Danish Cartoons: Freedom Of Speech Versus Freedom Of Religion?

2022 ◽  
pp. 13-33
Author(s):  
Karla L. Drenner

The chapter examines potential issues posed by the wide variety of state public accommodation statutes in the context of sexual orientation and religious freedom. The historical approach to antidiscrimination will briefly be examined. A review of recent cases of discrimination due to the legalization of same-sex marriage are analyzed in the context of the arguments regarding freedom of speech and freedom of religion.


Author(s):  
Espinosa Manuel José Cepeda ◽  
Landau David

This chapter considers the Court’s jurisprudence on the freedom of speech and religion. The Court’s work on the freedom of speech examines familiar conflicts—such as between speech and public order, or speech and the privacy of reputation of others—but in an unfamiliar context where the Court has often had to contend with the implications of the country’s internal armed conflict. Thus, for example, the Court has had to weigh the damage that might be done by publishing the statements of illegal armed groups and the effect of statements linking public officials with those groups. The Court’s jurisprudence on freedom of religion had sought to recognize plurality in a climate where Catholicism has historically dominated public and private life. This chapter considers both the Court’s jurisprudence striking down core provisions of the Concordat treaty with Rome, and its recognition of the right of conscientious objection from military service.


1991 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olwyn M. Blouet

In 1833 slavery was abolished in the British West Indian colonies. A labour system that had been in operation for two hundred years, ended. A campaign based on the concept of freedom came to fruition. The idea of freedom was central to enlightenment thought. Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, freedom of movement, a free press, free trade and free labour were all part of enlightenment ideology. The institution of slavery, which limited all freedoms, came under pressure in an enlightened environment. Unlike the ancients who believed there could not be a civilized society without slaves, enlightenment philosophers developed the view that slavery was antithetical to civilization.


1948 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-52
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman

The Supreme Court's decisions dealing with civil liberties in the ten years under review fall into four groups: (1) cases involving the rights protected by the First Amendment—freedom of religion, speech, press, and assembly; (2) those concerned with racial discrimination; (3) cases enlarging the power of the federal government to protect civil rights against invasion by private persons; (4) war-time cases arising out of conflicts between civil liberty and military power. Decisions dealing with procedural due process and other rights of those accused of crime are discussed in another part of this symposium.I. FIRST AMENDMENT—FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH, PRESS, AND ASSEMBLYDuring the decade we are examining, the Supreme Court not only has decided a substantial number of cases involving freedom of speech, press, and religion, but it has developed a new and important judicial philosophy or doctrine with respect to them. In this judicial doctrine, three principles are fused. The first is that the four liberties protected by the First Amendment are so indispensable to the democratic process and to the preservation of the freedom of our people that they occupy a preferred place in our scheme of constitutional values.


KALAM ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Muh. Tasrif

This paper discusses human right and the law of In the Reform Era, the existence of the Republic of Indonesia Presidential Decree No. 1/1965 About Prevention against Blasphemy came into a public debate. Many observers and human rights activists saw that the law is not compatible with the principles of freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution of 1945 and human rights. On the contrary, many leaders of Islamic organizations saw that the Law is in accordance with respect for religious freedom. Based on this context, it is interesting to raise questions of how to understand blasphemy in Islam in the perspective of human rights and its implications upon the Law in Indonesia. To answer the questions, I attempt to explain the terms used in conceptualizing actions of blasphemy. The explanation is followed by looking at forms of action of the Prophet Muhammad against perpetrators of blasphemy and interpreting it with the perspective of human rights and its implications upon the law in Indonesia. In this article, it is argued that measures of ignorance, rejection, abuse, and insult against the religion of Islam did not cause the Prophet punish the actors. The Prophet punished the actors based on that the actions had prevented Muslims from practicing their religion.In the perspective of human rights, to express a particular interpretation of religion and to seek support for the interpretation become part of freedom of religion and belief and also part of freedom of speech. For this reason, to put forward an interpretation of any religion can not be punished.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-131
Author(s):  
Andrew Jason Cohen

Abstract Early in the history of liberalism, its most important proponents were concerned with freedom of religion. As polities and individuals now accept a dizzying array of religions, this has receded to the background for most theorists. It nonetheless remains a concern. Freedom of speech is a similar concern and very much in the foreground for theorists looking at the current state of academia. In this essay, I argue that inappropriate limits to freedom of religion and inappropriate limits to freedom of speech—especially in the form of de-platforming on college campuses—both have, as one of their effects, what I call harms of silence. This means we ought not have those limits, so should seek to change them where they exist.


2007 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-90
Author(s):  
Flemming Lundgreen-Nielsen

Grundtvig og censuren[Grundtvig and censorship]By Flemming Lundgreen-NielsenFor forty-six years of his life Grundtvig was engaged in a struggle for freedom of the press and freedom of speech. Over this period his attitude gradually changed. At the age of 21, he wanted not to abolish but to update the rigid and stem decree on the issue dating from 1799, his idea being that educated and scholarly orientated writers could serve as counsellors for the authorities instead of censors appointed by the police or by the Danish Chancellery (Ministry of the Interior).During a long middle period of his career as an author he time and again discussed and suggested models for setting up semi-official literary courts outside the normal court system, which could secure and improve the freedom of Danish writers and poets to no detriment of Danish society as such. In a lost libel suit in 1826 Grundtvig incurred life-long personal censorship which ran until 1837, when a revision of the relevant legal paragraph was realized. As a 67-year-old member of the first Danish democratic parliament, Grundtvig in 1850 advocated freedom of the press and of speech with as few limitations as possible. His winding way to this conclusion is followed through a series of his own texts with particular attention to two sources which have been overlooked by Grundtvig scholars, namely the censor suppressed third part of an essay on the freedom of religion (printed 1827, but not published until 1866) and a pamphlet issued in 1845 but never reprinted, opposing a proposed revision (1844) of the 1799 press ordinance. In the latter case, references to fragmentary manuscripts not included in Grundtvig’s final argumentation are added.


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