scholarly journals Analysis on the Environmental Governance Efficiency of Local Governments in China and Its Influencing Factors

Author(s):  
Qinyun He ◽  
Chuan Tian ◽  
Ke Gao
Author(s):  
Ruxin Wu ◽  
Piao Hu

Central environmental protection inspections have completed their goal of full coverage of 31 provinces in China, and more than 17,000 officials have been held accountable. The media has evaluated the effectiveness of central environmental protection inspections using the notions of “instant results” and the “miracle drug of environmental governance.” Can this approach effectively promote local environmental governance? This paper takes the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution as an example. Using the method of regression discontinuity, central environmental protection inspections are found to have a positive effect on the air quality index (AQI), but this effect is only short term and unsustainable. Additionally, there are inter-provincial differences. Judging from the research results on sub-contaminants, the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution is mainly reflected in PM10, PM2.5 and CO. Under the current situation in which PM10 and PM2.5 are the main assessment indexes, this phenomenon indicates that due to the political achievements and promotion of local officials and for reasons of accountability, it is more effective for the central government to conduct specific environmental assessments through local governments than to conduct central environmental protection inspections.


Author(s):  
Qi Chen ◽  
Huijuan Yu ◽  
Yezhi Wang

Under the guidance of modern environmental governance concepts, there have been profound changes in the subject, structure, and operational mechanism of the modern marine environmental governance in China. This paper first classifies the subjects of modern marine environmental governance in China, as well as their relationships; analyses the structural characteristics from the three levels of rights, society, and region; explores the operational mechanism; and builds the framework of the modern marine environmental governance system in China. Both the central and local governments act as the leaders of the modern marine environmental governance system in China, and there have been many new changes in their relationships. On the one hand, the interest and goals of the central and local governments have gradually converged under the pressure system. On the other hand, local governments follow the principles of comprehensive governance regarding the coastline and collaborative cooperation is gradually beginning to occur. Different governance subjects are interrelated and intertwined to form a complete modern marine environmental governance structure, which includes the following three levels: the governmental power structure; the social structure, which involves collaboration between multiple entities; and the regional structure, which involves land-sea coordination in environmental governance. These structures each play their parts in the overall process of the marine environmental governance’s institutional arrangements, process coordination, and feedback adjustments and ultimately constitute a dynamic and complete modern marine environmental governance operational system.


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 448
Author(s):  
Syamsul Syamsul ◽  
Irwan Taufiq Ritonga

This study developed a research Beekes and Brown (2006) who found that corporate governance makes companies more informative (more transparent). This study aims to prove whether the same results were also found in environmental governance in Indonesia. The theory is used to achieve the goal of this research is the theory of agency. This research was conducted in 32 local governments in Indonesia. Based on a simple regression model, this study shows that local governance affects positively the transparency of local financial management. Such findings reinforce previous research. The findings of this study provide a useful contribution to government officials (executive and legislative), in demonstrating the important role of local governance in encouraging the transparency of local financial management. In addition, the findings of this study can be used as the basis for further research related to the topic of local governance and transparency of local financial management.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (17) ◽  
pp. 9752
Author(s):  
Qiezeng Yuan

In response to severe environmental challenges, green innovation (GI) has been thoroughly considered by various governments. Although China has promulgated many environmental policies to promote environmental governance, regulatory capture and the lack of independent external supervisors lead to a challenging future. This study employs an evolutionary game method to explore how the policy burden and media affect decision-making between local governments and manufacturing enterprises. On this basis, the simulation method is used to examine critical factors that affect regulatory capture and GI. The results show that the policy burden is the main factor that causes regulatory capture. When the policy burden exceeds a certain threshold, it will cause regulatory capture and hinder GI. Moreover, media, as an external supervisor, can restrain regulatory capture and promote GI significantly. Specifically, when the capacity of media supervision is high enough, due to the positive role of the media, it will inhibit the negative effects of policy burdens. Finally, combined with the different development stages of China’s green industry, the corresponding policy recommendations are given. These results extend the research of regulatory capture and provide a reference for governments to promote environmental governance in practice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi ◽  
Huang ◽  
Chen ◽  
Xu ◽  
Liu

In the context of multilevel governance, collaboration among governmental and non-governmental entities across different levels of government is increasingly popular in China’s environmental governance. Policy actors are engaged in two types of collaboration with other local governments: horizontal and vertical collaboration. Policy actors participate in horizontal collaboration when they work with entities at the same level, and in vertical collaboration when working with governments at different levels. This study examines multilevel environmental governance in China by studying how the decisions of policy actors to participate in local water governance networks are influenced by vertical pressures from higher level government and horizontal influences from other policy actors at the same level. We approach the research questions in the empirical context of local water governance in Dongguan city of Guangdong Province. With survey data collected from 31 municipal departments, 32 town governments, nine water-related private businesses and five NGOs, we tested the hypotheses with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. The results indicate that vertical pressure and horizontal brokerage are both drivers for participation in the local water governance network.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yankun Zhou ◽  
Hongtao Shen

PurposeThis study aims to deem the new policy – talk for environmental protection – promoted in the second half of 2014 to be the exogenous event and adopts PSM and DID to verify whether and how the central government’s mechanism of supervision of environmental enforcement improves firm environmental performance and reveals the micro effect and working mechanism of the supervision of environmental enforcement.Design/methodology/approachThe researchers first select reasonable control groups for target districts by means of PSM, then apply DID to compare corporations in the treatment group with those in the control group for the change of environmental performance before and after the talk for environmental protection, so as to evaluate the micro-level effect of such talks on corporate environmental performance; after that, the research examines the working mechanism of such talks on corporate environmental performance; then, it goes a step further to find out the environmental impact of such talks on corporations of different natures of property right.FindingsIt is found from the research that the talk for environmental protection will effectively improve the environmental performance of corporations in the target districts, and the improvement of environmental performance in state-owned corporations in the target districts will be more evident. However, such improvements, to a certain extent, are achieved by reducing the output value, and corporations do not increase environmental investments from a long-term perspective.Research limitations/implicationsFirst, the targets of the talk for environmental protection are mainly principals of municipal governments, but the research expands the scope to the whole province due to the small sample at the municipal level. Despite evidences showing that such a pressure of supervision impacts the whole province, the results obtained based on the data at the municipal level will be accurate. Second, the research selects a relatively short research period. Third, due to the limited data on corporate environmental performance in China, the research selects only listed companies from key monitored and controlled firms by state.Practical implicationsFirst, for the central government, environmental policy making is not the end of its job; it shall also supervise local governments’ work at environmental governance and properly handle its relationship with local governments. Second, for the local governments, in the course of implementing environmental policies, they should not only strengthen law enforcement but keep the continuity of law enforcement to avoid moving law enforcement. Third, in the long run, corporations must start from the source of production to enhance environmental governance and make cleaner production, so as to keep boosting corporate competitiveness and their ability of fighting risks.Originality/valueFirst, the research innovatively provides empirical evidence about the effect of China’s supervision of environmental enforcement. Previous studies on this topic are mostly theoretical discussions only, while this research makes the talk for environmental protection the exogenous event about the supervision of law enforcement and achieves breakthroughs in empirical studies of administrative enforcement supervision. Second, the research pushes the studies on the implementation effect of environmental policies from a medium level to a micro level. Third, the research achieves some breakthroughs in the data for measuring corporate environmental performance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 4696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guo ◽  
Bai

As an essential stakeholder of environmental resources, the public has become the third force which assists in promoting environmental governance, together with local governments and polluting enterprises. In this paper, we construct a mediation model and a 2SLS (Two Stage Least Square) model to illustrate the role of public participation based on inter-provincial panel data of China from 2011 to 2015. The results indicate that the advantages of handling informational asymmetry and enhancing social supervision are the two logical starting points of involving public participation in environmental governance. As the public has no executive power, they can participate in environmental governance in an indirect way by lobbying local governments’ environmental enforcement of polluting enterprises. In addition, their deterrent of polluting enterprises can also generate effects similar to local governments’ environmental enforcement, and such a deterrent will help promote environmental governance directly. At the present time in China, the effects of public participation in environmental governance are mainly reflected in the form of back-end governance, while the effects of front-end governance are not remarkable enough. This research is of great significance in perfecting China’s environmental governance system by means of arousing and expanding the public’s rights to participate in environmental governance.


2000 ◽  
Vol 163 ◽  
pp. 677-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Wing Hung Lo ◽  
Sai Wing Leung

Researchers on China's environmental governance have usually maintained that the inferior bureaucratic status of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) (formerly the National Environmental Protection Agency) and its local agencies have accounted for the limited enforcement of environmental regulations in China. Environmental agencies at all levels have found it difficult to obtain active support and co-operation from other bureaucratic authorities in charge of economic development to take a tough stand on tackling environmental problems. Strong and influential government agencies such as planning commissions (jiwei), economic commissions (jingwei), construction commissions (jianwei), and industrial and commercial authorities are known to be reluctant to endorse and enforce stringent environmental measures for fear that they might slow down economic growth. With a strong pro-growth orientation, both central and local governments have usually sided with these economic bureaus and have subordinated environmental protection to economic interests when the two have been in conflict.


Subject Enforcing environmental regulations in China. Significance Getting China's severe environmental problems under control depends on forcing large industrial firms to abide by environmental rules. Despite efforts to improve environmental governance as part of a 'war on pollution', the state's own heavy industrial firms account for a large number of environmental violations. Impacts The handful of SOEs in heavy industry responsible for the vast majority of pollution incidents will face significant pressure. The government's legitimacy is increasingly tied to its ability to curb pollution. Environmental problems will strain central-local relations as local governments struggle to regulate firms that answer to Beijing.


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