Chapter 24: The ILA Use of Force Committee’s Final Report on the Definition of Armed Conflict in International Law (August 2010)*

What Is War? ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 319-367 ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 92 (879) ◽  
pp. 569-592 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Bothe ◽  
Carl Bruch ◽  
Jordan Diamond ◽  
David Jensen

AbstractThere are three key deficiencies in the existing body of international humanitarian law (IHL) relating to protection of the environment during armed conflict. First, the definition of impermissible environmental damage is both too restrictive and unclear; second, there are legal uncertainties regarding the protection of elements of the environment as civilian objects; and third, the application of the principle of proportionality where harm to the environment constitutes ‘collateral damage’ is also problematic. These gaps present specific opportunities for clarifying and developing the existing framework. One approach to addressing some of the inadequacies of IHL could be application of international environmental law during armed conflict. The detailed norms, standards, approaches, and mechanisms found in international environmental law might also help to clarify and extend basic principles of IHL to prevent, address, or assess liability for environmental damage incurred during armed conflict.


1980 ◽  
Vol 20 (219) ◽  
pp. 287-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ionel Gloşcă

One of the principles underlying international law applicable in armed conflicts is that no act of war is permitted against the civilian population, consisting, by definition, of persons who take no part in the hostilities.Until the holocaust of 1939–45, international law gave practically no real protection to the civilian population in the event of war, and was not even intended to do so since up to that time war was considered to be a State activity from which civilians remained aloof. There were, nonetheless, general principles and rules in various international treaties which, in one way or another, related also to the civilian population.


1989 ◽  
Vol 29 (270) ◽  
pp. 177-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kamen Sachariew

The ultimate purpose of dissemination of and compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) is to mitigate the effects of armed conflict and provide the best possible protection for its victims. At the same time, IHL fosters wider acceptance of the ideals of humanity and peace between peoples. The relationship between IHL, the struggle for peace and the prohibition of the use of force is becoming ever clearer as the realization grows that lasting peace, development and peaceful international co-operation can be achieved only on the basis of compliance with international law and respect for human life and dignity.


Author(s):  
Mathias Forteau

This chapter examines one of the most contentious issues in the jus ad bellum: whether and when international law permits a state to use force unilaterally to rescue its nationals abroad when their lives or security are threatened. It first considers the definition of the phrase ‘rescuing nationals abroad’ and the legal scope and legal nature of the justification based on the necessity of carrying out such an act. It analyses the opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the matter before assessing the current position of international law on the permissibility of rescuing nationals abroad. It also discusses whether the use of force to rescue nationals abroad can be invoked for humanitarian assistance purposes involving non-nationals. The chapter shows that the notion of ‘rescuing nationals abroad’ is ambiguous from a legal perspective and that the legality of using force to rescue nationals abroad has remained unclear since 1945.


Author(s):  
Marc Weller

This chapter examines the role of international law in preventing war and armed conflict. It begins by discussing three approaches to war and peace: the realist approach, the managerial approach, and the utopian visionary approach. It then considers some of the features of the United Nations system that were drawn from the League of Nations experience, including enforcement, dispute resolution, rule of law, prohibition of the use of force, and self-defence. The chapter also analyses how the UN Security Council deals with armed attacks undertaken by non-state actors, such as acts of terrorism. Finally, it outlines new challenges to the law on the use of force, particularly the new potential for armed conflict following the end of the Cold War, the issue of humanitarian intervention, and claims to enforcement of global community values.


Author(s):  
Ward Thomas

International law and armed conflict have a rather contentious history together. One the one hand, armed conflict implies and absence of law, and yet, on the other, international law plays an important role in codifying the use of force. The UN Charter’s restrictions on the use of force, drafted in the waning days of a second cataclysmic world war, were intended to radically transform the centuries-old ideology of raison d’état, which viewed war as a sovereign prerogative. More precisely, Article 2(4) of the Charter forbids not just war but force of any kind, or even the threat of it. On its face, the Charter system is a model of simplicity, consisting of a clear prohibition and two exceptions to that prohibition. The apparent simplicity is misleading, however. Article 2(4) is violated so often that experts disagree about whether it should even be considered good law. The Chapter VII enforcement exception is rarely used, and the meaning of self-defense under Article 51 is the subject of contentious disagreement. Moreover, even some UN bodies have supported creating another exception (humanitarian intervention) that coexists uneasily with the organization’s foundational principles. In addition, there is yet another exception (the use of force by national liberation movements) that may be as significant as the others, yet is little discussed by contemporary commentators.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Łukasz Kułaga

The Use of Drones in Combating International Terrorism from the Perspective of ‘ius ad bellum’Summary The increasing practice of using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (military UAVs, commonly known as drones) by some countries to eliminate suspected terrorists raises a number of controversies from the perspective of international law. These controversies are also related to the specific features of military UAVs, which make it possible to kill targeted individuals without risk to the military personnel of the country concerned, and thereby may encourage the abusive interpretation of the applicable legal regulations. This article discusses these issues from the perspective of ius ad bellum, in particular the right to self-defence. It shows the main controversial points on the scope of invoking the right to self-defence in such cases, in particular the possibility of invoking the right to self-defence in response to an attack by a non-state entity, the question of pre-emptive self-defence, the importance of the severity of the force used as a condition allowing for the use of force in self-defence, and the relevance of the principles of proportionality and necessity. The article also presents an outline of the vast and highly controversial issues associated with the definition of terrorism from the point of view of international law.


Author(s):  
Boothby William H

This relatively brief chapter introduces the book as a whole. It positions weapons law within the framework of international law in general, and of the law of armed conflict in particular, noting the important distinctions between international and non-international armed conflicts, and between the law on the resort to the use of force and that which regulates the conduct of hostilities. The logical flow of the book is presented, and certain terms that are vital to the ensuing discussion, namely weapons, means of warfare and methods of warfare are explained. The all-important distinction between weapons law and the legal rules that regulate targeting is noted. A concluding section addresses the recently-adopted Arms Trade Treaty.


2009 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 53-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Goodman

AbstractAccording to a bedrock principle of international law, the rules regulating the recourse to war and the rules regulating conduct during war must be kept conceptually and legally distinct. The purported independence of the two domains – the ‘separation principle’ – remains unstable despite its historic pedigree. This essay explores recent developments that threaten to erode the separation. The author analyzes, in particular, doctrinal innovations that result in the regulation of the recourse to war through alterations of jus in bello. International and national institutions have incentivized states to pursue particular paths to war by tailoring the rules that regulate conduct in armed conflict. Some warpaths are accordingly rewarded, and others are penalized. The article then explores potential consequences, first, on state behavior involving the use of force and, second, on state behavior involving the conduct of warfare. One significant conclusion is that these recent developments channel state behavior and justifications for using force toward security-based and strategic rationales. These efforts – whether intended or not – risk suppressing ‘desirable wars’ and inspiring ‘undesirable wars.’ These recent developments also undercut humanitarian protections by undermining the mechanisms for compliance with legal norms on the battlefield.


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