peacebuilding and the Responsibility to Rebuild

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Ramesh Thakur
Keyword(s):  
Political Leadership ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
First Century ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Leadership Roles ◽  
World Summit ◽  
Critical Importance ◽  
International Policy ◽  
Distinctive Features

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, encompassing the three symbiotically linked responsibilities to prevent, respond and rebuild, was unanimously adopted at the United Nations World Summit in 2005. The responsibility to rebuild needs to be re-elevated to prominence as an integral component of R2P: conceptually, normatively and operationally; and its institutional homes in the UN system and the Secretary-General’s role clarified. The 2009 three pillar formulation of R2P works well in most contexts, but is problematic in that it buries and loses sight of the critical importance of the original ICISS third ‘responsibility to rebuild’ and reconstruct war-raved societies to the point of being viable and self-sustaining once again. Because R2P was adopted at a world summit, I begin by highlighting the distinctive attributes of summit diplomacy. Next, I derive some key lessons from the major international interventions of the twenty-first century and recall the context in which R2P was originally formulated in order to highlight the distinctive features of its contribution to international policy. I then describe three dimensions of the responsibility to rebuild – recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation – and the strategies and steps needed for the rebuilding agenda. Recalling that Security Council authorization of R2P coercive operations is a non-negotiable prerequisite, I suggest that the responsibility to rebuild can be reintroduced and implemented through the administrative and political leadership roles of the Secretary-General.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992–1996

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adekeye Adebajo
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
Tight Control ◽  
Double Standards ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
The Us ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Peacekeeping Missions

Egyptian scholar-diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s relationship with the UN Security Council was a difficult one, resulting eventually in him earning the unenviable record of being the only Secretary-General to have been denied a second term in office. Boutros-Ghali bluntly condemned the double standards of the powerful Western members of the Council—the Permanent Three (P3) of the US, Britain, and France—in selectively authorizing UN interventions in “rich men’s wars” in Europe while ignoring Africa’s “orphan conflicts.” The Council’s powerful members ignored many of his ambitious ideas, preferring instead to retain tight control of decision-making on UN peacekeeping missions. Boutros-Ghali worked with the Security Council to establish peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia.

Trygve Lie, 1946–1953

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellen Jenny Ravndal
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Security Council ◽  
The United States ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Political Role ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Political Negotiation

This chapter explores all aspects of Trygve Lie’s interaction with the Security Council, beginning with his appointment process and the negotiation of the relative domains of the Council and the Secretary-General. This was a time when the working methods of the UN system were rapidly evolving through political negotiation and responses to external crises. It examines Lie’s personality and character, how he viewed his own responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security as crises arose, the legal and political tools he developed and exercised, and his changing relationship with individual permanent members and the six elected members. In the emerging Cold War, Lie’s position in the Security Council would be determined in particular by his relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union. Taking initiative in response to external crises in Iran, Palestine, Berlin, and Korea, Lie succeeded in laying foundations for an expanded political role for the Secretary-General.

The UN Secretary-General and the Security Council

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
United Nations Security Council ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
Organizational Relationships ◽  
Dynamic Relationship ◽  
International Mediation ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Relationship

The United Nations Secretary-General and the United Nations Security Council spend significant amounts of time on their relationship with each other. They rely on each other for such important activities as peacekeeping, international mediation, and the formulation and application of normative standards in defense of international peace and security—in other words, the executive aspects of the UN’s work. The edited book The UN Secretary-General and the Security Council: A Dynamic Relationship aims to fill an important lacuna in the scholarship on the UN system. Although there exists an impressive body of literature on the development and significance of the Secretariat and the Security Council as separate organs, an important gap remains in our understanding of the interactions between them. Bringing together some of the most prominent authorities on the subject, this volume is the first book-length treatment of this topic. It studies the UN from an innovative angle, creating new insights on the (autonomous) policy-making of international organizations and adding to our understanding of the dynamics of intra-organizational relationships. Within the book, the contributors examine how each Secretary-General interacted with the Security Council, touching upon such issues as the role of personality, the formal and informal infrastructure of the relationship, the selection and appointment processes, as well as the Secretary-General’s threefold role as a crisis manager, administrative manager, and manager of ideas.

General Assembly

1960 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 563-575
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Special Session ◽  
New Members ◽  
The Soviet Union

The fourth emergency special session of the General Assembly, summoned by the Secretary-General in accordance with a resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 906th meeting on September 16, 1960, was held from September 17 through 19, 1960. During consideration of the provisional agenda, Mr. Wadsworth (United States) suggested that the admission of new members, scheduled for the regular fifteenth session of the General Assembly, be added to the agenda of the emergency session as item No. 1. After objections to this addition were voiced by the Soviet Union, several African states, and others, on the ground that the necessary documents were not yet in the hands of the Assembly, a proposal by the representative of Guinea for postponement of the matter was adopted by 43 votes to none, with 26 abstentions.

2. Memorandum on the Legal Aspects of the Problem of Representation in the United Nations, Transmitted to the President of the Security Council by the Secretary-General (Lie), March 8, 1950.

1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 356-360
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Aspects ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
Member States ◽  
Practical Standpoint ◽  
The United Nations

The primary difficulty in the current question of the representation of Member States in die United Nations is that this question of representation has been linked up with the question of recognition by Member Governments.It will be shown here that this linkage is unfortunate from the practical standpoint, and wrong from the standpoint of legal theory.

Ghana, The Congo, and The United Nations

1969 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jitendra Mohan
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
Second Phase ◽  
Military Assistance ◽  
American Military ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Belgian Congo

The recurrent crisis in the (ex-Belgian) Congo, which first exploded soon after the country's independence on 30 June 1960, was the main event in the history both of the United Nations (U.N.) and of Africa during the 1960s. Its first phase (with which this paper largely deals) opened with the mutiny of the Force publique on 5 July, the intervention of Belgian troops on 10 July, and the proclamation of Katanga's independence on 11 July; it came to an end with the suppression of Katanga's secession, tentatively in December 1961 and conclusively in January 1963. The Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (O.N.U.C.) was authorised by the Security Council on 14 July, on the independent initiative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, and in response to the Congo Government's appeals to the U.N. for technical and military assistance. The operation was the biggest and costliest by far in the life of the U.N.; 1 and its course was marked by political as well as financial ruin, from which the U.N. has never quite recovered. Evidence for this was furnished early. By the time the operation formally came to an end on 30 June 1964, the Congo was already in the thick of the second phase of the crisis; this phase, which began with the outbreak of rebellion in Kwilu in January 1964, was brought to an end of sorts by the Belgian-American military intervention in Stanleyville in November 1964, which produced few signs of activity by the U.N.

Secretariat

1964 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-131 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Annual Report ◽  
Sudden Change ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Law And Order ◽  
Member States ◽  
Territorial Integrity ◽  
The Military

Secretary-General U Thant in his Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1962—15 June 1963 commented that the year under review had been marked by a number of developments which on the whole may be said to have brightened the international outlook and strengthened the UN as a result. According to the Secretary-General, the Cuban crisis provided the UN with the opportunity to help avert what appeared to be impending disaster. Proposals which he had been encouraged to make by a large number of Member States not directly involved in the crisis had the immediate effect of tending to ease the situation. In addition, the UN provided an opportunity, both through the Security Council and the Secretariat, for dialogues among the interested parties. The turn of the year also marked a sudden change for the better in the Congo. As a result the terms of the UN mandate in the Congo as far as the military force was concerned had now largely been fulfilled. External military interference in the Congo had ceased, the territorial integrity of the country had been secured, and law and order had generally been restored and were being maintained, although the situation in one or two areas still was giving some cause for concern.

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